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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MATHEW R. BEI\JI\JETT AND 
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Plaintiffs- Appellants, 
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) 
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) 
Supreme Court No. 38138-2010 
vs. 
NANCY PATRICK, \) () \ \)._ '('f\ 12_ 
---
Defendant-Respondent, 
_________ ) 
CLERK'S RECORD 
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock. 
Before HONORABLE David C. Nye District Judge. 
For Appellant: 
For Respondent: 
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dicial District Court - Bannock Count 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2008-0004528-PI Current Judge: David C Nye 
Mathew R. Bennett, etal. vs. Nancy Patrick 
User: OCANO 
Mathew R. Bennett, Benjamin Lloyd Walton vs. Nancy Patrick 
Date 
11/6/2008 
11/20/2008 
11/28/2008 
12/4/2008 
12/22/2008 
1/23/2009 
1/26/2009 
2/11/2009 
2/20/2009 
Code 
LOCT 
NCPI 
SMIS 
COMP 
ATTR 
ATTR 
NOAP 
ATTR 
ANSW 
NOTC 
HRSC 
NOTC 
lt\lHD 
ORDR 
HRSC 
HRSC 
NOTC 
User 
MARLEA 
MARLEA 
MARLEA 
MARLEA 
MARLEA 
CAMILLE 
AMYW 
CAMILLE 
MARLEA 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
AMYW 
OCANO 
OCANO 
OCANO 
CAMILLE 
Clerk's Vault 
New Case Filed-Personal Injury 
Judge 
David C Nye 
David C Nye 
Summons issued to : Nancy Patrick David C Nye 
Complaint Filed David C Nye 
Filing: A - Civil Complaint for more than $1,000.00 David C Nye 
Paid by: johnson olson Receipt number: 0041697 
Dated: 11/6/2008 Amount: $88.00 (Check) For: 
Plaintiff: Bennett, Mathew R. Attorney Retained L David C Nye 
Charles Johnson 
Plaintiff: Walton, Benjamin Lloyd Attorney David C Nye 
Retained L Charles Johnson 
Return of Service - srvd on Nancy Patrick o n David C Nye 
11-13-08 
Filing: 17 - All Other Cases Paid by: merrill and David C Nye 
merrill Receipt number: 0044418 Dated: 
11/28/2008 Amount: $58.00 (Check) For: Patrick, 
Nancy (defendant) 
Notice Of Appearance; aty Brendon Taylor for David C Nye 
Def. 
Defendant: Patrick, Nancy Attorney Retained David C Nye 
Brendon C Taylor 
Answer and Demand for Jury Trial; aty Brendon David C Nye 
Taylor for Def. 
Notice of service - Defs First set of lnterrog. and David C Nye 
Request for Production of Documents to Plntfs; 
aty Brendon Taylor for defs 
Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference 
01/26/2009 09:15 AM) 
David C Nye 
Notice of service - Plntfs First set of lnterrog Req David C Nye 
for Production of documents and Req for 
Admissions to Def : aty C/Johnson 
Hearing result for Scheduling Conference held on David C Nye 
01/26/2009 09:15 AM: Interim Hearing Held 
Order Setting Pre-Trial and Order Setting Jury 
Trial; s/J. Nye on 2-11-09. Cert. Mailed to 
Counsel on 2-11-09. s/A.Wegner on 2-11-09. 
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 
05/17/2010 11 :00 AM) 
Hearing Scheduled ( Jury Pretrial 06/02/2010 
09:00 AM) 
David C Nye 
David C Nye 
David C Nye 
I\Jotice of service - Defs Answers and responses David C Nye 
toPlntfs ; aty Brendon Taylor for def 
Date: 1/4/2011 
Time: 10:07 AM 
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Sixth udicial District Court - Bannock Count~ 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2008-0004528-PI Current Judge: David C Nye 
Mathew R. Bennett, etaf. vs. Nancy Patrick 
User: DCANO 
Mathew R. Bennett, Benjamin Lloyd Walton vs. Nancy Patrick 
Date 
2/25/2009 
4/13/2009 
4/14/2009 
4/27/2009 
5/4/2009 
5/6/2009 
5/11/2009 
6/19/2009 
9/22/2009 
11/19/2009 
Code 
NOTC 
User 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
Judge 
Notice of service - Plaintiff Bennetts Answers to David C Nye 
Defendants First set of lnterrog and Requests for 
Production of Documents to Plaintiffs and the 
original Plaintiff Waltons Answers to Defs First set 
of lnterrog and req for Production of documents 
to plntfs : aty Charles Johnson 
Motion for Summary Judgment; aty Charles 
Johnson 
Motion to compel; aty Charles Johnson 
Notice of hearing; on Motion to Compel on 
5-11-09@ 10am: a ty Charles Johnson 
David C Nye 
David C Nye 
David C Nye 
Notice of hearing; on Motion for Summary David C Nye 
Judgment, set for 5-11-09 @ 1 0am: aty Charles 
Johnson 
Defendants Response and Memorandum in David C Nye 
Opposition to Plntfs Matin for Summary 
Judgment; aty Brendon Taylor for def 
Affidavit of Nancy Patrick; aty Brendon Taylor David C Nye 
Affidavit of Brendon Taylor for def. David C Nye 
Notice of service - Defs First Supplemental David C Nye 
Answers and Responses to Plntfs first set of 
lnterrog. , req for Production and requests for 
Admission and this notice; aty Brendon Taylor 
for def 
Defs Response and Memorandum in Opposition David C Nye 
to Plntfs Motion to Compel; aty Brendon Taylor 
for def 
Affidavit of Jared A Steadman; aty Brendon 
Taylor for def 
David C Nye 
Response in Support of Plntfs Matin for Summary David C Nye 
Judgment; aty Cl Johnson for plntf 
Plaintiffs Reply to Defs Response and 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plntfs Matin for 
Compel; aty Charles Johnson for plntf 
David C Nye 
Notice of Deposition of Defendant Nancy Patrick David C Nye 
on 7-15-09@ 9am: aty Charles Johnson for 
plntf 
Minute Entry and Order; court DENIED without David C Nye 
prej Plntfs Matin for Summary Judgment; ,I Nye 
6-19-09 
Notice of Depa of Nancy Patrick on 9-24-09 @ David C Nye 
9am: aty Charles Johnson for plntfs 
Motion for Expedited Trial setting, small lawsuit David C l\lye 
resolution act proceedings, and Mediation; aty 
Charles Johnson for plntf 
First Amended and Renewed Motion for David C Nye 
Summary Judgment; aty Charles Johnson 
Date: 1/4/2011 
Time: 10:07 AM 
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Case: CV-2008-0004528-PI Current Judge: David C Nye 
Mathew R. Bennett, etal. vs. Nancy Patrick 
User: OCANO 
Mathew R. Bennett, Benjamin Lloyd Walton vs. Nancy Patrick 
Date 
11119/2009 
12121 /2009 
11412010 
11612010 
111212010 
111512010 
21412010 
211212010 
211612010 
212212010 
31412010 
Code 
NOTC 
HRSC 
NOTC 
DCHH 
MEOR 
User 
OCANO 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
MEGAN 
MEGAN 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
AMYW 
AMYW 
AMYW 
AMYW 
AMYW 
CAMILLE 
Notice of Hearing on Motion for Summary 
Judgement; December 21, 2009 at 10:00 AM. 
Judge 
David C Nye 
Affidavit of Brendon Taylor; aty Brendon Taylor David C Nye 
for def. 
Order for Mediation; .I Nye 12-21-09 
Order granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Juqgment on Liability; .I Nye 1-4-2010 
Motion for costs and attys fees on summary 
Judgment as to Liability; atyCharles Johnson 
David C Nye 
David C Nye 
David C Nye 
Memorandum of Costs and Affidavit of Charles David C Nye 
Johnson in support of Motion for costs and fees; 
aty Charles Johnson for plntf 
Miscellaneous Payment: Copies Paid by: Lloyd David C Nye 
Jones Receipt number: 0001299 Dated: 
111212010 Amount $20.00 (Credit card) 
Miscellaneous Payment: Technology Cost - CC David C Nye 
Paid by: Lloyd Jones Receipt number: 0001299 
Dated: 111212010 Amount $3.00 (Credit card) 
Defendant objectijon to Plntfs Motion for Costs 
and Attys Fees on Summary Judgment as to 
Liability; aty Brendon Taylor for def 
David C Nye 
Plaintiffs Disclosure of Fact and Expert David C Nye 
Witnesses; aty Charles Johnson 
Notice of hearing; on Plntfs Motion for Costs and David C Nye 
ATtys Fees set for 2-16-2010@ 10:30am: aty 
Charles Johnson for plntf 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 0211612010 10:30 David C Nye 
AM) 
Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Objection to David C Nye 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees on 
Summary Judgment as to Liability; Isl Charles 
Johnson, atty for Plaintiffs 
Notice of Service; Plaintiffs Second Set fo David C Nye 
Interrogatories, Requests for Production of 
Documents and Requests for Admissions; Isl 
Charles Johnson, atty for Plaintiffs 
Hearing result for Motion held on 0211612010 David C Nye 
10:30 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Waived 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 pages. 
Minute Entry and Order; parties came for hearing David C Nye 
on Plaintiffs Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees; 
court denied the plaintiffs motion under Rules 56 
& 11, the court took the matter under advisement 
as to Rule 36 and will issue a decision within 30 
days; Isl J Nye, 2-22-10 
Defendants disclosure of Lay and Expert 
Witnesses; aty Brendon Taylor 
David C Nye 
Date: 1/4/2011 
Time: 10:07 AM 
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Case: CV-2008-0004528-PI Current Judge: David C Nye 
Mathew R. Bennett, etal. vs. Nancy Patrick 
User: OCANO 
Mathew R. Bennett, Benjamin Lloyd Walton vs. Nancy Patrick 
Date 
311212010 
311712010 
412212010 
412712010 
412912010 
413012010 
51312010 
511112010 
511412010 
511712010 
512412010 
Code 
MOTN 
NOTC 
HRSC 
NOTC 
HRVC 
NOTC 
MEMO 
DCHH 
User 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
AMYW 
AMYW 
AMYW 
AMYW 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
AMYW 
CAMILLE 
AMYW 
AMYW 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
AMYW 
AMYW 
Judge 
Decision on Costs and ATtorney Fees; (Plaintiffs David C Nye 
Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees on Summary 
Judgment is DENIED, without prej: ,I Nye 
3-12-2010 
Notice of Service - Defendants Answers and David C Nye 
Rsponses to Plaintiffs Second set of lnterrog, 
Requests for Production and Requests for 
Admission; and this Notice; atyBrendon Taylor 
for Defendants 
Motion to Compel; Isl Charles Johnson David C Nye 
Notice of Hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel; David C Nye 
Isl Charles Johnson, atty for Plaintiff 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel David C Nye 
0510512010 01 :30 PM) 
Notice of Mediation; Isl J Brown David C l\lye 
Notice of Deposition of Dr. Evan Holmstead David C Nye 
Recorded by Audio Video Means; on 4-30-2010 
@ 11 :30 am atyCharles Johnson for plntf 
Notice of Deposition of Dr. Richard Maynard David C Nye 
Recorded by Audio Video Means on 5-7-2010 @ 
11:30 am: 
Notice of Deposition of Dr. Matthew Williamson David C Nye 
Recorded by Audio Video Means: aty Charles 
Johnson for plntf 
Notice of Service - Defendants Third David C Nye 
Supplemental Answers and Responses to 
Plaintiffs First set of lnterrog Requests for 
Production and Requests for Admission: and this 
Notice of service : 
aty Brendon Taylor 
Hearing result for Motion to Compel held on 
0510512010 01 :30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
David C Nye 
Motion in Limine; atyCharles JOhnson for plntfs David C Nye 
Notice of Hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine; David C Nye 
hrg set for 5117 at 11 :00 am; Isl Charles Johnson, 
atty for plaintiffs 
Stipulated Joint Pre-trial Memorandum 
Motion in Li mine; aty Brendon Taylor for Def. 
Defendants Response to Plaintiffs Motion in 
Limine; aty Brendon Taylor for def 
David C Nye 
David C Nye 
David C Nye 
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on David C Nye 
0511712010 11 :00 AIVI: District Court Hearing Heh 
Court Reporter: Stephanie Morse 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 pqges. 
Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendant's Requested 
Jury Instructions; Isl Charles Johnson, atty for 
Plaintiffs 
David C Nye 
Date: 1/4/2011 
Time: 10:07 AM 
Page 5 of9 
Sixth Judicial District Court - Bannock County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2008-0004528-PI Current Judge: David C Nye 
Mathew R. Bennett, etal. vs. Nancy Patrick 
User: OCANO 
Mathew R. Bennett, Benjamin Lloyd Walton vs. Nancy Patrick 
Date 
5/24/2010 
5/26/2010 
6/1/2010 
6/2/2010 
6/3/2010 
6/4/2010 
Code 
RESP 
ORDR 
DCHH 
JTST 
AFFD 
SUBR 
User 
AMYW 
AMYW 
AMYW 
AMYW 
AMYW 
AMYW 
CAMILLE 
AMYW 
AMYW 
CAMILLE 
AMYW 
CINDYBF 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
AMYW 
OCANO 
AMYW 
Judge 
Response and Opposition to Defendant's Motion David C Nye 
in Limine; /s/ Charles Johnson, atty for Plaintiffs 
Plaintiffs' Objection and Response to Defendant's David C Nye 
Exhibits; /s/ Charles Johnson, atty for Plaintiffs 
Order Granting Motion in Limine as to Dr. Henry David C Nye 
West; no mention how plaintiffs were referred to 
Dr. West at trial; /s/ .I Nye, 5-24-10 
Plaintiffs' Requested Jury Instructions; /s/ Charles David C Nye 
Johnson, atty for Plaintiffs 
Plaintiffs' Proposed Voir Dire Questions; /s/ 
Charles Johnson, atty for Plaintiffs 
Defendant's Proposed Jury Instructions; /s/ 
Brendon Taylor, atty for Def 
Objection to Plaintiffs Jury Instructions; aty 
Brendon Taylor for Defendants 
David C Nye 
David C Nye 
David C Nye 
Portneuf Medical Center's Ex Parte Motion to David C Nye 
Shorten Time for Hearing on Portneuf Medical 
Center's Motion to Quash Subpoena and Motion 
for Proective Order; /s/ Jennifer Brizee, atty for 
PMC 
Defendant Portneuf Medical Center's Motion to David C Nye 
Quash Plaintiff's Subpoena, and INtial 
Memorandum in Support Thereof; /s/ Jennifer 
Brizee, atty for PMC 
Notice of Hearing on Portneuf Medical Centers David C Nye 
Motion to quash plntfs subpoena and Portneuf 
Medical Centers Motion for Protective Order; aty 
Jenmnifer Brizee for Portneuf 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 06/02/2010 David C Nye 
09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Stephanie Morse 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Over 500 pages. 
Jury Trial Started David C Nye 
Portneuf Medical Centers Motion for Protective David C Nye 
Order and Memorandum in support; aty 
Jennifer Brizee for Portneuf Med 
Affidavit of Jennifer K Brizee; aty Jennifer David C Nye 
Brizee for Portneuf Med 
Affidavit of Brendon Taylor; /s/ Brendon Taylor, David C Nye 
atty for Def 
Subpoena Returned; Joann Hayward, Holly David C Nye 
Parkinson or Stephanie Evans; Charles Johnson, 
Atty for Plntfs. 
Special Verdict David C Nye 
Date: 1/4/2011 
Time: 10:07 AM 
Page 6 of 9 
udicial District Court - Bannock Coun 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2008-0004528-PI Current Judge: David C Nye 
Mathew R Bennett, etal. vs: Nancy Patrick 
User: OCANO 
Mathew R. Bennett, Benjamin Lloyd Walton vs. Nancy Patrick 
Date Code 
6/712010 MEOR 
JDMT 
EXLT 
6/18/2010 
MEMO 
MEMO 
6/21/2010 
6/24/2010 
HRSC 
7/6/2010 
User 
AMYW 
AMYW 
AMYW 
AMYW 
AMYW 
AMYW 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
AMYW 
AMYW 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
AMYW 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
Judge 
Minute Entry and Order; parties appeared for trial David C Nye 
on 6/2110, jury selected, witnesses testified, 
special verdict form the jury answered No to 
Questions 1 & 2; Isl J Nye, 6-7-10 
Judgment on Verdict; judgment in favor of Plaintiff David C Nye 
Matthew Bennett in amount of $3978.47 and 
Benjamin Walton in the amount of $10,030.92; Isl 
J Nye, 6-7-10 
Pre-Emptry Challenges for Qualification to Hear David C Nye 
Jury Trial 
Jurors Selected for Vair Dire Questioning and David C Nye 
Pre-Emptry Challenges for Qualification to Hear 
Jury Trial 
Jurors Selected for Trial 
Exhibit List 
Motion to Alter and Amend Judgment and for 
Additur; and Motion for Pre Judgment Interest; 
aty Cl Johnson for plntf 
David C Nye 
David C Nye 
David C Nye 
Motion for Costs and Attorneys fees of the David C Nye 
Prevailing Party on Jury Verdict and Judgment on 
the Verdict; aty Cf Johnson for plntf 
Memorandum of Costs and Affidavit of Charles David C Nye 
Johnson in Support of Motion for Costs and Fees; 
Isl Charles Johnson, atty for Plaintiffs 
Memorandum & Brief in Support of Motion for David C Nye 
Costs and Attorney's Fees to Plaintiffs Bennett & 
Walton; Isl Charles Johnson, atty for Plaintiffs 
Defendant's Motion for Costs; aty Brendon David C Nye 
Taylor for Def. 
Defendants Memorandum for Costs; aty David C Nye 
Brendon Taylor for Def. 
Defendants Motion for Reduction to Judgment; David C Nye 
aty Brendon Taylor for def 
Affidavit of Brendon C. Taylor; aty Brendon David C Nye 
Taylor for Def. 
Notice of hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for Costs David C Nye 
and Attorneys Fees of the Prevailing party on the 
Jury Verdict and Judgment on the Verdict; and 
Motion to Amend Judgment and for additur; and 
motion for pre judgment interest aty Charles 
Johnson for plntf 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/26/2010 09:30 David C Nye 
AM) 
Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants Motion for David C Nye 
Reduction toJudgment; aty Charles Johnson for 
plntf 
Plaintiffs Objection to Defendants Motinfor Costs; David C Nye 
aty Charles Johnson 
Date: 11412011 
Time: 10:07 AM 
Page 7 of9 
udicial District Court - Bannock Count 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2008-0004528-PI Current Judge: David C Nye 
Mathew R. Bennett, etal. vs. Nancy Patrick 
User: OCANO 
Mathew R. Bennett, Benjamin Lloyd Walton vs. Nancy Patrick 
Date 
71712010 
7121/2010 
7122/2010 
7126/2010 
713012010 
81512010 
8125/2010 
Code 
AFFD 
DCHH 
AFFD 
.IDMT 
User 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
AMYW 
AMYW 
AMYW 
AMYW 
AMYW 
CAMILLE 
AMYW 
AMYW 
CAMILLE 
AMYW 
AMYW 
Judge 
Defendants Objection to Plaintiffs Post Trial David C Nye 
Motions for Additur, interest, costs and attorneys 
fees; aty Brendon Taylor for def 
Plaintiffs Objection and REsponse to Defs David C Nye 
Objection to Plntfs Post Trial Motions for Additur, 
Interest Costs and Attorneys Fees; aty Charles 
Johnson 
Supplement to Defendant's Post-Trial Motions David C Nye 
and Responsive Pleadings; Isl Brendon Taylor, 
atty for Def 
Affidavit in Support of Post-Trial Supplement; Isl David C Nye 
Brendon Taylor, atty for Def 
Hearing result for Motion held on 0712612010 
09:30 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Stephanie Morse 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 pages. 
David C Nye 
Plaintiffs' Objection to Supplement to Defendant's David C Nye 
Post-Trial Motions and Responsive Pleadings; Isl 
Charles Johnson, atty for Plaintiffs 
Plaintiffs' Supplemental Objection to Defendant's David C Nye 
Motion for Costs; Isl Charles Johnson, atty for 
Plaintiffs 
Supplemental Authority on Attorneys Fees; aty David C Nye 
Charles Johnson 
Defendant's Post-Hearing Brief; Isl Brendon 
Taylor, atty for Defendant 
David C Nye 
Affidavit Brendon Taylor Regarding Bankruptcy David C Nye 
Order and Stipulation; Isl Brendon Taylor, atty for 
Def 
Response and Objection to Defs Post-Hearing David C Nye 
Brief and Affidavit on Bankruptcy Stipulation; 
aty Charles Johnson 
Amended Judgment on Verdict; amended to David C Nye 
reflect Matthew Bennett received verdict in the 
amount of $5,065.11, which includes costs in the 
matter of $728.49, Ben Walton verdict in the 
amount of $10,671.63, which includes costs in the 
amount of $789.70, no attorney fees award to 
either party; Isl J Nye, 8-25-10 
Decision on Post-Judgment Motions; Motion for David C Nye 
Additur is DENIED, pre-judgment interest 
awarded to each plaintiff, Walton $851.01, 
Bennett $530.15, Motion for Remittitur is 
GRANTED, Walton's verdict is reduced by $1,000 
and Bennett's verdict is reduced by $172, Plaintiff 
Bennett and Walton are the prevailing parties 
against Patrick, Motion for Costs is GRANTED in 
part and DENIED in part, Attorney fees are not 
awarded to any party, amended judgment 
entered; Isl J Nye, 8-25-10 
Date: 1/4/2011 
Time: 10:07 AM 
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udicial District Court - Bannock Counti"';~ 
ROA Report 4,1,jr 
User: OCANO 
Case: CV-2008-0004528-PI Current Judge: David C Nye 
Mathew R. Bennett, etal. vs. Nancy Patrick 
Mathew R. Bennett, Benjamin Lloyd Walton vs. Nancy Patrick 
Date Code User Judge 
91712010 CAIVIILLE Motion for relief and reconsideration of decision David C Nye 
on Post Judgment Motions Denying Attys Fees; 
aty Charles Johnson for plntf 
CAMILLE Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform to David C l\lye 
Evidence: aty Charles Johnson for plntf 
HRSC AMYW Hearing Scheduled (Motion 0912712010 09:30 David C Nye 
AM) 
NOTC AMYW Notice of Hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend David C Nye 
and Motion for Relief; hrg set for 9127110 at 9:30 
am; Isl Charles Johnson, atty for Plaintiffs 
912012010 CAMILLE Defendants Objection and Brief in Opposition to David C Nye 
Plntfs Motion for relief and reconsideration of Post 
Judgment Motions denying attys fees and plntts 
Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform to 
evidence under IRCP 15b: aty Brendon Taylor 
for def 
912412010 AMYW Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Objection to David C Nye 
Costs and Attorney's Fees and Supplementation 
of the Record; Isl Charles Johnson, atty for 
Plaintiffs 
912712010 DCHH AMYW Hearing result for Motion held on 0912712010 David C Nye 
09:30 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Stephanie Morse 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Court Reporter 
912812010 CAMILLE Minute Entry and Order; Motion to Amend to David C Nye 
Conform to Evidence was filed timely but is 
DENIED, the Motion for Relief and 
Reconsideration of Decision on Post Judgment 
Motions Denying Attorney Fees is also DENIED: 
sl Judge Nye 9-28-2010 
CSTS CAMILLE Case Status Changed: Closed David C Nye 
101412010 NOELIA Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to David C Nye 
Supreme Court Paid by: Johnson, L Charles 
(attorney for Bennett, Mathew R.) Receipt 
number: 0034561 Dated: 101512010 Amount: 
$101.00 (Check) For: Patrick, Nancy (defendant) 
APSC OCANO Appealed To The Supreme Court David C Nye 
NOTC OCANO NOTICE OF APPEAL; Charles Johnson, Atty for David C Nye 
Pl nftsl Appellants 
101612010 IVIISC OCANO CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL; Signed David C Nye 
and Mailed to SC on 10-6-10. 
1011512010 MISC OCANO IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Notice of Appeal David C Nye 
received in SC on 10-12-10. Docket Number 
38138-2010. Clerk's Record and Reporter's 
Transcripts Due in SC on 1-12-11. (12-8-10 5 
weeks prior). The following Transcripts shall be 
lodged: Jury Trial 6-2-10 thur 6-7-10 and Motion 
Hearing held 7-26-10. 
Date: 1/4/2011 
Time: 10:07 AM 
Page 9 of9 
udiclal District Court - Bannock Coun 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2008-0004528-PI Current Judge: David C Nye 
Mathew R. Bennett, etal. vs. Nancy Patrick 
User: OCANO 
Mathew R. Bennett, Benjamin Lloyd Walton vs. Nancy Patrick 
Date 
10/15/2010 
10/28/2010 
10/29/2010 
12/7/2010 
1/4/2011 
Code 
IVIISC 
STJD 
STIP 
MISC 
MISC 
User 
OCANO 
CAMILLE 
OCANO 
OCANO 
OCANO 
Judge 
IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Clerk's Certificate David C Nye 
Recieved in SC on 10-12-10. 
Satisfaction Of Judgment David C Nye 
Stipulation Notice of Request for Additional David C Nye 
Records and Transcripts; Brendon C. Taylor, Atty 
for Dfdt. 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT received in Court David C Nye 
Records from Stephanie Morse fort he following 
hearings: Jury Trial held 6-2-10, Motion held 
7-26-10 and Motions held 9-27-10. 
CLERK'S RECORD RECEIVED IN court records David C Nye 
on 1-4-11. 
Brendon C. Taylor 
Jared A. Steadman 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
109 North Arthur - 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
(208) 232-2286 
(208) 232-2499 Telefax 
ISB #6078 (BCT), #7804 (JAS) 
Attorneys for Defendant 
201n JUL 22 PM 3: 04 
3Y (1u.) 
DEPUTY CLERK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF BANNOCK 
MATHEW R. BENNETT and 
BENJAMIN L. WALTON, 
Plain ti ff s, 
vs. 
NANCY PATRICK, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Bannock ) 
) 
) 
) Case No. CV-08-4528-OC 
) 
) AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
) POST-TRIAL SUPPLEMENT 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Brendon Taylor, being first duly sworn, deposes and states: 
1. I am one of the attorneys for the Defendant in the above entit]ed 
action and as such I make the following statements of my own 
personal knowledge and belief. 
Affidavit of Brendon C. Taylor -Page 1 
n.1 -r1\ -r-ro-,, n1 -~ ...1;_~~\ ~ .-.: ...t---:-1- TI---...:~- --r ___ , _ -A 
2. On June 3, 2010, Defendant's counsel raised the issue of a 
bankruptcy order entered by stipulation of the parties regarding a 
limit to Plaintiffs' recovery in this lawsuit. Defendant had prepared 
Defendant's Second Motion in Limine and Affidavit of Brendon 
Taylor to support that motion. Defendant reasonably believed thoe 
documents to· have been filed at or before the time the matter was 
discussed in chambers. Defendant attaches hereto a true and correct 
copy of Defendant's Second Motion in Limine and Affidavit of 
Brendon Taylor. The Court and counsel agreed that this issue would 
be reserved for post-trial hearings. 
3. Plaintiffs post-trial motions are dated Friday, June 18, 2010, and 
copies were served on Defendant's counsel via mail. Defendant filed 
her own post-trial motions contesting attorneys fees, costs and asking 
for a reduction to the verdict, on June 21, 2010. Defendant later filed 
an Objection further explaining her opposition to Plaintiffs' post-trial 
motions on July 6, 2010, and served the same upon Plaintiffs'counsel 
via depositing a copy in the mail on July 6, 2010. Monday, July 5, 
2010 was a federal holiday and the Court and mail were not open on 
that day. 
4. Further, your affiant saith naught. 
DATED this 22,')day of July, 2010. 
Affidavit of Brendon C. Taylor -Page 2 
O· I 77177Wll Pleadimrslaffidavit-Rrendon Tavlor4. wnd 378 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to this~oa-day of July, 2010. 
:~1/~) ~w/. .. o ~, -a 
~TARY FOR rdiifo 
Residence: =:Enncx\Ci 1:... 
Commission expires: ) - \ 2:-;;(\/4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Brendon C. Taylor, the undersigned, one of the attorneys for the 
Defendants, in the above-referenced matter, do hereby certify that a true, full and correct 
~ 
copy of the foregoing document was this 2'2" day of July, 2010, served upon the 
following in the manner indicated below: 
Charles Johnson 
JOHNSON OLSON CHARTERED 
PO Box 1725 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1725 
Affidavit of Brendon C. Taylor 
0: \ 77\ 7783\Pleadings\affidavit-Brendon Tavlor4, wod 179 
[_] U.S. Mail 
[~T Hand Delivery 
[_] Overnight Delivery 
lJ Telefax 
-Page 3 

Brendon C. Taylor 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
109 North Arthur - 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
(208) 232-2286 . 
(208) 232-2499 Telefax 
Idaho State Bar #6078 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MATHEW R. BENNETT and BENJAMIN L. ) 
WALTON, ) 
) Case No. CV-08-4528-PI 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
vs. ) DEFENDANT'S SECOND MOTION IN 
) LIMINE 
NANCY PATRICK, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
) 
COMES NOW the above named Defendant, Nancy Patrick, by and through her counsel of 
record, Brendon C. Taylor ofMenill & Menill, Chartered, and hereby make Defendant's Second 
Motion in Limine as follows: 
1. In January of 2009, the parties entered a stipulation to lift the automatic bankruptcy 
stay that was mandated by Defendant having filed for bankruptcy. That stipulation 
was incorporated into the order of the Bankruptcy Court on January 20, 2009. A 
copy of the stipulation and the order are attached to the Affidavit of Brendon C. 
Taylor, filed herewith. 
2. The Stipulation and order provide that the automatic bankruptcy stay protecting 
Defendant Nancy Patrick was only lifted as to the Defendant's auto liability policy 
through Allstate Insurance Company. Plaintiffs stipulated that they would not pursue 
and course of action in state court that would result in Ms. Patrick being personally 
liable for any amount in excess of her pending insurance coverage with Allstate 
Insurance Company. The parties further agreed that any judgment or settlement 
awarded to Plaintiffs Bennett and Walton in the state court will only be attributable 
to and payable by Defendant's insurance carrier, Allstate Insurance Company and 
will be limited to the Defendant's Insurance policy. 
Defendant's Second Motion of Limine 
7783/ea 
3. Defendant's insurance policy has policy limits for bodily injury in the amount of 
$25,000 per person and $50,000 total. A copy of the policy declarations sheet is 
attached to the affidavit of Brendon C. Taylor. 
4. Until the last two weeks, Neither Plaintiff has asserted a claim for damages in excess 
of $25,000. Throughout discovery, Plaintiffs' discovery responses included a listing 
of total damages ofless than $25,000. A copy of those damage statements is attached 
to the Affidavit of Brendon C. Taylor. Thus, at no time before the close of discovery 
had Plaintiffs indicated they would seek damages above the amount they had 
stipulated to pursue and were granted stay relief to pursue by the United States 
Bankruptcy Court. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for a limiting instruction that neither plaintiff may seek an 
amount in excess of$25,000 from the jury in this matter. Defendant further moves the Court to limit 
any award to am~~ oWS,000 per Plaintiff. 
Dated this _11'_- ddayofJune, 2010. 
MERRILL & MERR11=,L, CHARTERED 
/ 
By:_0_. _.,, _· _.,., _ _,, ·~·/ __ 
-~ C. Tayl@f'< . 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Brendon C. Taylor, the undersigned, one of the attorneys for the Defendant, in the above-
referenced matter, do hereby certify th~ true, full and correct copy of the foregoing Defendant's 
Second Motion ofLimine was this f/- dayof~lO, served upon the following in the manner 
indicated below: -- 0 vv •. .JL· 
Charles Johnson 
JOHNSON OLSON, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 1725 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1725 
Defendant's Second Motion of Limine 
7783/ea 
382 
[_] U.,$: Mail 
[d-'fland Delivery 
[_] Overnight Delivery 
[_] Telefax 
?Q? 
Brendon C. Taylor 
Jared A. Steadman 
:MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
109 North Arthur - 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
(208) 232-2286 
(208) 232-2499 Telefax 
ISB #6078 (BCT), #7804 (JAS) 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MATHEW R. BENNETT and 
BENJAMIN L. WALTON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NANCY PATRICK, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Bannock ) 
) 
) 
) Case No. CV-08-4528-0C 
) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF BRENDON 
) TAYLOR 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Brendon Taylor, being first duly sworn, deposes and states: 
1. I am one of the attorneys for the Defendant in the above entitled 
action and as such I make the following statements of my own 
personal knowledge and belief. 
Affidavit of Brendon C. Taylor -Page 1 
0: \77\ 7783\Pleadings\affidavit-Brendon Tavlor3. wod 
2. Defendant Nancy Patrick had filed for Bankruptcy before the 
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint; and Defendant Patrick has asserted an 
affirmative defense regarding the bankruptcy stay protection. 
3. The parties to this lawsuit reached an agreement and entered a 
stipulation regarding stay relief as to this lawsuit. A true and correct 
copy of the stipulation is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
4. The Bankruptcy Judge, The Honorable Jim Pappas, entered an order 
incorporating the stipulation. A true and correct copy of the order 
granting stay relief is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
5. Defendant Nancy Patrick' s insurance coverage that is addressed in 
the Stipulation and Order attached hereto was through Allstate 
Insurance Company. The policy limits for bodily injury claims is 
$25,000 per person, $50,000 per total claim. A copy of the insurance 
policy and declarations page are attached hereto as Exhibit C. 
6. During all times before the discovery period closed in early May, 
2010, neither Plaintiff disclosed a claim for total damages that 
exceeded $25,000. These statements of damages were produced in 
response to discovery demands that Plaintiff set forth their damage 
claims. Attached hereto as Exhibit D are copies of damages 
statements produced by Plaintiffs during discovery. At about the time 
of the pretrial conference, PlaintiffBeajamin Walton began producing 
a damage statement that exceeded $25,000. 
7. Further, your affiant saith naught. 
DATED this_!{!._ day of June, 2010. 
Affidavit of Brendon C. Taylor -Page 2 
0: \ 77\ 7783\Pleadin,gs\affidavit-Brendon Tavlor3. wnrl 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to this] vl day of June, 2010. 
Residence: f 0 C-4.-~ /~ TD 
Commission expires: 7 h-t lt1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Brendon C. Taylor, the undersigned, one of the attorneys for the 
Defendants, in the above-referenced matter, do i,eby certify that a true, full and correct 
copy of the foregoing document was this 3 day of June, 2010, served upon the 
following in the manner indicated below: 
Charles J obnson 
JOHNSON OLSON CHARTERED 
PO Box 1725 
Pocatello, Idaho 83 204-1725 
Affidavit of Brendon C. Taylor 
0'.\ 77\77R".\\ PlPoninae\offirlouit.l'lrPnrlnn T~ulnr1. ,>mrl 
L] J.kS. Mail 
0 Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[_] Telefax 
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Brendon C. Taylor, ISll #o078 
,fared A. Stead111ans lSB-#784M 
MElllULL & MERlULL, CB'.AR~ 
109!'1lortb Atthnr-~'Floor 
P. o . .Boie 991 
Pocatello, ldAho 83204.J)99l 
Telephone: (108) 231-ll86 
Facsimile: (108) 132-~ 
Mn.il: 1~t1.11dmaa@mfflfUAJ:1d1urrif1.et1m 
bt@mmiJ~bdmen-ill.com 
Attorneys for Debtor 
'UNITED STATES BANKRUP'fCY COURT 
DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
ln, Re: 
? .\ lRICI<, NANCY D., 
Debtor. 
------~-·------··-..-
Case No 08-40764-tDP 
sraULAnoN RE: 
AUroMA.nc tn"A y RELIEF AS 
TO CREDfro'.RS MAT8EW 
ll!:NNrn'.ANI> BENJAMIN 
WALfON 
the Debtor, Nancy D Patriok (MDebW). lhrough het" oounael af ~ Jared A Steadman, 
ofMenill ond Menill ~ aod~mnM '10012gblood. Esq.; and tlM: C-..t~', Matfiew R 
B6anettand Benjamio l . Walton ("Creditllni") throu;g'h theb·coun,sl of~ Charles Johnson, of 
Tobn&on Olson, Chartered; and tho Baribuptcy In.wee, R.. Sam l{oplcin, eupulate and agree 
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L !he creditor, Mathew R. Bennett, at all times 11111terial hel'eto, was a ~dent of Pocatello. 
Bannock County, Idaho 
2. The Cteditor, Benjirrnin L Walton, at all times material hen:tot was a resident of Pocatello, 
B~ook County, Idaho .. 
3. The Debt.or, Nauer D. Patrick, is the debtor.in this cueand at al! times materialbeieto, was 
a resident of' l>ocatello, Bannock County, Idaho S~ is also the owner and <biver of a 
vehicle involved in a collision, which is the 311bject of a sta~ oourt peiscm11J injwy eetion 
filed hy the Creditors., 
4. The Debt01; ·Nanoy D Patdck. filed a Chapt.v 7 petition in banla:uptcy on Aopt 28, 2008 
I_he OebtOt WiS alleged.lyumware of the claim Until after.the petition hlld been filed so the 
Creditors are not listed in the appropriat<t banlmlptcy schedules.. Hence. the Credimrsweie 
5 l he Creditor&, in view of the &ct that Debto1 has filed a no asset-Chnpter 7'bankruptey and 
that the alleged debt is a prepetidon debt. aptbattbey will notpumue ,my couue of aotion 
in state eomt: that wonld result in Debtor being~ly liable fot any amount in excess of 
her·. ))ending insurance co~ with Allstate Insurance Company Any judsmem OJ 
settlement awarded to Credi10rs in the state coutt peieoaal iJUUty olaim will om)' be 
atttibutable to and payable by Dobtor'.s insunm.ec cauier Anstate In~ Company and 
will be limited to the Dcb1or't imuranc:e policy. Any e:<cC6$ judgment 01 judgment not 
oovered in Debtor'& insuiance policy will not be c:ollcoted fr<>m Dobto1 pC?SonaUy or :ftom 
het pets0nal atsets. 
6 Debtoz, in view of caso Jaw regarding in1Utu1te <.ompanies' liability despite a dobtor's 
discharge, agiees to a lifting and tetmination of the. automatic stay before and aftet discharge 
8TIPUI.ATION RE; AUiOMA 110 STAV REL/SF AS RESAROS MATTHEW BENNETT AND Fle,,/JAMIN 
WAI. TON'S' PERSOf.JAL INJURY CLAIMS- 2 
Rec e i v e d T i me J an. 13. - 4: i 5 PM 
In Re: 
PATRICK, NANCY D. 
Debtor. 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
Case No. 08-40764-JDP 
ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION FOR RELIEF 
FROM STAY AND THAT BANKRUPTCY STAY 
DOES NOT APPLY TO PERSONAL INJURY 
CLAIM AGAINST DEBTOR'S INSURANCE 
CARRIER AFTER DISCHARGE 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on January 14, 
2009 on the motion to vacate discharge and determine that the 
bankruptcy stay does not apply to personal injury claim against 
debtor's insurance carrier filed by creditors, Mathew R. Bennett 
and Benjamin L. Walton, through their counsel of record, Charles 
Johnson, on or about December 11, 2008 as Docket# 23. The Court 
was advised that the parties had entered into a STIPULATION RE: 
AUTOMATIC STAY RELIEF AS TO CREDITORS MATHEW BENNETT AND BENJAMIN 
WALTON filed in this case as Docket# 28; and upon consideration of 
the record in this case and, good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
stipulation is granted by the Court. The provisions thereof are 
adopted as the order of the Court. 
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
creditors, Mathew R. Bennett and Benjmain L. Walton, are granted 
relief from the stay and a determination that the stay does not 
apply after discharge to a pending automobile accident claim and 
State Court litigation for recovery of insurance proceeds, only, in 
the case of Mathew R. Benett and Benjamin L. Walton v. Nancy D. 
Pa trick; Bannock County Case No. CV-08-4 528-0C, in the above 
entitled bankruptcy case, pursuant to 11 U.S. C. § 362 and § 
OROER 1 
524(a) (2). This claim in this case for personal injuries against 
the defendant debtor will be defended and any award or judgment 
will be paid by her insurance carrier Allstate Insurance Company 
only and not the defendant and debtor Patrick personally after 
discharge (if any) in this case. 
There is no reason to delay entry of this order, which is 
effective immediately notwithstanding F.R.B.P. 4001 et seq. 
//End of Text// 
Dated: January 20, 2009 
Hon~ Pappas 
Onited States Bankruptcy Judge 
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f\11s1arn insurance ~Orr"'1ny 
Polley Number: 0 07 D0665912n3 
Polley Eflecllve Date: June 13, 2D07 
COVERAGE FOR VEHICLE 11 
1997 Buick Sky I ark 
COVERAGE 
Automob!le Liability Insurance 
• Bodfly Injury 
• Property Damage 
Uninsured Motorists Insurance 
ror Bodily Injury 
Automobile Medical Payments 
Aulo Comprehensive Insurance · 
y 1t: Shal!et Ins Agy Inc !2D8) 233-7454 
UMITS DfDUCTIBlE 
$25,000 each person 
Not Applicable 
$50,000 each accident 
$25,000 each accident 
$25,000 each person Not Applicable 
$50,000 each accident 
$2,000 _each person NQt Applicable 
Actual Cash Value $1,000 
Towing and Labor Costs Coverage $50 each disablement Not Applicable 
Tola! Premium for 97 Buick Skylark 
DISCOUNTS 
Mul!lple Car 
Multiple Polley 
Your premium for this vehicle reflects the following discounts: 
$35.42 Passive ReS1raint 
$16.97 Alltllock Brakes 
RATING INFORMATION 
$4.04 
$11.38 
PREMIUM 
$102.45 
$7.10 
$9.42 
$40.82 
$2.10 
$161 .89 
This vehicle Is driven over 7,500 miles per year, 0·3 miles to. work/school, with no unmarried driver under 25, good driver 
rate 
A·-11,s:ta,te 
A.uto 1--ns11ra.nce 
Policy 
Po I icy: Eflective: 
Issued to: 
PDUlJ 
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?Q? 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
General Provisions 
Insuring Agreement .............................................. 2 
When And Where The Policy Applies .................. 2 
Conformity To State Statutes ............................... 2 
Insurance Coverage In Mexico ............................. 2 
Definitions Used Throughout The Policy ............. 3 
Premium Changes ................................................ 4 
Coverage Changes ............................................... .4 
Duty To Report Policy Changes ........................... 4 
Notice .................................................................. A 
Wnat To Do If There Is A Loss ............................. 4 
Medical Reports ................................................... ;5 
Assistance And Cooperation Of The Insured ....... 5 
Subrogation Rights ............................................... 5 
Combining Limits Of Two Or More 
Autos Prohibited ............................................. 5 
Transfer ................................................................ 5 
Payment .............................................................. :6 
Conditional Reinstatement ................................... 6 
Fraud Or Misrepresentation .................................. 6 
Cancellation .......................................................... £ 
Non-Renewal ......................................................... 7 
Loss Reduction Items ........................................... 8 
Action Against Allstate .......................................... 8 
Bankruptcy Or Insolvency .................................... 8 
Part 1 
Automobile Liability Insurance 
Bodily Injury Liability-Coverage AA 
Property Damage Liability-Coverage BB 
General Statement of Coverage ............................ 8 
Our Right To Appeal ............................................. 8 
Additional Payments Allstate Will Make ............... 8 
Additional Definition For Part 1 ............................ 9 
Exclusions - What Is Not Covered ..................... 9 
Financial Responsibility ...................................... 10 
Limits Of Liability ................................................ 10 
If There Is Other Insurance ................................. 11 
Additional Interested Parties .............................. 11 
Part2 
Automobile Medical Payments 
Coverage .cc 
General Statement of Coverage .......................... 11 
Additional Definitions for Part 2 ... , ..................... 11 
Exclusions - What Is Not Covered ................... 12 
Gi~~~~~;~ab,~i~r ·unnec·es;iry.Meiifc~i····· .. ···· .. ···13 
Expenses ..................................................... ..13 
lfThere Is Other lnsurance ................................. 14 
Part 3 
Uninsured Motorists Insurance 
ca:ver,gjJ·$s' · · 
GeneratStatement of Coverage ............... , .......... 14 
An U~ir1SW'.ed.Auto Is ........................ , ............... , 14 
An Uni.ns.ur~d Au,tQ Is Not ................................... 14 
AdditionalDefinitibns For Part 3 ........................ 14 
Exclu~jons -What ls,Not Covered .............. ,. .... 15 
Limits Of Liijbility ..................... : .......................... 15 
Non,,Oupli~tion Of .Benefits ............................... 16 
. If There Is Other Insurance ................................. 16 
Trust Agreement ................ : ................................ 16 
Payment Of Loss By Allstate .............................. 16 
legal Actions ...................................................... 1.6 
If We Cannot Agree .• , ......................................... ;!!>, 
Part 4 
Pro,t1u:tion Against loss To The Auto 
General Stqternent ofCoyerage ...••• "'., ......... ,,, .. ,. 17 
Additional Payments Allstate Will Make' . ; . 
Under fart 4 ............................ :: .. ~'.; .......... :.; . .tW•·, 
Additii;inaJ Definitions For Part 4 .. 1 ... ;:::;.: .......... A9. . 
Losses We Do N9tCov~r Untler Cov,~t~iMlS 
D0, HH.JJ, LG, Rc,-·uu, ZA and ZZ .: ............ 1·9 
Payment OfLoss By Allstate ...................... : .. : .... 21 
Right To Appraisal ........................................... :.,21 
Limits 'Of Liability ............................................... .21 
Limits Of Liability Under tease Or 
Lo~n Gap Coverage ....................................... 2~ 
Limits Qf.Uaoility Uni:ferRepa:ir Or 
Replacement Cost Coverage ........................ 22 
If-There 'rs Other Insurance ................................. 22 
No Benefit To 'Bailee ........................................... .22 
Loss Payable Clause ........................................... 22 
Page 1 
394 
A Stock Company 
Home Office: Northbrook, Illinois 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
The following provisions apply to all parts of the 
policy except where otherwise noted. 
Insuring Agreement 
This policy is a legal contract between you and us. 
A coverage applies only when a premium for it is 
shown on the Policy Declarations. If more than one 
auto is insured, premiums will be shown for each 
auto. We may find it necessary to Issue yoµ two or 
more different policy numbers for this one policy. 
Even if we issue two or more policy numbers, this 
shall still constitute one policy. Your Policy 
Declarations lists the policy numbers appricabje. If 
you pay the premiums when due and comply with 
the policy terms, Allstate, relying on the 
information you have given us, makes the following 
agreements with you. 
You agree to review your Policy Declarations to 
aonfirm which of the available coverages and limits 
described in this policy have been issued to you. · 
You agree to also review those sections of this 
policy which relate to those coverages issued to 
you so that you fully understand the insura.nce 
protection you are receiving., F,~ilure to review this 
policy, including your Policy OecJarations, wilt riot 
relieve you of this obligation. You should contact 
Allstate, orthe agent listed on your Policy 
Declarations, immediately if you have any 
questions about the coverages.or limits, if you 
believe there Is any mistake aboutthe coverages or 
limits issued to you, or if you have any questions 
or do not understand anything in-this policy. 
While your agent can help answer many specific 
questions about the coverages, only you can 
determine if you have selected the insurance 
coverages you neen and that those coverages have 
actually been issued to you. · 
The terms of this policy impose joint obligations on 
persons defined in applicabl~ sections of this policy 
as insured persons. This means that the 
responsibilities, acts and omissions of a person 
defined as an insured person will be binding upon 
other person(s) defined as insured person(s). 
When And Where The Policy App.lies 
Your policy applies only during the policy period. 
During this time, it applie:;; to covereo losses to the 
insured a,uto, accjdents, and occurrences within 
the United States, its territories or possessions, 
Canada, and between th.eir pcirts. The policy period 
is shown on the Policy Declarations. 
ConfarmityTo· State Statutes 
When any policyprovisiciri is in.conflict with the law 
of the state in which the·insµred auto is principally 
garaged, the minimum requirements of the law pf 
the state apply. 
Insurance Cf,lverag~ lnJIJ'lexico 
Priorto enterif)g and driving. In Mexico, 'YA!l must 
check witMheappropriate Mexican authoriti_es 
regarding automobile insurance requirements. 
Automobile accidents in Mexico are:subject tothe .· 
laws of Mexico, NOT the United States'.>th Mexico, 
an autoiriobile accident can'be considered a . 
CRIMINAL OFFEI-J'SEaswelFas a civii matter. 
In some cases, part or aN ofth;S policy ~ay NOT be 
recognized by Mexican authorities. 4ndwe may not 
be allowed to provide any insuram:~ coverage atii'II 
in Mexico. For your pr~t.ectiQ,n, y1111 sh64ld · 
c9n~ider p~rcha$ing: au{orriQblle insurance 
coverage from a licensed Mexican insurance 
company before·dd~iijg. into Mexico. · 
However, when permitted, protection will be 
afforded un~_er thO:se'.¢oyerages tor which a 
premiUITI is shown grr tfle Policy Declarations tor 
an insured·auto wtiileJhat insurell auto is within 
75 miles of. fhe United'States bard.er and only for a 
period not to ex1;;eed t~n days· after each separate ... • 
entry into Mexico. 
If loss or daff!i:IQ~ occucs .which,may require r~pair 
of the iOSl![@d,tulff!l.r r~'plac~~ent C!Hefy.part(s) 
while .the ilisui"eiJ·auw isiJnMexicO, thi(qasis f()r 
adjustment oUhe':e~iitt 'fiill bfas foHows::Any ... 
amount payablerest!lting trqm any coVered· loss or 
damage occurring in Mexico shall be payaoleil)the 
United States. We wil[not be liable for more than 
the cost of having the repairs made or parts 
replaced at the nearest point in the United States 
where repairs or replacements can be performed. 
The costs for towing, transportation, and salvage 
operations of the insured auto while within Mexico 
are not covered under this policy. 
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Definitions Used Throughout The Policy 
The following definitions apply throughout the 
policy unless otherwise indicated. Defined words 
are printed in bold face type. 
1. "Additional Auto''means an auto or utility 
auto of which you become.the owner during 
the policy period. This auto wilJbe covered 
by Allstate or one of its affiliates as of the 
date you acquired the auto.if.: 
a. Allstate or one of its ~ffiliates insures all 
other private passenger autos and utility 
autos you own; 
b. the newly acquired auto or utility auto is 
not covered under any other automobile 
insurance policy; 
c. you tell us within 30 days of acquiring 
the auto or utility auto; 
d. Allstate or one of its affiliates agree~ to 
continue coverage for ti.tis additional 
auto or utility ~uto; and 
e. you pay any additional premium. 
2. "Allstate," "Wet •us,' or ''Our" means the 
company shown on the Policy Declarations. 
3. 0Auto" means a private passenger land motor 
vehicle with at least four wheels designed for 
use on public roads. · 
4. "Bodily Injury'" means physical harm to the 
body, sickness, disease, or death, but does 
not include: 
a. Any venereal disease; 
b. Herpes; 
c. Acquired Immune DQficiency Syndrome 
(AIDS); • 
d. AIDS Related Complex (ARC); 
e. Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV); 
or any resulting syrtiptom, effect, condition, 
disease or illness related to a. through e. 
listed above. 
5. "Insured Auto" means any auto or utility 
auto you own which is described'on the · 
Policy Declarations. This also includes·: 
a. A replacement auto; 
b. An additional auto; 
c. A substitute a11to; 
d. A non-owned auto; or, 
e. A trailer while attached to an insured 
auto. The trailer must be designed for 
use with an auto or utility auto. This 
trailer can't be used for business 
purposes with other than.an auto or 
utility auto. This definition e. does not 
apply to Uninsured Motorists Insurance. 
6. 0 Non-owned Auto" means an auto used by 
you or a resident relative with the owner's 
permission but which is not: 
a. owned by you or a resident relative, or 
b. .available or furnished for the regular use 
of you or a resident relative. 
7. "Replacement Auto• means a newly acquired 
auto,or utility auto you own which is a 
permanent replaceroeot for Jhe,1uto 
d~scribed on the Policy Declarations. You 
must notify us within 30 days of acquisition 
and pay any additional premium. 
8. "Resident° means a person who physically 
resides in your household with the intention 
to con~nue residence there. We must be 
notified whenever an operator becomes a 
resident of your household .. Your unmarried 
dependent children whiltt temporalily away 
from home will be consider:ed re1idents if 
they intend to resume residing in your 
household. 
!;l. "Substitute Auto• means a non-owned auto 
being temporarily use~ by you 9r a r~tid~nt 
reJ;iJive with the permission Qf the owner 
While your insured euto .is b1.1ir1g ~e.rv~d or 
repaired, or if your insured auto is stQl~n or 
destroyed. · 
10. "Utility Auto" meansan.~lito_ofthe pii:~~up 
body, sedan delivery or paµeltrucld.ype:This 
auto must have a·gross vehicle weight of 
10;000 pounds or less, according to 
manufacturer's specifications. · 
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11. "You" or "Your" means the policyholder 
named on the Policy Declarations and that 
policyholder's resident spouse. 
Premium Changes 
The premium for each auto is based on 
information Allstate has received from you or 
other sources. You agree to cooperate with us in 
determining if this information is correct, if it is 
complete, and if it changes during the policy 
period. You agree that if this information changes 
or is incorrect or incomplete, we may adjust your 
premium accordingly during the poncy period. 
Changes which result in a premium aqjustrnent 
are described in our rules. These changes 
include, but are not limited to: 
1. autos insured by the policy, including 
changes in use; 
2. drivers residing in your household, their ages 
or marital status; 
3. coverages or coverage limits; 
4. rating territory; and 
5. discount or surcharge applicability. 
Any calculation or adjustment of your premium 
will be made using the rules, rates arid forms in 
effect, and on file if required, for our use in your 
state. 
Coverage Changes 
When Allstate broaden's a coverage during the 
policy period without aadiftonal charge, youliave~-- .. 
the new feature if you havd the coverage to Which 
it applies. The new featu·re'appUes on''the daf1rthe 
coverage change is effective'in your state. 
Otherwise, the policy can be changed only by 
endorsement Any change in your coverage will 
be made using the rules,' rates and.fQrmslh effect. 
and on file if required, for our use in your state. 
Duty To Report Polley Changes 
Your policy was issued iri reliance on the 
information you provided concerning autos, 
persons insured by the poflcy and your plaae of 
residence. To pr-0perly-insure your auto, you 
must promptly notify us When you change your 
address or whenever any resident operators 
insured by your policy are addett oHleleted. 
You must notify us within 30 days w~en1you 
acquire an additionafautoi tfyoli don:,•t, the 
coverages under this policy will notapply to the 
additional auto. 
When you acquire an additional auto it wUI be 
covered by Allstate or one of its affiliates for 30 
days immediately after you acquire ownership. 
However, Allstate or one of its affiliates Will 
provide this coverage only if Altst1fe'or one of its 
affiliates insures all other autos you own, no other 
ins'uronce policy provides coverage for this auto, 
and y~u pay the additional premium. 
Coverage wiH be continued beyond this 30 day 
period only if: 
a. you ask us to continue coverage within 30 
days after you acquire, the auto; 
b. Allstate or one of its affiliates agrees to 
continue coverage for this additional auto; 
and 
c. you pay the additional premium. 
If you don't notify us within 30 days of acquiring a 
repiacement auto, the coverage under Part 4, 
Protection Against loss To The Auto, of this 
- policy.will not applyto the replacement auto. 
Notlc.e 
Your notice to an authora.ed:Allstateagentshall 
be deemed to be notice to us. 
What To Do If There Is A Loss 
1. If an insured person has an accident 
involving a motor vehiqle; AU$1a~ or any 
authorized agent of Allstat•mustbe. 
informed as soon as possible of all details. 
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As soon as possible, any person making a 
claim must give us written proof of loss, 
including all details we may need to 
determine the amounts payable. 
2. We may require any person making a claim 
to file with us a sworn proof of loss. We may 
also require that person to submit to 
examinations under oath, separately and 
apart from others, and to sign the transcript. 
3. If an insured person is sued as the result of a 
motor vehicle accident, we must be informed 
immediately. 
4. You must allow us to inspect the damaged 
property. 
5. You must protect the auto from further loss. 
We will pay reasonabl.e expenses to guard 
against further loss. If you don't protect the 
auto, further loss is not covered. 
6. You must report all theft I.asses promptly to 
the police. 
Medical Reports 
The injured person may be required to take 
medical examinations by physicians we choose, 
as often as we reasonably require • .We,must,be 
given authorization to obtain medieal repor,t_s and 
other records pertinent to the claim. · 
Assrstance And Cooperation Of The 
Insured 
An insured person must cooperate with us·in th·e 
investigation, settlement and defense of any claim 
or lawsuiUf we ask, that person must also help 
us obtain payment from anyone Who may be 
joindy responsible. 
We are not obligated to provide reimbursement if 
an insured person voluntarily takes any action or 
makes any payments other than f!>r covered 
expenses for bail bonds or firsfaid to 
others.Under Uninsured Motorists insurance, we 
may require an insured person to take proper 
action to preserve all rights to recov~r damages 
from anyone responsible for the bodily injury. 
Subrogation Rights 
When we pay under Automobile Medical 
Payments or Protection Against Loss To The 
AtJto, an insured person's 1ights of recovery 'from 
anyone else become ours up to the amount we 
have· paid.An insured person must protect these 
rights and, at our request, help us enforce them. 
Combining Um its Of Two Or More Autos 
Prohibited 
The coverage 1.imits applicable to any one auto 
shown on the Policy Declarations will not be 
combined with or added to the coverage limits 
applicable to any other auto shown on the Policy 
Declarations or covered by the policy.This means 
that no stacking or aggregation of coverages will 
be allowed by this policy.This is true even though 
a separate premium is charged for each of those 
autos.This is true regardless of the number of: 
1. vehicles or persons shown on the Policy 
Declarations; 
2. vehicles involved in the accident; 
3. persons seeking damages as a result of the 
accident; or 
4. insured persons from whom da·mages are 
sought. 
If two or more autos are shown on the Policy 
Declarations and one of these· autos is involved in 
an accident to which coveragt applies, the 
coverage limits shown oifthe,PolioyDeclarations 
for tlieinvolved auto will applyJf,Fcovered 
accident involves an auto other than one shown 
on the PoHcy Declarations, or if an insured person 
is struck as' a pedestrian in a co.vered aooident, 
the· highest coverage limits shown on the Policy 
Declarations for the applicable coverage for any 
one tu'to will apply. 
Tranifer 
This.policy can't be transferred to another person 
with out our written consent.However, if you die, 
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this policy will provide coverage, unUI the end of 
the policy period for your legal representative 
while acting as such and for persons covered on 
the date of your death. 
Payment 
If your initial premium payment for your first 
policy period is by check, draft, or any remittance 
other than cash, such payment is conditional 
upon the check, draft, or remittance;beir:fg 
honored upon presentation.lfsuch check, draft, 
or remittance is not honored upon presentation, 
this policy shall be deemed v.oid from its 
inception.This means that Allstate will not be 
liable under this policy for any claim~ or damages 
which would otherwise be covered had the check, 
draft, or remittance been honored upon 
presentation. 
If you pay by check, electronic transaction, or 
other remittance which is not honore~ because of 
insufficient funds or a closed account, you will be 
charged a fee of $10.00 · 
Conditional Reinstatement 
If we mail a cancellation notice because you.didn't 
pay the required premium w~endue and you then 
tender payment by check, draft, or other 
remittance which is not honored, upon 
presentation, your policy will terminate on the 
date and time shown on the cancellation notice 
and any notice we issue wbich waive.s the 
cancellation or reinstates cove rime is void.This· 
means that Allstate will not be,liable un.der this 
policy for claims or damages after the date and 
time indicated on the cancellation notice. 
Fraud Or Misrepresentation. 
This policy shall be deemed void,from"its 
inception if it was obtained'or renewed/through 
material misrnpresenJatjonJra.ud~~r _CQJ~C!!~lment 
of material fact This means that Allstate will not 
be liable for any claims or damages which would 
otherwise be covered, had there not been material 
misrepresentation, fraud, or concealment of 
material fact. We do not cover any loss or 
occurrence in which any insured person has 
concealed or misrepresented any material fact or 
circumstance. 
Ca.ncel lation 
Your Right to Cancel: 
You may cancel this policy by notifying us of the 
future date you wish to stop coverage.We will 
refund amounts under $2.00 only upon your 
request 
Our Right to Cancel: 
Allstate may cancet all or part of this policy by 
mailing notice to you at your last known 
addres~.lf we cancel because you didn't pay tl)e 
premium, the date of cancellation wm be at least 
1 O ~aysafier the date of mailing.If we cancel for 
any reason other than non-payment of premium, 
we will give you no~ as follows: 
1. During the first59 days·the origin'al policy is 
in effect we will mail'you at least 10days 
notice of canceHation. 
2. After the policy has been in effect tor 60 days 
or more, or if it is a renewal policy, we will 
mail you at least 20 days notice of 
cancellation. 
After your original policy has been in effect for 60 
days or more, Atlstate won!tcaRG!Wor reduce 
your coverage during thepdlicypariod or reftite 
to renew your policy unless: 
1. YO!I don't pay the premium when it's due; 
2. Allstate has mailed notice during the first 59 
days that we don'tiptend to continue the 
policy; 
3. aQy insured violated any of the terrns and 
conditions of the policy; 
4. thQ policy was obtaineO tfirm1gh a IT!ilterial 
misrepresentation; · 
5. YJ>U or 11ny insured has made a.false or 
fraudulent claim or knowingly aided or 
'.=199 
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abetted an other in the presentation of such a 
claim; 
6. you or any other operator who lives in your 
household or who customarily operates your 
insured auto: 
a. has had a driver's licl:lnse suspender:! or 
revoked within the 36 months preceding 
our notice of cancellation or non-
renewal; 
b. has a history 0f,,md is subject to 
epile-psy or heart;attacks, unles:S we 
receive a certificate from a physician 
attesting that, without qualification, that 
person can safely operate a motor 
vehicle; 
c. has an accident or conviction record for 
criminal or traffic violations or a 
physical, mental or other condition such 
that his operation of an auto might 
endanger the public; 
d. has, during the policy period, eng~ged in 
a prearranged competitive speed contest 
while occupying or operat_irig any 
automobile insured und·er this policy; 
e. has been addicted to the use of narcotics 
or other drugs within the 36 months 
preceding our netice of canceliation or 
non-renewal; 
f. used alcohol to excess; 
g. has been convicted of or forfeited bail for 
any of the following offenses within the 
36 months preceding our notice of 
cancellation or non:.:renewal: 
i. any felony; 
ii. criminal negligence which resulted 
in death, homicide, or assault 
arising out of th·el-6peration .of a 
motor vehicle; -
iii. operating a m0t0r'vet1iclewhile in 
an intoxicated,coridition-or while 
under the influence oftdrugs; 
iv. leaving the scene of,an-accident 
without stopping to repo:rt; 
v. theft or unlawful taking of any.motor 
vehicle; 
vi. making fraudulent statements in an 
application for a griyer,'s li~nse; or 
vii. three or more vioiiifions otany law, 
. ordinance or regµJ,atjon limiting the 
speed of a motor vehicle or ofany 
motor vehicle law in any state, 
violation of which is a 
misdemeanor. 
7. your insured auto is: 
a. so mechanically defective that its 
Qperation might endanger public safely; 
b. used in carrying passengers for hire or 
compensation, except thiit the use of an 
auto for a car pool will not be considered 
use of an auto for hire or compensation; 
c. used in the business oftransportation of 
flammables or explosives; 
d. an authorized emergency vehicle; 
e. modified or changed in condition during 
the policy period so as to increase the 
1isk substantially; or 
f. subject to an inspeetion law and has not 
been inspected or, if inspected, has 
tailed to qualify. 
Proof of our mailing the notice of cancellation to 
you at your last mailing address known to us shall 
be sufficient proof of rett1iPt:9tnt>tice,.Covetage 
under this fjolicy will terminate on theJffe,Gtiv.e 
date and time stated on the cancellation· '' 
notice.Your return premium, if any, will be 
calculated on a pro rata basis an_d refunded at the 
time-of cancellation or as soon,iis 1)8ssilile.We 
will reftmd amounts under $2.00 only upon your 
request.However, refund of unearned premium is 
not a condition of cancellation. 
Noi1-Renewal 
If we don't intend to continue thecpolicy beyond 
the current policy period, we will 'mail you rit>tice 
at least 30 days before the ericl of the polfcy 
peiiod.Proof of mailing the notice of non-renewal 
fo you at your last mailing add'ress knilwnfo us 
shall be deemed proof of notice._ 
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Loss Reduction Items 
From time to time, we may provide you with 
certain items designed to help you i:nanage the 
risks you face, loss reduction related items, 
discounts or incentives not otherwise specified 
herein. 
Action Against Allstate 
No suit or action may be brought against us 
unless there has been full compliance with all 
policy terms and conditions. 
If liability has been determined by judgment after 
trial, or by written agreement among the insured, 
the other person, and us, then whoever obtains 
this judgment or agreement against an insured 
person, may sue us up to the limits of this 
policy.However, no one has the right to join us in 
a suit to determine legc1I responsibility. 
Bankruptcy Or Insolvency 
The bankruptcy or insolvency of an insured 
person or that person's estate will not relieve us 
of any obligation under the policy. 
Part 1 
Automobile Liability Insurance 
Bodily Injury Lia'bHitv~ 
Coverage AA 
Property Damage LiabHitv-
Coverage BB 
General Statement of Coverage 
If a premiu_m is shown on the Policy Declarations 
for Bodily Injury Liability CoveJage andJ'rnperty 
Damage Liability Coverage, AHJtate will pay 
damages which an insured person is legally 
obligated to pay because of: 
1. bodily injury sustained-by any person, and 
2. damage to, or destruction of, property. 
Under these coverages, your policy protects an 
insured person from liability for damages arising 
out of the ownership, maintenance or use, loading 
or unloading of an insured auto. 
We will not pay any punitive or exemplary 
damages, fines or penalties under Bodily Injury 
Liability or Property Damage Liability coverage. 
We will defend an insured person sued as a 
resultof a covered accident involving an insured 
auto.We will choose the counsel.We ·ma:y s·eitle 
any claim or suit if we belie'Je' iHs:proper.We will 
not defend an insured person s-ued for damages 
arising out of bodily injury or property damage 
which are not covered by this policy. 
Our Right To Appeal 
If an insured person 6r any other insurer elects 
not to appeal a judgment, we may do so.We will 
pay reasonable costs ~nd in~r.est incidental to the 
appeal.We will not be~fia~.leJqr rrto,re than ihe limit 
shown on your Policy o'edafations plus the 
re;isonable costs and interest inc,fdenfal to· the 
appeal. · 
Add,jtional Payments. Aflstite WIIIJWake 
When,we defend an insured person 'under Part 1, 
we will pay: 
1. up to $50 a day forJtl~ l~s ofs~ges or 
salary ttwe ask that pers,on to,attep~ 
hearings ortrials to defend against a ~odily 
injury,suit.We won't pay for los.s,:otoiher 
ioc;ome.We will pay other reasonable 
expenses incurred at·ouue(ftlflSt 
2. courtcostsforde'fense. . . , ., 
3. interest accruing on a judgmen.te~tered 
againstyou, but only on that part of a 
judgr:pent entered against\yautwl.dGtutoes 
not e>Cc:eed our limits oHiability.rirrttil·suct:r 
time as we have paid, formallyoffered;.,or 
corwiti<mally or unconmtionaUy,de:positedin 
cotJrt, the amountfor whichwa,are,liable 
under this policy.This means'-that:u"nderno 
circumstances will we pay interest on that 
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part of a judgment entered against you which 
exceeds ou,r stated limits o'f H~bility. 
4. premiums on appeal bonds ~nd on bonds to 
release attachments, but not in excess of our 
limit of liability.We have rio-obiig,~tion, 
however, to apply for or furnishlhese bpnds. 
We will repay an insli.red person for: 
1. the cost of any bail bpnqs rnqµired because 
of an accident or trafficlaw violation 
involving the use of the Jn~ured 
auto.Payment won't exceed $300 per 
bond.We have no obligation to apply.for or 
furnish a bond. 
2. reasonable expenses incurred by an insured 
person for first aid to other persons at the 
time of an auto accident involving the 
insured auto. 
AddlUonal Definition For Part 1 
"Insured Person(s)" means: 
1. While using your insured auto: 
a. you, 
b. any resident, 
c. and any other person using it with your 
permission. 
2. While using a non-owned auto: 
a. you, and 
b. any resident relative. 
Exclusions - What Is Not Covered 
Allstate will not pay for any damages an insured 
person is legally obligated tQ pay because of: 
1. bodily injury or proper1y #rnage resu!tlng 
from the ownership, maintenance or u'se, 
loading or unloading of the insured autd"by 
any person as an employee ot,tlle United 
States government, while aGtlng withitthe 
scope of such employmerit'.thi~ eicl~sion _ 
applies only if the prqv,isions of the Federal 
Tort Claims Act, as afu~ndiid, require the 
Attorney General of the United States to 
defend that person in any civil aGtion or 
proceeding which may be tirou'ghtfor tbe' 
bodily injury or property damage. 
2. bodily injury or property damage arising out 
Qf the use of an insured a~towhile used to 
carry persons or property-fora charge, or the 
use ofany auto an insured person is clriving 
while available for hire by the public.This 
exclusion does not apply to shared-expense 
car pools. 
3. bodily injury or property damage arising out 
of auto or motor vet:ticle business operations 
such as repairing, servicJng, testing, 
washing, parking, storing or selling of'autos 
or motor vehicles.However, this exclusion 
does not apply to you, resident relatives, 
partners or employees of the partnership of 
which you ora resident relative are a partner, 
when using your insur,ed auto. 
4. bodily injury or property damage arising out 
of the use of a non-owned -auto, in any 
business or occupation of an insured 
person.However, thisilxclusiondoes not 
apply while you, your chauffeur, or domestic 
servant are using an auto or trailer. 
5. bodily injury or property damage arising out 
of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a 
motor vehicle with less than four wheels. 
6. bodily injury to an employee of any insured 
person arising out of or in the course of 
employment.This exclusion does not apply to 
your demestic employee who is not requfted 
to be covered by a workers' compensation 
law or similar law. 
7. bodily injury to a co-worker irijuredfaJJ:re 
course of employment.This exclusion·does 
not apply to you. 
8. damage to or destruction of property an 
insured person owns, transports, is in 
charge of, or rents.However, a private 
residence or a garage-rentecl by;that person 
is,covered. 
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9. bodily injury or property damage intended 
by, or reasonably ex:pected to result from, the 
intentional or criminal acts or omissions of, 
an insured person.This exclusion applies 
even if: 
a. such insured person lacks the mental 
capacity to control or govern his or her 
conduct; 
b. such insured person is temporarilY 
insane or temporarily lacks the mental 
capacity to control or govern his or her 
conduct or is temporarily unable to form 
any intent to cause ·bodily injury or 
property damage; 
c. such bodily injuiy or property damage 
is of a different;kinif or,degree than 
intended or reasonably expected;,or 
d. such bodily injury or property damage 
is sustained bra different person than 
intended or reasonably expeeted. 
This exclusion applies regardless of,whether 
an insured person,is actually charged with, 
or convicted of, a crime. 
This exclusion precludes coverage for all 
insured persons under the pelicy regardless 
of whether the person seeking cove rage 
participated in any way in the intentional or 
criminal acts or omissions. 
10. bodily injury or property damage which: 
would also be cove.red under nuclear energy 
liability insu ranee.This appli!!s even if the 
limits of that insurance are exhausted. 
11. bodily injury or property, darnage arising out 
of the participation in,any prearranged or 
organized racing or speed contest, or in 
practice or preparation for any contest of this 
type. 
Financial Responsibility 
When this policy is certified as proof underany. 
motor vehicle financial responsibility law, the 
insurance under this part of the policy will comply 
with the provisions of that law. - -
limits Of liability 
The limits shown on the Policy Declarations are 
th'e maximum we will pay for any single accident 
involving an insured auto.The fim\tstafed for 
e.ti:h person for bodily injqif is'"ihii totafltmit of 
liatiility for all damages be'ccfuse of bodily injury 
sustained by one person, including ~II damag~s 
sustained by anyone else as~ [esuft:ofth,al bodJly 
injury .Subject to the lirriitfor each person, the 
linlit stated for each accident is ouifotal limit of 
iiability for all damages for bodily fojury.For 
property damage, the limit stated for each 
accident is our total limit oflrablrify for property 
damage sustained in any single accident involving 
an insured auto. · 
The liability limits shown on the Policy 
Declarations may not be added to the limits for 
similar coverage applying to other motor vehicles 
to determine the limit of insu ranee coverage 
available.This applies regardless of the number of: 
1. policies involved; 
2. vehicles involved; 
3. persons covered; 
4. claims made; 
5. vehicles or premiums shown on the Policy 
Declarations; or 
6. premiums paid. 
There will be no duplication of payments made 
under the Bodily Injury Liab{lity arid UniM.ured 
Motorists lnsu ranee of this. policy, 
c:/ , 
THIS MEANS THAT NO STACKING OR 
AGGREGATION OF AUTOMOOliE'U;i.8lltTY 
tNStllrANCE-BODILY ~~ll:JRY'~NP'PifQPEJlTY 
DAMAGE WHATSOEVER Will B. E ALLOWEifBV 
. . ., . . 
THIS POLICY. 
If-none of the autos shown 011 the' P'oiicy 
Declarations is involved in tfie accident, the 
highest limit of liability shown on the Policy 
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Declarations for any one auto will apply. 
An auto and attached trailer are considered one 
auto.Also, an auto and a mounted camper unit, 
topper, cap, or canopy are considered one auto. 
If There Is Other Insurance 
If more than one policy applies on a primary basis 
to an accident involving your insured auto, we 
will bear our prop.ortionate share with other 
collectible liability insurance. 
If an insured person is using a substitute auto or 
non-owned auto, our liability insurance will be 
excess over other collectible insurance.However, 
if an insured person is operating an insured auto 
which is owned by a person, firm, or corporation 
in the business of selling, leasing, re'pairing, 
servicing, delivering, testing, road testing, 
parking, or storing motor vehicles, our liability 
insurance will apply on a primary basis. 
Additional Interested Parties 
If one or more additional interested parties are 
listed on the Policy Declarations, the Automobile 
liability Insurance coverages of this policy will 
apply to those parties as insureds. 
We will mail or deliver at least 20 days notice to 
an additional interested party if we cancel or make 
any changes to this policy which adversely affect 
that party's interest. 
Our notice will be considered properly given if 
mailed to the last known address of the additional 
interested party. · · 
The naming of an additional interested party does 
not increase that party's right to recovery under 
this policy, nor does it impose an obligation for 
the payment of premiums undettliis policy. 
Part2 
Automobile Medical Payments 
Coverage CC 
General Statement of Coverage 
If a premium is shown on the Policy Declarations 
for Automobile Medical Payments, Allst,te will 
pay to or on behatf of an insur.ed person all 
reasonable expenses actually incurred by the 
insured person for necessary mediQal treatment, 
medical services or medical products actually 
provided to the insured pers.onby a state 
licensed health care provider .Ambulance, 
hospital, medical, surgical, X-ray, dental, 
orthopedic and prosthutic devices, professional 
n u:rs irig services, pharmaceutical$, ,yeglasses, 
hearing aids, and funeral expenses are 
covered.Payment will be made only when bodily 
injury is caused by a motor vehli:.le accident. 
The costs of treatment, service.,,, or.products 
must be incurred within one year after the 
accldent or within three years if the'injury has 
been discovered and treated Wilhio one,year from 
the da,te of.:the accident. This wllf be extended to 
five¥ears tf the amount of insurance shown on 
the Policy Declarations for this cove rag~ is more 
than $5,000. 
T:llis coverage does not apply to any person to the 
extent that the treatment iscovereq unde[any 
workers' compensation law. · · ·· · · 
Additional Definitions For Part 2 
t ·rnsured Person(s)" means~ 
a. You and any residentn~liffiy,e who 
sustains bodily Injury while in, on, 
getting into or out of, or getting on or off 
of, or when stru,ck ;uu p~des..tria.!1 by a 
motor vehii:le oUrailenThe use oh 
non-owned aut~ ~ust be with the 
owner's permission. 
b. Any other pers.onwho·susntins·bodlly 
injury while in, on, getting into or out o.f, 
or getting on or off of: 
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i. Your insured auto while being used 
as a vehicle by you, a resident 
relative, or any other person with 
your permission. 
ii. A non-owned auto or trailer if the 
injury results from the operation or 
occupanc;fby: 
(a) you, 
(b) your private chauffeur or 
domestic servant on your 
behalf, or 
(c) a resident relative. 
The use of any non-owned auto must be with 
the owner's permission. 
2. "Motor Vehicle' means a land motor vehicle 
designed for use on public roads. 
Exclusions-What Is Not Covered 
This coverage does not apply to bodily injury: 
1. intended by, or reasonably expected to result 
from, the intentional or criminal acts or 
omissions of an insured person.This 
exclusion applies even if: 
a. an insured person lacks the mental 
capacity to control or govern his or her 
own conduct; 
b. an insured person is temporarily insane 
or temporarily lacks the mental capacity 
to control or govern his or her conduct 
or is temporarily unable to form any 
intent to cause bodily injury; 
c. such bodily injury is of a different kind 
or degree than intended or reasonably 
expected; or 
d. such bodily injury is sustained by a 
different person than intended or 
reasonably expected. 
This exclusion applies regardless of whether 
or not an insured person is actually charged 
with, or convicted of, a crime. 
This exclusion precludes coverage for any 
insured persons under the policy regardless 
of whether the person see~ng ~Jverage 
p~rtiGipated in any way in the intentional or 
criminal acts or omissions. 
2. to you or a resident relative while in on 
getting into or out of, or getting on -~r off of, 
an auto owned by you or a resident relative 
which is not insured for this coverage. 
3. to you or a resident relative while in on 
getting into or out of, getting on or ~ff of, or 
struck as a pedestrian by: 
a. a vehicle operated on rails or crawler-
treads; or 
b. a vehicle or other equipment designed 
for use off public roads, while not on 
public roads. 
4. to any person while in, on, getting intQ or out 
of, or getting on or off ot · 
a. an auto owned by you or a resident 
reJative while available for hire by the 
public.This exclusion does not apply to 
shared-expense car pools; or 
b. an auto or trailer while used as a 
residence or premises ... 
5. to any person, other than you or a resident 
rel~tive, while using a non-owned auto: 
a. which is available fQJ ~ir~ by the public; 
b. ·in·auto or motor vehicle lltisfness 
operations sucri~i rep~fting, servk:ing, 
testing, washing, parlcin'g, storing or 
selling of autos or motor vehicles; or 
c. in any other business qr occupatiqn, 
,,,,yOV;t:@Oe is provided for yoil or your pnvate 
chauff~r or domestic servant while using an 
irtsured auto or trailer in ~ny other business 
or occupation. · · 
6. caused by war or Wet~ a#ts, inclu~ihg, but 
not limited to, insurrection, rebellion, or 
revolution. 
7. to any person when bodily injury arises out 
of participation in any prearranged or 
organized racing or speed contest or in 
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practice or preparation for any contest of this 
type. 
8. to any person or dependent of a person to 
the extent that such person or dependent is 
eligible to receive benefits provided by the 
U.S. government under a contract of 
employment including past or present 
military duty. 
We will reimburse the U.S. government, as 
required in Chapter 55 of Title 1 o of the U.S. 
Code, for expenses covered under this part 
of the policy when itincurs such expenses on 
behalf of an insured pers'on through a facility 
of the uniformed services. 
Limit Df Liability 
The limit shown on the Policy Declarations is tfie 
maximum we will pay for all expenses incurred by 
or for each person as the result of any one motor 
vehicle accident. 
The Automobile Medical Payments limit of liability 
shown on the Policy Declarations may not b~ 
added to the limit(s) for similar coveraQ.e applying 
to other autos or motor vehicles to determine the 
limit of insurance coverage available.This applies 
regardless of the number of: 
1. policies involved; 
2. vehicles involved; 
3. persons covered; 
4. claims made; 
5. vehicles or premiums shown on the Policy 
Declarations; or 
6. premiums paid. 
THIS MEANS THAT NO STACKING OR 
AGGREGAllON OF AUTOMOBILE MEDICAL 
PAYMENTS WHATSOEVER WILL BE ALLOWED 
BVTHIS POLICY. 
If none of the autos shown on the Policy 
Declarations is involved in the accident, the 
highest limit of liability shown an the Policy 
Declarations for any one auto will apply. 
If an insured person dies as the result of a 
cqve,req motor vehicle accident, we will pay the 
least ofthe following as a fune~I expen,ses 
benefit: 
1. $2,000; or 
2. the Automobile MedicaLPayments, limit of 
liability stated on the Policy O~clarations; or 
3. the remaining portion of the Alltomobile 
Medical Payments limit of liability not 
expended for other covered medical 
expenses. 
This funeral service expenses benefit does not 
increase, and will not be paid in additioil. to, the 
limit of liability shown on the Policy Declarations 
forAutomobile Medical Payments. Thjs benefit is 
payable to the. deceased i11srfred lllll'.SOP~S ~po.4se 
Ha r~sident of the same household at the time of 
the accidentHowever, if the deceased is a minor, 
the benefit is payable to either parent who is a 
resident of the same household at the time of the 
accident In all other cases, the benefiUs payab~ 
to the deceased insured person's ilstc\te. 
There will be no duplication of payments made 
under the Bodily lnjuryliabillty Coverage, 
Uninsured'Motorists Insurance, and Automobile 
Medical Payments Coverage of this policy. All 
payments made to or on behaH of any person 
under this coverage will be considered as 
advanc;e payments to tl)at persop. Any dama~es 
payable under the Bodily lnjul}'liability Coverage 
or Uninsured Motorists Insurance of this policy 
will be reduced by that amount 
Unreasonable Or Unnecessaiy Medlcal 
Expenses 
It the insured person incurs medical expenses 
which we deem to be umea~~friable or -. 
unnecessary, we may refuse to pay for those 
medical expenses and contest tkeni. 
If the insured person is sued by a medical 
setvices provider because we refus"e to. pay 
medical expenses which w.e deerri to be 
unreasonable or unnecessary; we will pay 
resultin'g defense costs, anif pay any resulting 
judgment against the insured person, up to the 
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Automobile Medical Payments policy limit We 
will choose the counsel. The insured person must 
cooperate with us in the defense of any claim or 
lawsuit. If we ask the insured person to attend 
hearings or trials, we will payup fo $50 per day 
for loss of wages or salary. We Will also pay other 
reasonable expenses incurred at our request. 
No insured person may sue Allstate for medical 
expenses Allstate deems unreasonable or 
unnecessary unless: 
1. the insured person has paid the entire 
disputed amount to the medical services 
provider; or 
2. the medical services provider has expressly 
threatened or initiated collection activity 
toward the insured person. 
If There Is Other Insurance 
When this coverage applies to a substitute auto 
ornon-owned auto, Ailstate will pay only after all 
other collectible auto medical insurance nas been 
exhausted. When this coverage applies to a 
replacement auto or additional auto, this policy 
\Nill not apply if you have other collectible auto 
medical insurance. 
Part3 
Uninsured Motorists lnsur~nce 
Coverage SS 
General Statement of- Cover,age 
If a premium is shown on the Policy Declarations 
for Uninsured Motorists ln~u.ra,nce, we .will p~y 
damages which an insured person ~,legally · 
entitled to recover from the owne.r of 9perator of 
an uninsured auto because of bodilyJnjury 
sustained by an insured person. 
The bodily injury must be caused by accid~!)t and 
arise out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of 
an uninsured auto. We will not pay any punitive or 
exemplary damages, fines or penalties under 
Uninsured Motorists lns1nance. 
An Uninsured Auto Is: 
1. a motor vehicle which has no bodily injury 
liability bond or insurance policy in effect at 
the time of the accident. 
2. a motor vehicle covered by a bond or 
insurance policy which doesn't provide at 
least the minimum financial security 
requirements of the state ih which your 
insured auto is principally garaged. 
3. a motorvehicleforw,h~h the ins,urer, other 
th~n-Allstate under thjs,,p9ricy, denies 
coverage or becomesinsolv~nt. 
4. a hit•and-run motorvehil:lewtiich causes 
bqdily injury to ~niosured person by 
physical contact witl1 the insured pei:so~ or 
with a vehicle occupied by that person. The 
ic;leqtity of the operator and the owner of the 
ve'h1cle must be unknown. The accident must 
be r8-ported within 24 hours to the proper 
authorities. We must be notified within 30 
day~. ff the insured .person was occupying a 
vehicle at the time of the accident, we have a 
right to inspect it. 
Ari Uninsured Auto Is Not 
1. ii mobtr nhicle tliatJs .lawfully self-insured. 
2. a mDtorvehicle which is insured under the 
AlttQmobile Liability Insurance of this policy. 
3. a.nlcttclr vehicle owned by any federal, state, 
or IQCBl government or agency. 
Addithlnal DellnHlons For Part 3 
1. ·insured Perso .. (s)"means: 
a. you and any resident relative. 
b. ;my person while in, on, getting into or 
out of, or getting on or off, an insured 
iauto with your permission. 
c. any other person who:is legally entitled 
to-recover because of'bodily injuryto 
you, a resident relative, or an occupant 
.of your insured auto with your 
permission. 
2. "Motor Vehicle" means a land. mbtorvehicle 
o.rtrailer other than: 
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a. a vehicle or other equipment designed 
for use off public roads, while not on 
public roads, 
b. a vehicle operated on rails or crawler-
treads, or 
c. a vehicle when used as a residence or 
premises. 
Exclusions- Wllat Is Not Covered 
Allstate will not pay any damages an insured 
person is legally entitled to recover because of: 
1. bodily injury to any person, if that person or 
that person's legal representative makes a 
settlement without our written consent. This 
will include any payment made by any person 
on behalf of the uninsured motorist. 
2. bodily injury while in, on, getting into or out 
of, or getting on or off of a vehicle which you 
own which is insured for this coverage under 
another policy. This exclusi~n does not apply 
to you or resident relatives. 
3. bodily injury if the payment directly or 
indirectly benefits any workers compensation 
or disability benefits insurer. This includes a 
self-insurer. 
4. bodily injury arising out of the use of an 
insured auto while used to carry persons or 
property for a charge, or the use of any auto 
an insured person is driving while available 
for hire by the public. This exclusion doe.snot 
apply to shared-expense car pools. 
5. bodily injury sustained while in, on, getting 
into or out of, getting on or off of, or when 
struck by a vehicle owned by or available or 
furnished for the regular use of, you or a 
resident which is notinsured for this 
coverage. 
6. bodily injury while in, on, getting into or out 
of, getting on or off of, or wherd,triick by an 
uninsured auto owned by or available or 
furnished for the regular us·e of you or a 
resident.--
Limits Of Liability 
The coverage limit shown on the Policy 
Declarations for: 
1. 'each person" is the maximum that we will 
pay for damages arising out of bodily injury 
to one person in any one motor vehicle 
accident, including damages sustained by 
anyone else as a result of that bodily injury. 
2. ~each accident' is the maximum we will pay 
for damages arising out of all bodily i11jury in 
any one motor vehicle accident. This limit is 
subject to the limit for "each person." 
The liability limits shown on the Policy 
Declarations for Uninsured Motorists Insurance 
may not be added to the limits for similar 
coverage applying to other-motor vehicles to 
determine the limit of insurance coverage 
available. This applies regardless of the number 
of: 
l policies involved; 
2. vehicles involved; 
3. persons covered; 
4 .. claims.made; 
5. vehicles or premiums shown in the Policy 
Declarations; or 
6. pr~miums paid. 
THIS.MEANS THAT NO STACKING OR 
AGGREGATION OF UNINSURED MOTORISTS 
INSURAN'Ct WHATSOEVER WILL BE ALLOWED 
BY THIS POLICY. . 
The Uninsured Motorists Insurance limits apply to 
each ins_ured auto as shown on the Policy 
Declarations. 
If hone of the autos shown on th~ Policy 
:oetlarations is involved in the actjdea.L the 
highest limits of liability showri on the Policy 
D1fclarations for any one auto will apply. 
Damages payable under U11insurecl r0otorlsts 
Insurance shall be red1Jbe~1>y:. . . , ~ 
f. · a1Farhciunts paid or payable .by or Oh liWalf . 
of any person or organization that rri'ay'be 
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legally responsible for the bodily injury for 
which the payment is made, including, but 
not limited to, any amounts paid under the 
bodily injury liability coverage of this or any 
other insurance policy. 
2. air amounts paid or pay;ible under any 
workers' compensation law, disability 
benefits law, or similar law, Automobile 
Medical Payments, or any similar automobile 
medical payments coverage. 
Non-Duplication Of Benefits 
No injured person will recover duplicate benefits 
for the same elements of loss under this or any 
other uninsured motorists insurance, including 
approved plans of setf-insurance. 
If There Is Other Insurance 
If the insured person was in, on, getting into or 
out of, or getting on or off of, a vehicle you do not 
own which is insured for this coverage under 
another policy, this coverage will be excess. This 
means that when the insured person is legally 
entitled to recover damages in excess of the other 
policy limit, we will pay up to your policy limit, but 
only after the other insurance has been 
exhausted. No insured person may recover 
duplicate benefits for the same elements of lo.ss 
under this coverage and the otherfosurance. 
If more than one policy applies to the accident on 
a primary basis, the total benefits payable to any 
one person will not exceed the maximum benefits 
payable by the policy with the highest limit for 
uninsured motorists benefits. We will bear our 
proportionate share with other uninsured 
motorists benefits. This will apply no matter how 
many autos or auto policies may be involved 
whether written by Allstate or'another company. 
that person recovers from any responsible 
party or insurer. 
2. all rights of recovery against any responsible 
party or insurer must be maintained and 
preserved for our benefit. 
3. insured persons, if we ask, must take proper 
action in their own name to recm.,erdamages 
from any responsible party or insuret W.e 
will select the attorney and pay all related 
costs and fees. 
We will not ask the insured person to sue the 
insured of an insolvent insurer. 
Payment Of Loss By Allstate 
Any amount due is payable ·to the ,insured person, 
to the parent or guardian of an insured per.son 
who is an·injured minor, or to the s~ouse of any 
insured person who dies. HoWever, we may pay 
any person lawfully entitled to recover the 
damages. 
~galAcflons 
No :onQ may sue us under this coverage unless 
thete/ls full compliance with all the policy terms 
and conditions. 
If, at a·n)(~me before we pay for the loss, an 
insured ~t;r.son institutes a suit against anyone 
b~lieved 're~ponsible for the accident, we must be 
given 'a copy of the summons and complaint or 
other prOQ!ss. If a suit is brought without our 
written consent, we aren't bound by any resulting 
judgrrierit 
If We Ciumot Agree 
If ttr~ in,,ir.ttd person and we d,qn't agree on that 
pera,on'~J(ght to receive damages or on the 
an:i~~~t •. m,er upon rnutual written consent, the 
Trust Agreement disagreement wm be settled by ~rfli~icm. If.the 
When we pay any person unqer thi~ cov~r~ge: i.~urtd, p,e_"on and 111e ~o nota.q{lie:tp ~rbltrate, 
1. we a re entitled to repaymenfofamoimts paid l!len.Jh, d.is,greement will~ re~<>lved io a court 
by us and related colleG~on.exP,enses.t>ut of ofco1J,1Petentjurisdlction. The arb~rato{J willn.ot 
the proceeds ~f ~~y seUl~mepf.J>!Jl!-r!9.::..cITT:.;;.en,;:,;t ___ bavidhe poWQrJo __ d!!_c:jp~JIOY Jltspiftuega[Cf/ng ____ _ 
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the nature or the amo.untof the covenme 
provided by the policy or claims for damages 
outside the terms of the policy, including, but not 
limited to, claims for bad faith, fraud, 
misrepresentation, punitive or exemplary 
damages, attorney fees and/or interest. 
Arbitration will take place under the rules of the 
American Arbitration Association or as agreed to 
by the parties. 
Regardless of the method of arbitration, any 
award not exceeding the limits of the Rnancial 
Responsibility law of Idaho, will be binding and 
may be entered as a judgment in a proper court. 
Regardless of the method of arbitration, when any 
arbitration award exceeds the Financial 
Responsibility limits in the State of Idaho, either 
party has a right to trial on all issues in a court of 
competent jurisdiction. This right must be 
exercised within 60 days of the award, Costs, 
including attorney fees, are to be paid by the party 
incurring them. 
Part4 
Protection Against Loss To The 
Auto 
Other information applicable to all these 
coverages appears after all the cover~ge 
descriptions. 
Auto Collision Insurance 
Coverage DD 
ff a premium is shown on the P.olicy Declarations 
for Auto Collision Insurance, Allstate will pay for 
direct and accidental loss to an insure·d auto from 
a collision with another object or by upset of that 
auto or trailer. 
Auto Comprehensive Insurance 
Coverage HH 
If a premium is show.n on the Policy Declarations 
for Auto Comprehensive Insurance, Altst1te;will 
pay for direct and accidentaMoss to an Insured 
auto not caused by collision. Loss caused by 
missiles, railing objects, fire, theft or larceny, 
explosion, earthquake, windstorm, hail, water, 
flood, malicious mischief or vandalism, and riot or 
civil commotion is covered. Glijss breakage, 
whether or not caused by collision, and collision 
with a bird or animal is covered. Plastic or other 
materials used by the manufacturer as substitutes 
for glass will also be considered glass: 
If by agreement between you and Allstate, glass 
is repaired rather than rep1aced, the deductible 
amount will not be subtracted from a glass 
breakage loss. 
Towing And. Labor Costs 
CoverageJJ 
If a premium is shown on the Policy Declarations 
forTowing and LaborCosts,.AJlstatewill.pay 
costs for labor performed at the initial place of 
disablement and for towing made nece.ssary by 
the disablement of an insured auto. The to~I limit 
of our liability for towing and labor caused ,by a 
single loss is stated on the Policy Declarations. 
LeaJe Qr Loan Gap Coverage 
CQVercto.e.LG 
If a premium is shown on the Policy Declarations 
for Lease Or Loan Gap Coverage, and if the 
amount you owe under the,term~ of the auto 
lease or loan agreement on yoqr auto exceeds the 
actual cash value of the a11tq, then Allstate will 
pay the difference be~~n the~eamountsJn.the 
event of a tolal loss due to p~yslG3l(l;im~e. or 
theft of that auto. We m~y, pay you ~nd '1@:lessor 
or l[eoholder named on the Policy Declarations. 
Lease Or loan Gap Coverage apr,_lies onw itJ.OU 
have both Auto Collision ,a,nd:t~ompreh.ensiv.e 
Insurance in effect under this °j101icy.aod:Jhe !Rss 
is CQVerep 1,1nder either cwel'clge. Tp~ coy.eJt_ge 
apP.,lie(o)lly to the original J,e~se pr lo,an wfitten 
ortyour'iruto and appli~s Ql)ly ifyour,mo~~ 
riot;previously titled. If, according to the 
information you have given11s;the le;lse or loan 
ends during the policy period, we wiil stop this 
Page17 
coverage at the end of that policy period. 
However, you must tell us if you want this 
coverage to end at an earlier date. 
Repair Or Replacement Cost Coverage 
Coverage RC 
If a premium is shown on the Policy Declarations 
for Repair Or Replacement Cost Coyerage, it will 
be Allstate's option to pay to repair or replace the 
auto to which this coverage applies as shown on 
the Policy Declarations fora covered loss ~you 
have purchased both Auto Collision Insurance 
and Auto Comprehensive Insurance and either 
coverage is applicable to the loss. This coverage 
does not apply to loss caused by fire, theft, 
larceny or flood. 
This coverage will continue until the first policy 
renewal after the coverage has been in effect for 
three years. Repair Or Replacement Cost 
Cove rage does not automatically 'transfer to any 
replacement auto or additional,auto aequired 
during the policy period. This coverage does not 
apply to any other vehicle, including, but not 
limited to, additional autos, replacement autos, 
or substitute autos. 
Rental Reimbursement Coverage 
Coverage UU 
If a premium is shown on the Policy Declarations 
for Rental Reimbursement Coverage, and if you 
have an auto accident, or the entire insured auto 
is stolen, Allstate will reimburse you fotyour cost 
of renting an auto from a rental agency,or garage. 
We will not pay more than the dollar amount per 
day shown on the Policy Declarations. 
If an insured auto is disabled by a collision or 
comprehensive loss, coverage starts the day of 
the loss. If the entire insured"aufo is stolen, 
coverage begins the day you report the theft to 
1. if an insured auto is disabled by a collision or 
compr~hensive loss, completion of the 
repairs or replacement of the auto; 
2. if an insured auto is stolen, when we offer 
settlement or your auto is returned to use; or 
3. thirty full days oh:overage. 
Sound System Coverage 
Coverage lA 
/fa premium is shown on \he Po/icy Declarations 
for Sound-System Coverage, Allstate will pay for 
loss to a sound system. 
Sound System Coverage applies only jf Auto 
Comprehensive Insurance is in effect under this 
policy. This coverage makes sou,nd systems 
insured property under the term~ of both Auto 
Collision Insurance and Auto Compreh~nsive 
Insurance. The limit of our liability is shown on 
the Policy Declarations. 
Tape Coverage 
CQvor.ane u ' 
It i~fu1urn is shown:on the Policy Declarations 
foFifaptt'Coverage, Allstate will pay for loss to 
any tapes-, compact discs or similar items used 
with auto sound systems. Coverage app~to 
property owned by you or a resident relative that 
is in or upon your insured auto at the time of the 
loss. The 'total limit of our rrability for each loss is 
shown on the Policy Declarations. 
This coverage appries only if.you have Auto 
Corripfeherisive Insurance under the policy. Tape 
Coverage makes tapes, compactdiscs, or:similar 
~ITJ~'ihsuted property under your Auto 
Comprehensive Insurance. 
us. If an insured auto is driveab/e, coverage starts 
the day the auto is taken to the garage for repairs. 
AdqiU.;111~1 Paymen_ts Allstate WIii Make 
UnderPatl4 
1. · AllstaJe will pay up to,$200 -for loss of 
clo.thing and personaHuggage, including its 
contents, belonging to,you<0r:a resident 
--- -- -· ·-----.. ~----relative while it is inorupoityour insure{ 
Coverage ends when whichever ofthe following 
occurs first: 
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auto. This provision does not apply if the 
insured auto is a traveHrailer. 
This coverage applies only when: 
a. the loss is caused by collision and you 
have purchased Auto Co.Uision 
Insurance; 
b. the entire auto is stolen, and·you have 
purchased Auto Comprehensive 
Insurance; or 
c. physical damage is done to the auto and 
to the clothing and luggage caused by 
earthquake, explosion; falling objects, 
fire, lightning or flood and you have 
purchased Auto Comprehensive 
Insurance. 
The amount stated under paragraph 1 above 
is the maximum we will.pay, regardless-of 
the number of vehicles insured. 
2. If you have purchased Auto Collision or Auto 
Comprehensive lnstHance under this policy, 
Allstate will pay general average and.salvage 
charges imposed when your insured auto is 
being transported. 
Additional Definitlonsifor Part 4 
1. •camper Unitu means a demountable unit 
designed to be used as·temporary,living 
quarters, including all equipment and 
accessories built into arid forming a 
permanent part of the unit A camper unit 
does not include:, 
a. caps, tops, or canopies designed for use 
as protection of the cargo· area of a 
utility auto; or 
b. radio or televisiti'tl antennas, awnings, 
cabanas, or equipment designed to 
create additional off-h"ighwaY living 
facilities. 
2. "Insured Person(s)" means: 
a. While using your insured auto: 
i. you, 
ii. any resident, 
iii. and any other person using it with 
your permission. 
b. While using a non-owned auto: 
i. you, and 
ii. any resident relative. 
3. "Motor Home" means a self-propelled land 
motor vehicle equipped,designed oF used as 
a living quarters. 
4. "Sound System" n,eans ~ny device 
permanently installed in~ide your.insured 
auto by bolts, brac~ets,or other similar 
means designed for: 
a. voice or video transmission, or for voice 
or video reception; or 
b. recording or playing back recorded 
material; or 
c. supplying power to cellular or similar 
telephone equipment, 
and which is installed in a location other than 
the one designed by the auto's manufacturer 
for that device. 
A sound system also includes antennas or 
other apparatus in or on your insured auto 
used specifically with.f,hat system, if 
permanently installed-, Ap~~JUs de!lS not 
include sound reproducing,me.d@ such as 
compact discs or cassette,tapes. A sound 
system does not include any equipment that 
is externally exposed except toqmtennas. 
5. ''T ravel-traileru mean~ a:tr.ailer ott,1e house, 
cabin or camping typ11 equipped or U$ed 3$'.3 
living quarters. 
bos-ses We Do Not Coverllnder-Ge~rages 
DD HH JJ LG RD UU- ZA _ai,i.., "J''I', , , , , ~ . , ,111,ua 
Wedo not cover loss to the ~rope~dest:nbed in 
Coverage DD-Auto Colliston·fosu'rance; 
Coverage HH-Auto Comprehensive lnsunfnpe, 
CQVerage JJ- Towing ind tafilrCosfs, 
Coverage L~ - Lease Or Loan Gap {;9V_erage, 
Coverage RC-RepairOiRepla&,merit Cos't 
Coverage, Coverage UU-'Renfaj . 
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Reimbursement Coverage, Coverage 7.A-
Sound System Coverage, and Coverage ZZ-
Tape Coverage, consisting of or caused by: 
1. property damage intended by, or reasonably 
expected to result from the intentional or 
criminal acts or omissions of, an insured 
person. This exclusron applies even if: 
a. an insured person lacks the mental 
capacity to control or govern his or her 
own conduct; 
b. an insured person is temporarily insane 
or temporarily lacks,the mental capacity 
to control or govern his orher conduct 
or is temporarily unable to form any 
intent to cause property damage; 
c. such property damage is of a different 
kind or degree than:intended or 
reasonably expected; or 
d. such property damage is sustained by a 
different person than intended or · 
reasonably expected. 
This exclusion applies regardless of whether 
an insured person is actually charged with, 
or convicted of, a crime. 
This exclusion precludes coverage for any 
insured persons under the policy regardless 
of whether the person seekino coverage 
participated in any way in the intentional or 
criminal acts or omissions. 
2. property damage arising out of the use ofany 
auto used to carry persons or property for a 
charge, or the use of any auto,an insured 
person is driving while available torhire by 
the public. This exclusion does not apply to 
shared-expense car pools. 
3. any damage or loss,to any·non-owned auto 
arising out of auto or motpr v,Wch,l1ebusiness 
operations such a$ repaitingir servicing, 
testing, washing, parking, stQfing, br selling 
of autos or motor vehicles ... 
4. any damage or loss to"ii'ny ngn-own1,1d auto 
with more than four wheels. ···· 
5. any damage.or loss r~$Jlting from any act of 
war, insurrection, rebellion or revolution. 
6. any damage or loss due.to radioactive 
contamination. 
7. any damage or loss resulting from: 
a. wear and tear; 
b. freezing; or 
c. mechanical or electrical breakdown 
unless the damage is the burning of wiring 
used to connect electrical (.Wmponents, or 
the result of other loss covered by this policy. 
8. loss to tires unless stolen or damaged by fire, 
malicious mischief on,andalism. Coverag.e is 
provided if the damage to tires occurs at the 
,same time and from the same cause as other 
loss covered by this poky, . 
9. loss to any sound system within .your 
insured auto. Coverages under this Part also 
will not apply to any apparatus in or on your 
insured auto designeif, for use with ;that 
system. This exclusion,will,not apply if you 
have purchased Sound System Coverage. 
10~ loss to any tapes, compact discs or similar 
items. This exclusion will notapply'ifYDU 
purchased Tape Cove,age undertlils policy. 
11. loss to a camper untt:whether or not 
mounted. This exclusion wuinotapply if the 
camper unit is described on the Porrcy 
Declarations. 
12. loss to appliances, furniture, equipmefltand 
accessories that are noi btJJltinto:qr,f.orroJng 
a permanent part of a 111ot,r,h11rne qr:lf'.,,n~l-
frailer. 
13. loss to your motor home or m~HMr11iler, 
while rented to anyoneelsq unless a,&peG.iflC 
premium is shown on the Policy Declarations 
for the rented vehicle. 
14. loss arising out of partie::ipation in.any 
prearranged or organized racing or speed 
coutes.t or iJJ practice 9r prepafatio11 tor any 
cqn~t of this type. 
15. confiscation or seizure by a g9vemrnent 
authority. 
16. loss. due to conversion or embezzlement by 
;iny pe,;son who has the vehicle due,tp any 
rental, lease, lien or sales agr!)~f1;r1t. 
17. home, office, store, display, or passenger 
naiJers or travel-trailers. This exclusion wil.1 
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not apply if the item is described on the 
Policy Declarations. 
18. any device that is designed for the detection 
of radar or laser. 
Payment Of Loss By Allstate 
Allstate may pay for the loss in money, or may 
repair or replace the damaged or stolen property 
at our option. We may, at any time before the loss 
is paid or the property is replaced, return at our 
own expense any stolen property, either to you or 
at our option to the address shown on the Policy 
Declarations, with payment for any resulting 
damage. We may take all or part of the property at 
the agreed or appraised value. We may settle any 
claim or loss either with Jou or the owner of the 
property. 
Right To Appraisal 
Both you and Allstate have a right to demand an 
appraisal of the loss. Each will appoint-and pay a 
qualified appraiser. other appraisal expenses will 
be shared equally. The two appraisers, ora judge 
of a court of record, will select an umpire. Each 
appraiser will state the actual cash value and the 
amount of loss. If they disagree, they'll submit 
their differences to the umpire. A written 
agreement by any two of these:three persons will 
determine the amount of the loss. 
Limits Of Llability 
Allstate's limit of liability is the least of: 
1. the actual cash value of the property or 
damaged part of the property at the time of 
the loss, which may include a deduction for 
depreciation; or 
2. the co.st to repair or replace the property or 
part to its physical coqdition ,atthe time of 
loss using parts produced by or for the 
vehicle's manufacturer, or parts from other 
sources, including, but not limited to, non-
original equipment manufacturers, subject to 
applicable state laws and regulations; or 
3. $500, if the loss is to a covernd trailer not 
described on the ,Policy Declamtions. 
Any applicable deductible amount is then 
subtracted. 
If A11$tate, at its option, elects to pay for the, cost 
to repair or replace the property or p~rt, All$tate's 
liability does not include any decrease iri the 
property's value, however measured; resulting 
from the loss and/or rapalr or replacement. If 
repair or replacement results in the betterment of 
the part, you may be responsible, subject to 
applicable state laws and regulations, for the 
amount of the betterment. 
An auto and attached frailer are considered 
~eparate autos, and you must pay the deductible, 
if any, on each. Only one deductible will apply to 
an a~t!I with a mounted camp~r unit. If 
unmounted, a separate deductible will apply to the 
auto and camper unit. 
When more than one coverage is applicable to the 
loss, you may recover underthe broadest 
cove~ge1but not both. However, any Sound 
System Coverage deductible will always apply. 
Limits Of Liability Und~r ~saOrJ.oan-.. - . 
Gap Coverage · 
If the P.gUcy Declarations indicate~ a premium 
charq~, for Lease Or Loan Gap Coverage our limit 
of liabihty with respectto that coverage is the 
amount you owe under the terms of the auto 
lease 91 loan agreementto which the auto 
describe~ on the Policy Declarations is subject. 
The amount payable will be redu,Ged by:, 
1. overdue payments and the financial penalties 
a~sociated with tho.~e1:1ay.01ents; 
2. .the transfer or roll.Oller of a previous 
outstanding lease or loa.l\'balance from 
another vehicle to the original lease or loan 
for the auto described on the Policy · 
Declarations; 
3. the dollar amount of unrepaired damage 
which occurred prior to the,towHoss of your 
- ·-..::..-=--.------·; . ..._,,auto, and· · ·- ··· .::'--_.; .. ~·.····.-- · ~.-.,.. ··Jo· ~."'!~·,·~~'"'.""'·:---,. .. ~ .. -..,.._,.,.,._ ... _~-;----__.i:~--~~ 
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4. all refunds paid or payable to y-0u as a result 
of the early termination of the lease or loan 
agreement or, to the extent financed, as a 
result of the early termination of any warranty 
or extended service agreement on your auto. 
Limits Of Liability Under R~pair Or 
Replacement Cost Cdv~r,iloe 
If the Policy Declarations iodigites a premium 
charge for Repair Or Replace(Tlent_Cost Qoverage, 
it will be our option to pay to repair or replace the 
auto to which this coverage applies as shown on 
the Policy Declarations for a covered loss, subject 
to the applicable Auto Collision Insurance or Auto 
Comprehensive Insurance deductible, but without 
a deduction for depreciation. This coverage does 
not apply to loss caused by fire, theft, larceny or 
flood. 
However, the most we will pay for the loss will be 
the lesser of the: 
1. Cost of repair or replacement of the property 
or part using parts manufactured by <>Jfor 
the vehicle's manufacturer or pa.rts Mm 
other sources, including, but not limited to, 
non-original equipmellt manufactµrers as 
permitted by state laws and regulations. 
2. Cost of a new auto of the same make and 
model with the same equipmenfff an ·~ufo of 
the same make and model with the same 
equipment is not availa'bfe, the new auto 
must be of similar size, class, body type and 
equipment. A new aut1tis-an auto thathas 
not been previously titled and is of the latest 
model year available at the time of the loss. 
We reserve the right to repair, or to reJ:)laee the 
damaged property, or to payfor·th·e lass in 
money. If Allstate, at its option, elects to·'f}ay,for 
the cost to repair or replace the .property or part, 
Allstate's liability does not include any decrease 
in the property's value, however measured, 
resulting from the loss and/or repair or 
replacement. 
In no event, shall an insured person ·be entitled to 
recover forthe same element of loss under both 
Repair Or Replacement Cost Coverage and Auto 
Collision Insurance or Repair Or Replacement 
Cost Coverage and Auto Comprehensive 
Insurance. 
If There Is Other Insurance 
If there is other insurance covering the loss at the 
time·of the accident.we will pay only our share of 
any damages. Our share is determined by adding 
the limits of this insurance to the. limits of all other 
insu ranee that applies on the same basis and 
finding the percentage of the total that our limits 
represent. 
When this insurance covers a substitute auto or 
non-owned auto, we will pay only after all other 
collectible insurance has been exhausted. 
When this insurance covers a replacement auto 
or .sdditfonal auto, this pplicy won't apply if.you 
have other collectible in.surance. 
Lease DI Loan Gap Coverage is excess over any 
othercoll~ctible insurance. 
NoBenefH To Bailee 
This insurance will not benefitany person or 
orgim,i~tion who may be ca-ring for or·handling 
,riur property for a fee. 
toss 'Payable Clause 
If a ff~nhoider is shown on the Policy 
Declarations, we may pay loss under this policy to 
you and to the lienholde:r as its inter~st may 
appear.The Uenholder's interestwill not be voided 
by: 
1. any act or neglect of the owner of the auto; 
or 
2. any c~ange in title orownership ofthe auto if 
lie lienholder notifies us within 10 days. 
'The liehholder must notify us of any known 
increase in hazard. The lienholdertnustpay, at · 
our re,quest, the premium for any increase ·in 
hazard; otherwise this policy will be void. 
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We may cancel this policy according to its terms. 
Cancellation will also be effective with respect to 
the lienholder's interest. We may also cancel this 
clause of the policy. In either event, we will mail at 
least 10 days notice to the lienholder. Proof of our 
mailing of notice will be proof of notice. 
If you do not submit proof of loss within the time 
specified in this policy, the lienholder must do so 
within 60 days. Proof of loss must be submitted 
in the form and manner specified in the What To 
Do If There Is A Loss" provision in the "General 
Provisions" section of this policy. The lien holder 
will be subject to provisions relating to appraisal, 
time of payment, and bringing suit. 
When we make payment to the lienholder for loss 
under this policy, we will be subrogated to the 
rights of the party we pay, to the extent of our 
payment. When we pay a Henholder for a loss for 
which you are not covered, we.are entitled to the 
lienholder's right of recovery against you to the 
extent of our payment We have the option to pay 
the lienholder the entire amount due or which will 
become due on the mortgage or other security 
agreement with interest and receive full 
assignment and transfer of the mortgage or 
security agreement. Our right to subrogation will 
not impair the lien holder's right to recover the full 
amount of its claim. 
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Policy Endorsement 
The following endorsement changes your policy. Pleaseread this document carefully and keep it. with your 
policy. 
Idaho 
Amendatory Endorsement- PoU11a-3 
In the General Provisions, the following changes are made: 
A. The Payment provision is replaced by the following: 
Payment 
tt your initial premium payment for your first policy period is by check, draft, or any remittance other 
than cash, such payment is conditional upon the check, draft, or remittance being honored upon 
presentation. If such check, draft, or remitj:ance is not honored upon presentation, this policy shall be 
deemed void from its inception. This means that Al.lstate will not be. liable under this policy for any 
claims or damages which would otherwise be cove red had the check, draft, or remittance been 
honored upon presentation. 
tt, at any time, your payment of any premium amount due is made by check, electronic transaction, or 
other remittance which is not honored because of insufficient funds or a closed account, you will be 
charged a fee. 
B. The following provisions are added: 
What Law Will Apply 
This policy is issued in accordance with the laws of Idaho and covers property or risks principally 
located in Idaho. Subject to the following paragraph, any and all claims or disputes in any way related 
to this policy shall be governed by the laws of Idaho. 
If a covered loss to the auto, a covered auto accident, or any other occurrence for which coverage 
applies under this policy happens outside Idaho, claims or dispiutes regarding that covered loss to the 
auto, covered auto accident, or other covered occurrence may 0e governed by the laws of the 
jurisdiction in which that covered loss to the auto, covered auto accident, or other covered occurrence 
happened, only if the laws of that jurisdiction would apply in the absence of a contractual choice of law 
provision such as this. 
Where Lawsuits May Be Brought 
Subject to the following two paragraphs, any and all lawsuits in any way related to this poli€y·shall be 
brought, heard, and decided only in a state or federal court located in Idaho. Any and all lawsuits 
against persons not parties to this policy but involved in the sale, administration,.performance, 1x 
alleged breach of this policy or involved in any other way with t-his policy, shall be brought, heard, and 
decided only in a state or federal court located-in Idaho, provided that such persons are subject to or 
consent to suit in the courts specified in this paragraph. 
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~ a covered loss to the auto, a covered aulo accident, or any other occurrence for which cove.rage 
applies under this policy happens outside Idaho, lawsuits regarding that covered loss to the auto, 
covered auto accident, or other covered occurrence rµay also b.e brot1ght in the j1,1dicial district where 
that covered loss to the auto, covered auto accident or other covered occurrence happened. 
Nothing in this provision, Where Lawsuits May Bre Brought, shall impair any party's right to remove a 
state court lawsuit to a federal court. 
II. In Part 1, Automobile Liability Insurance Bodily Injury liability-Coverage AA and Property Damage 
Liability- Coverage BB, the following changes are made: 
A Under Exclusions-What Is Not Covered, exclusion 11. is replaced by the following: 
11. bodily injury or property damage arising out of the participation in any prearranged, organized, or 
spontaneous: · 
a. racing contest 
b. speed contest; or 
c. use of an auto at a track or course designed or used for racing or high performance driving, 
or in practice or preparation for any contest or use of this type. 
8. The If There Is other Insurance provision is replaced by the following: 
If There Is other Insurance 
tt more than one policy applies on a primaiy basis to an accident irivolving your insured auto, we will 
bear our proportionate share with other collectible liability insurance. 
tt an insured person is using a substitute auto or lion-owned auto, our iiability in.surance will be 
excess over other collectible insurance. However, if an insured P.erson is operating an insu~d auto 
which is owned by a person, firm, or corporation in the business ofselling, leasing, repairing, servicing, 
delivering, test, road testing, parking, or storing mQtor vehicles, our liability insurance will apply on a 
primary basis, excepUhat the owner's poilcy shall provide primary cov~rage fQr dam~ge tofhe 
substitute auto or non-owned auto. ·· · 
If the owner of a substitute auto or non-owned auto receives any compensation for or on behalf of the 
insured person for temporary use of the substitute auto ornon'iiwned auto (excluding any 
compensation provided to the owner as a result of the repairing or servicing:of the vehicle for the 
operator), then the owner's insurance coverage will bit primary and our liability irisurance wrll be 
excess. 
Ill. In Part 2, Automobile Medical Payments Coverage CC:, the frnlowing changes are made: 
A The Generai Statement of Coverage provision js replaced by the followirig: 
If a premium is showr:i:on the Policy Oeclaratrons tor Alltoinobile Medical Payments, Allstate will pay to 
or on be half of an insured persQn all reasonable expenses actually incurred by the insured p~rsimtor ·· 
necessary medical treatment, rneoicai services or medical products:actually provided to the insurl}d · 
person by a state licensed health care provider. Ambulance, hOspital, medical, surgical, X-ray, dental, 
orthopedic and prosthetic devices, professional nursillg services, pharmaceuticals, eyeglasses, hearing 
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aids, and funeral expenses are covered. Payment will b~ made only when bodily injury is caused by a 
motor vehicle accident. 
The costs of treatment, services, or products must be incurred within one year after the accident or 
within three years if the injury has been discovered and treated within one year from the date of the 
accident. This will be extended to five years if the amount of insurance shown on the Policy 
Declarations for this coverage is more than $5,000. We will not pay any interest, prejudgment or 
otherwise, on amounts paid or payable under this coverage. 
This coverage does not apply to any person to the extent that the treatment is covered under any 
workers' compensations law. 
B. Under Exclusions- Whal Is Not Covered, exclusion 7. is replaced by the following: 
7. to any person when bodily injury arises out of the participation in any prearranged, organized, or 
spontaneous: 
a. racing contest; 
b. speed contest; or 
c. use of an auto at a track or course designed or used for racing or high performance driving, 
or in practice or pre pa ration for any contest or use of this type. 
IV. In Part 3, Uninsured Motorists Insurance Coverage SS, the following changes are made: 
A The General statement of Coverage provision is replaced by the following: 
General Statement of Coverage 
If a premium is shown on the Policy Declarations for Uninsured Motorists Insurance, we wfll pay 
damages, other than punitive or exemplary damages, which an insured person is legally entitled to 
recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured or underinsured auto because of bodily injury 
sustained by an insured person. The bodily injury must be caused by an accident and arise out of the 
ownership, maintenance or use of an uninsured or underinsured auto. 
The right to receive any damages and the amount of damages will be decided by agreement bet.ween 
the insured person and Allstate. If the insured person and we do not agree, then the disagreement will 
be resolved in a court of competent jurisdictim. Costs, including attorney fees, are to be paid by the 
party incurring them. We will not pay any interest, prejudgment or otherwise, on amounts paid or 
payable under this cove rage. 
tt an insured person sues a person believed responsible for the accident without our written consent, 
we are not bound by any resulting judgment. 
B. Under An Uninsured Auto Is, item 5. is added: 
5. an underinsured molar vehicle which has bodily injury liability protection in effect and applicable 
at the time of the accident in an amount equal fo o(greaterthan the-minimJm limits specified by 
the financial responsibility laws of Idaho, but in an amount less than the applicable limit of liability 
fort his coverage shown on the Policy Declarations. 
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C. Under Exi:lusions -Whal Is Nol Covered, exclusion 7. is added: 
7. bodily injury arising out of the participation in any prearranged, organized, or spontaneous: 
a. racing contest; 
b. speed contest; or 
c. use of an auto at a track or course designed or used for racing or high performance driving, 
or in practice or preparation for any contest or use of this type. 
D. Under the Lim its of Liability provision, the following paragraphs are added: 
Limits of Liability 
The limits for Coverage SS will be reduced by all amounts paid by or on behalf of the owner or operator 
of the underinsured motor vehicle. 
We are not obligated to make any payment for bodily injury underthis coverage which arises out of an 
accident involving an underinsured motor vehicle until after the limits of liability for all bodily injury 
liability protection in effect and applicable at the time of the accident have been exhausted by 
payments of ji.Jdgrnents or settlements. 
E. The Non-Duplication Of Benefits provision is replaced by the following: 
Non-Duplication Of Benefits 
No injured person will recover duplicate benefits for the same elements of loss under this or arry other 
uninsured motorists insurance or underinsured motorists insurance, including approved plans of self-
insurance. 
F. The If We Cannot Agree provision no longerapplie;;;. 
. . 
V. In Part 4, Protect ion Against 4Jss_To J~e ~to, .the following i;ha.nges are fllade: 
A. Under Additional D~finifi~nsFor Part.4, item 6. is ~dded: < 
6. Custom parts or equipment means equipm,~nt, devices, ac~essodes, enhancement~. and 
changes, other than those"6ttered by the ITJ?nllfacturerpftn~' auto speclfically for that model, pr 
installed by the auto dealership when new as part of the original sale-, which alter the appearance 
or performance of an auto. · · · ·· · · · 
This does not include items designed for assisting disabled persons or items covered under Sound 
System Coverage. 
B. Under Losses We Do Not Cover Under Coverages DD, HH, JJ, LG, RC, UU, ZA, and U, the following 
changes are made: 
1. ~em 14. is replaced by the following: 
. . 
14. loss or damage.arising out of the participation in.any pre;manged, organized, or sponwneous: 
a. racing contest; · · ·· · 
b. speed contest; or . 
c. use of an auto at a track or course designed or used for racing or high performance 
driving, 
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or in practice or preparatio11 for any contest or use of tl-iis type. 
2. Item 19. is added: 
19. loss to any custom parts or equipment designed for racing which is installed in or upon your 
insured auto. niis includes, but is not limited to, nitrous oxide systems, roll cages, and air 
intake modifications. 
C. The Limfls of Liability provision is replaced by the following: 
Limits of Liability 
Allstate's limit of liability is the least of: 
1. the actual cash value of the property or damaged part of the property at the time of the loss, which 
may include a deduction for depreciation; or 
2. the cost to repair or replace the property or part to its physical condition at the time of loss using 
parts produced by or for the vehicle's manufacturer, or parts from other sources, including, but not 
limited to, non-original equipment manufacturers, subject to applicable state laws and regulations; 
or 
3. $500, if the loss is to a covered trailer not described on the Policy Declarations. 
Any applicable deductible amount is then subtracted. 
~ Allstate, at its option, elects to pay for the cost to repair or replace the property or part, Allstate's 
liability does not include any decrease in the property's value, however measured, resulting from the 
loss and/or repair or replacement. ~ re pair or replacement results in the betterment of the part, you 
may be responsible, subject to applicable state laws and regulations, for the amount of the betterment. 
The maximum Allstate will pay for a covered loss to any custcim parts or equipment is $1000. 
An auto and attached trailer are considered separate autos, and you must pay the deductible, if any, on 
each. Only one deductible will apply to an auto with a mounted camper unit. If unmounted, a separate 
deductible wil I apply to the auto and camper unit. 
When more than one coverage is applicable to the loss, you may recover under the broadest coverage 
but not both. However, any Sound System Coverage deductible will always apply. 
D. The Loss Payable Clause provision is re placed by the following: 
Loss Payable Clause 
~ a Lienholder and/or Leaseholder is shown on the Policy Declarations, we may pay loss or damage 
under this policy to you and the Lienholder and/or Leaseholder as its interest may appear, except: 
1. When the vehicle(s) is intentionally damaged, destroyed or concealed by or at the direction of you 
or any owner. 
2. When you or any owner makes fraudulent statement(s) or engages in fraudulent conduct in 
connection with any accident or loss for which coverage is sought. 
Page 5 
The Lienholder and/or Leaseholder must notify us of any change in ownership or hazard that is known. 
tf you or any owner fails to render proof of loss within the time granted in the policy, the Lienholder 
and/or Leaseholder must do so within sixty days in the form and manner described in the policy. The 
Lienholder and/or Leaseholder are subject to the provisions of the policy relating to appraisal, tirre of 
payment and bringing suit. · 
We may cancel this policy according to its terms. We will notify the Lienholder and/or Leaseholder at 
ieast ten days prior to the date of cancellation that the cancellation is effective as to the interest of the 
Lienholder and/or Leaseholder. 
'Mleneve r we pay the Lien holder and/ or Leaseholder any sum for loss or damage under this policy, we 
will be subrogated to the extent of payment to the rights of the party to whom payment was made. 
However, these subrogation provisions must in no way impair the rights of the Lienholder and/or 
Leaseholder to recover the full amount of its claim from the insured. 
The Lienholder and/or Leaseholder has no greater rights under the provisions of the policy than the 
insured. 
All other policy terms and conditions apply. 
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Policy-Endorsement. 
The fallowing endorsement changes your pa/Jcy. Please read this document carefully and keep ii with your 
pa/icy. · 
Idaho· 
Renewal Offer Guarantee Endorsement-JUJ12!ios 
'Mien the Policy Declarations indicates that the Idaho Renewal Offer Guarantee Endorsement applies, your 
policy is amended as follows: · 
A. ln the General Provisions section of your polrcy, the following provision is added: 
Renewal 
Prior to the expiration of each policy period during which the Policy Declaratioos indicates t.nat the Idaho 
Renewal Offer Guarantee Endorsement applies, Allstate will offer to you the opportunity to renew·this.policy. 
Allstate will offer to renew this policy with such coverages, policy terms, conditions, limits of liability, 
deductibles and premiums as Allstate, in its discretion, elects to include in the offer of renewal to you on 
the date that the renewal offer is processed by us. You may ele_ct to accept our renewal offer by co)l:lp!ylng 
with the terms and conditions of the ofter and all applicable p·olicyterms and conditions, including thos·e 
relati_ng to premium payment. · · 
k:. a condition of our offer to renew this policy, Allstate may, at its discretion and as permitted by law, 
require that any operator added to your policy after the Idaho Renewal Offer Guarantee Endorsement was 
first made a part of your policy be excluded from coverage under the policy. 
~. at the time we offer you the opportunity to renew this policy, Allstate has ceased to offe( tfie·ldaho 
Renewal Offer Guarantee Endorsement, we will notify you that the renewal policy we are ·offering will not 
include the· Idaho Renewal Offer Guarantee Endorsement. · · 
We are not required to offer to you the opportunity to renew this policy if: 
1. this policy is cancelled pursuant to the Cancellation prCNision of this policy nr if: 
2. you or any member of your household who operates an auto: 
a. has had his or her driver's license suspended or revoked or otherwise fails to maintain a valid 
driver's license; or . 
b. is convicted of driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, leaving tlie scerie of an 
accident or any other violation considered to be a major violation as described in our rUJes that are 
in effect and on file Of required) for our use in Idaho. 
n items numbered 1 or 2 above apply, or if the Policy Declarations does not indicate that the Idaho Renewal 
Qffer Guarantee Endorsement applies, we may nonrenew this policy. Jf we intend to nanrenew this policy, 
we will ma ii notice to you at least 30 days before the end of the policy period. Our mailing of notice of 
nonrenewal to you at your last mailing address know_n to us shall be deemed proof of notice. 
B. In the General Provisions section of your policy, the provision titled Non-Renewal is deleted. 
All other policy terms and conditions apply. 
424 
4?.~ 
BENJAMIN L. WALTON 
DAMAGES SUMMARY 
MEDICAL BILLS 
Portneuf Medical Center 10/18/07 
(Exhibit 90) 
Primary Care Specialists (Dr. Ri chard Maynard) 
10/26/07 and 11/09/07 
(Exhibit 104) 
West Chiropractic 
11/21/07 through 05/07/08 
(Exhibits 123-124) 
Idaho Medical Imaging 02/19/08 (MRI) 
(Exhibit 133) 
Radiology Physicians of Idaho (MRI diagnostic) 
(Exhibit 91) 
TOTAL MEDICAL 
Future Medical BillSi estimated to be $20.00 a month for 
pain medication for rest of life expectancy plus 
medi c a l c a r e a s necessa r y 
Lost 
f---
Pain 
TOTAL 
LOST WAGES 
Wages for one week from the date accident 
PAIN AND SUFFERING 
and Suffering (estimated three times medical 
EXHIBIT 
b 
~ 148 
ft 
.__426 ___ ,, 
future 
bills) 
$917.00 
$202.42 
$703.00 
$1,170.50 
$38.00 
$3,030.92 
$2,500.00 
$1,200.00 
$16,500.00 
$23 J 231. 00 
BENJAMIN L. WALTON 
DAMAGES SUMMARY 
MEDICAL BILLS 
Portneuf Medical Center 10/18/07 $917.00 
Primary Care Specialists (Dr. Richard Maynard) $202.42 
10/26/07 and 11/09/07 
West Chiropractic $703.00 
11/21/07 through 05/07/08 
Idaho Medical Imaging 02/19/08 (MRI) $1,170.50 
Radiology Physicians of Idaho (MRI diagnostic) $38.00 
TOTAL MEDICAL $2,992.92 
Future Medical Bills; estimated to be $20.00 a month for $2,500.00 
pain medication for rest of life expectancy plus future 
medical care as necessary 
LOST WAGES 
Lost Wages for one week from the date accident $1,200.00 
PAIN AND SUFFERING 
Pain and Suffering (estimated three times medical bills) $16,500.00 
TOTAL $23,200.00 
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BENJAMIN L. WALTON 
DAMAGES SUMMARY 
MEDICAL BILLS 
Portneuf Medical Center 10/18/07 
(Exhibit 90) 
Primary Care Specialists (Dr. Richard Maynard) 
10/26/07 and 11/09/07 
(Exhibit 104) 
West Chiropractic 
11/21/07 through 05/07/08 
(Exhibits 123-124) 
Idaho Medical Imaging 02/19/08 (MRI) 
(Exhibit 133) 
Radiology Physiciins of Idaho (MRI diagnostic) 
(Exhibit 91) 
TOTAL MEDICAL 
Future Medical Bills; estimated to be $20.00 a month for 
pain medication for rest of life expectancy; plus future 
medical care as necessary per Dr. David Simon for: 
Physical Therapy, per session and for one week; 
Musel~ Relaxers, per pill and for one month; and 
Trigger Point Injections, per injection x 3 
LOST WAGES 
Lost Wages for one week from the date accident ($30 hr) 
PAIN .AND SUFFERING 
Pain and Suffering (est three times medical bills) or 
Past pain and suffering of one dollar per hour for six 
months (or 12 hours X 180 days) equals $2,160.00 plus 
Future pain and suffering of fifteen cents per hour for 
life expectancy ( 12 X 365 X .15 X 20.72) $13,613.04 
For a total of $15,773.04 
TOTAL 
EXHIBIT 
j 
·D 
j 153 
_ _,...?~-
$917.00 
$202.42 
$703.00 
$1,170.50 
$38.00 
$3,030.92 
$2,500.00 
and $1,500.00 
$1,200.00 
$16,500.00 
ii 
$24,730.92 
Charles Johnson 
JOHNSON OLSON CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 1725 
FILED 
BANNOCK COUNTY 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
20!0 JUL 26 A"' 8: ~ 7 
Pocatello, Idaho 
Telephone: (208) 
Facsimile: (208) 
ISB No. 2464 
83204-1725 
232-7926 
232-9161 
3Y OE~M 
E-Mail: cjlaw@cableone.net 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MATHEW R. BENNETT and 
BENJAMIN L. WALTON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NANCY PATRICK, 
Defendant. 
) Case No. CV-08-4528-PI 
) 
) 
) PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO SUPPLEMENT TO 
) DEFENDANT'S POST-TRIAL MOTIONS and 
) RESPONSIVE PLEADINGS 
) 
) 
) 
) 
__________ ) 
The plaintiffs Bennett and Walton, through their counsel of 
record, hereby file this Response in Opposition to Defendant's Post 
Trial Motions and Responsive Pleadings and Second Motion In Limine 
on insurance coverage. The plaintiffs would show the court that 
they made a pre-trail offer to settle the case within policy limits 
of $25,000 per person under Idaho Code Section 12-120(4) which was 
rejected by the defendant's insurance carrier, Allstate Insurance 
Company stipulated in bankruptcy court and the bankruptcy court 
ordered that "any award of judgment will be paid by Plaintiff's 
insurance carrier, Allstate Insurance Company only, and not the 
defendant Patrick personallyu, and the defendant's insurance 
contract specifies that the defendant Allstate will pay, "court 
costs for defense.u 
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Further, Allstate insured both the plaintiff Walton and 
defendant but failed to settle case within policy limits in good 
faith before or after the case was filed or in mediation. Allstate 
now seeks to limit their liability after the fact to policy limits 
contrary to Idaho law. Allstate Insurance Company is liable for 
payment of the full amount of the Plaintiff's damages, interest, 
costs, and attorney's fees to be awarded by the court. The 
plaintiffs would show the court specifically as follows. 
1. The plaintiffs in this case made a settlement demand 
within policy limits to the defendant's insurance carrier, Allstate 
Insurance Company, which was contained in the Statutory Demand 
Letter to Allstate under Idaho Code 12-120(4). See the copy of the 
demand letter attached as Exhibit 161 to the "Memorandum of Costs 
and Affidavit of Charles Johnson in support of Motion for Costs and 
Attorney's Fees." The policy limits of $25,000 are coincidentally 
identical to the 12-120 ( 4) attorney's fees limits of $25, 000 in 
this case. 
2. The ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION FOR RELIEF FROM STAY AND 
THAT BANKRUPTCY STAY DOES NOT APPLY TO PERSONAL INJURY CLAIM 
AGAINST DEBTOR'S INSURANCE CARRIER AFTER DISCHARGE attached as 
Exhibit B to the defendant's motion in limine, in the last sentence 
of the last paragraph states as follows: 
"This claim in this case for personal injuries against the 
defendant debtor will be defended and any award or judgment will be 
paid by her insurance carrier Allstate Insurance Company only and 
not the defendant and debtor Patrick personally after discharge (if 
any) in this case. 
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3. The defendant's, Allstate Insurance Company, policy in 
this case, attached as Exhibit C to the Defendant's Motion and 
Limine at page 8, states that additional payments Allstate will 
make include "2. Court costs of defenseu along with interest on 
the judgment. 
4. Allstate made the decision to reject Plaintiff's offer to 
settle the case within policy limits. They subsequently rejected 
Plaintiff's other settlement demands, choosing instead to take the 
(not considering 
This conduct of 
case to trial and spend almost as much on costs 
attorney fees) than there was in dispute. 
defendant Nancy Patrick's insurance carrier Allstate Insurance 
Company took place after the bankruptcy was filed, which could 
arguably create post-bankruptcy petition personal liability for 
Nancy Patrick or her insurance carrier Allstate for rejection of 
the settlement within policy limits, including additional costs and 
attorney's fees; along with a similar claim Walton may have. 
Therefore, Allstate should be legally responsible for the total 
judgement awarded by the court, including the principal amount of 
the jury verdict, pre and post judgment interest, court costs, and 
attorney's fees under Idaho Code 12-120(4). 
5. Allstate insures both the plaintiff Walton and the 
defendant, and has a duty to both parties to settle claims in good 
faith within policy limits. The failure to do so makes Allstate 
liable for the damages in excess of policy limits and other 
consequential damages in both contract and tort. See White v. 
Unigard Mutual Insurance Company, 112 Idaho 94, 96, 730 P. 2d 1014 
4::t1 
(1986); see also McKinley v. Guaranty National Insurance Company, 
144 Idaho 247, 251, 159 P.3d 884 (2007); other citations omitted. 
WHEREFORE, the Court should grant the plaintiffs' Motion for 
interest, costs and attorneys fees to be paid by defendant's 
insurer Allstate Insurance Company in full based on the record as 
discussed above in this case. 
DATED this 26 th day of July 2010. 
Johnson 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I hand delivered a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document by placing the same in the United States 
mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Brendon C. Taylor 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991 
on this 26 th day of July 2010. 
Licensed Lawyer 
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Charles Johnson 
JOHNSON OLSON CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 1725 
Pocatello, Idaho 
Telephone: (208) 
Facsimile: (2 0 8) 
ISB No. 2464 
83204-1725 
232-7926 
232-9161 
E-Mail: cjlaw@cableone.net 
FILED 
BANNOCK COUNTY 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
3:0IO~ 8=47 
OE TY CLERK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MATHEW R. BENNETT and 
BENJAMIN L. WALTON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NANCY PATRICK, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-08-4528-PI 
PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL OBJECTION 
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR COSTS 
The plaintiffs, Mathew R. Bennett and Benjamin L. Walton, 
through counsel of record, hereby file thus supplemental 
plaintiffs' objection to defendant's motion for costs. The 
plaintiff Walton would point out that he was clearly the prevailing 
party as to all prior offers made by Allstate, and is certainly 
entitled to all his costs and attorney's fees in pursuing his claim 
without objection from the defendant and is clearly not liable for 
any costs of the defendant at all. The plaintiff Bennett would 
point out that he was the prevailing party on: the first Allstate 
pre-trial offer under Idaho Code§ 12-120(4), the second Allstate 
offer of Judgment under IRCP 68, and the "adjusted award" computed 
after the inclusion of interest, costs and attorney's fees under 
IRCP 68(b); so he is entitled to all his costs and attorney's fees, 
and is not liable for any costs of the defendant as stated in their 
prior objection to the defendant's costs. 
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION 1 
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However, they would also point out they are the prevailing 
party for an award of costs under IRCP 54 (d) (1) (B) as well. IRCP 
54 (d) (1) states that "the trial court in its sound discretion 
should consider the final judgment or result of the action in 
relation to the relief sought by the respective parties." There 
are several cases which have interpreted this rule to allow an 
award of attorney fees to plaintiffs in situations similar to this 
case, but where even a smaller judgment was awarded. 
In Decker v. Homeguard Systems, 105 Idaho 158, 162-163, 666 
P.2d 1169 (Ct. App. 1983) the plaintiff prevailed even though only 
awarded 3% of part of their claims. The court found that the 
plaintiffs were the prevailing party. The court also approved an 
award of attorney fees on an hourly basis even though there was a 
contingency fee agreement. 
In Gilbert v. City of Caldwell, 112 Idaho 386, 399, 732 P.2d 
300 (Ct. App. 1987) there was a similar result. The plaintiffs 
prevailed when they were awarded $7,500 on a $160,000 claim or 
about 5% of claim. 
See also Collins v. Jones, 131 Idaho 556, 559-560, 961 P.2d 
647 (1998) ,plaintiff prevailed even though only awarded part of 
claim. There are other citations omitted. 
WHEREFORE, defendant's motion for costs in this case should be 
denied in all material respects by the Court. 
DATED this 2 6TH day of July 2010. 
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I hand 
of the foregoing document as 
Brendon C. Taylor 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991 
on this 26~ day July 2010. 
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION 
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a true and correct copy 
Lawyer 
3 
Charles Johnson 
JOHNSON OLSON CHARTERED 
419 West Benton 
P.O. Box 1725 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1725 
Telephone: (208) 232-7926 
Facsimile: (208) 232-9161 
ISB No. 2464 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MATHEW R. BENNETT and 
BENJAMIN L. WALTON, 
) Case No. CV-08-4528-PI 
) 
) 
.7 
Plaintiffs, ) SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY ON ATTORNEY'S 
) FEES 
vs. 
NANCY PATRICK, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
__________ ) 
The plaintiffs, Bennett and Walton, through counsel of record, 
hereby file this Supplemental Authority of Right to Attorney's Fees 
under Idaho Code 12-124 in response to the allegation that a new or 
different claim was submitted, constituting a Waiver of Claims. The 
plaintiffs take the position that their claim did not substantially 
change at all, and they are entitled to costs and attorney's fees. 
Their position is supported by additional authority, as ser out 
below or discussed during oral arguments as follows: 
41Fi 
First, Harris vs. Alessi, 141 Idaho 901, 909-910, 120 P.3ct 289 
(2005) held that even though one medical bill had not been 
presented, that a small difference in the claim did not constitute 
a waiver of costs and attorney's fees. The court ruled that because 
the insurance company already knew about all the bills at the time 
the case was filed and during settlement negotiations, that this 
was a minimus amount and does not constitute a significant new item 
of damages. 
Second, the court discussed a case with Jesse Robinson and the 
Cooper Larsen firm that reached a similar result. It is believed to 
be the case of Kathy A. Newcomb and Douglas V. Newcomb vs. 
 and Karlene Priest; Case No. CVPI-98-00094B, attached 
hereto as Exhibit A. 
Therefore, the plaintiffs request the court award their costs 
and attorney's fees since there was not a new or different claim 
presented in this case. 
DATED and signed this 28 th day of July 2010. 
Charles Johnson 
d?7 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document by placing the same in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Brendon C. Taylor 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991 
on this 28 th day of July 2010. 
Licensed Lawyer 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
Register No. CVPI98-00094B 
KATHY A. NEWCOMB, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs- MINUTE ENTRY & ORDER 
 a minor, and 
KARLENE PRIEST, his parents 
or guardian, 
Defendants. 
The Plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements and the 
Defendants' Motion to Disallow Costs came before the Court for 
hearing on November 22, 1999, pursuant to notice. Appearing at the 
hearing were Jesse C. Robison of Jones, Chartered for the Plaintiff 
and Gary L. Cooper of Cooper & Larsen, Chartered for the 
Defendants. 
Register No CVPI98-00094B 
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EXHIBIT 
I 
Prior to the hearing, the Court had received and reviewed the 
Memorandum and the Motion. At the hearing, the Court heard the 
respective arguments of counsel and took the matter under 
advisement. Now the Court issues its opinion as to these matters. 
The Court awards the Plaintiff $25,022.47 in costs. 
DISCUSSION 
The Court, in its discretion, has determined the following 
matters necessary for making this decision. 
A. 
Given the jury verdict in this matter awarding the 
Plaintiff, Mrs. Kathy A. Newcomb, $20,000.00, the Court finds her 
to be the prevailing party. Rule 54 (d) (1) (B) of the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
B. 
Pursuant to Rule 54 (d) ( 1) (C) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Court awards the Plaintiff, Mrs. Kathy A. Newcomb, 
$2,191.27 in costs as a matter of right. 
C. 
Rule 54 (d) ( 1) (D) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
states: 
Additional items of cost not enumerated in, or in an 
amount in excess of that listed in subparagraph (C), 
may be allowed upon a showing that said costs were 
necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred, 
and should in the interest of justice be assessed 
against the adverse party .... 
Register No CVPI98-00094B 
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The discretionary costs claimed here are amounts in excess of 
those claimed as costs as a matter of right and/or a fee for a 
sign language interpreter. 
The Court finds all of such costs to be necessary, 
reasonably incurred, and awardable in the interest of justice. 
The Court also finds the fee for the sign language interpreter to 
be exceptional (different than the normal). The Court has never 
had a sign language interpreter in its courtroom prior to this 
case. That fact makes the cost exceptional. 
The Court also finds that the cost of a biomechanical 
engineer to be exceptional. It is indeed exceptional that 
parties would use biomechanical engineers in a case in which the 
Plaintiff agrees to take no more than $25,000.00 from the 
Defendant, in any event. Therefore, the-Court finds that 
incurring this cost is exceptional for this case. 
However, the Court does not find that hiring one doctor 
and/or one chiropractor to prove damages in a traffic accident 
case is exceptional. The Court finds those expenses necessary 
and usual each time one has to prove such damages in tort cases. 
The Plaintiff argues that the Court should award the excess 
costs for experts, because (1) it is never questioned in other 
courts and (2) the failure to do so would cause these small cases 
never to be brought. The Court disagrees. All other courts do 
Register No CVPI98-00094B 
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not award these discretionary costs without question. Fish v. 
Smith, 131 Idaho 492, 960 P.2d 175 (1998); Inama v. Brewer and 
Cowles, 99. 4 ICSR 102, 105, 973 P. 2d 148 (1999); Beco Const. Co. 
v. Harper Contracting, 130 Idaho 4, 11, 936 P.2d 202, 209 (Ct. 
App. 1997). 
In general, this Court has been vigilant in making certain 
that discretionary costs were "exceptional," because unquestioned 
awards of discretionary costs (travel costs, long distance phone 
calls, photocopying costs, faxes, postage, excess expert witness 
fees) can make a small verdict, in a case where the Defendant had 
made an appropriate offer of judgment, into no recovery at all 
for plaintiffs. Further, where insurance companies (who can plan 
for such costs) are entitled to seek discretionary costs, the 
Court has protected plaintiffs (who are generally poor and just 
able to pay for their own costs in seeking redress for 
grievances). If the Court were to relax this standard only for 
plaintiffs, that would not be consistent. If the plaintiffs' bar 
believes that the amounts set out in "costs as a matter of 
right," are too low to bring cases under Idaho Code section 12-
120(4), then those costs should be increased. It should not be a 
cost of trial that the courts should apply inconsistently as 
discretionary costs to plaintiffs and defendants. 
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The Court therefore awards $2,416.20 in discretionary costs 
to the Plaintiff. 
D. 
The parties stipulated that "the Plaintiffs have properly 
perfected a claim to attorney fees under and pursuant to Idaho 
Code section 12-120(4) ." See October 6, 1998(9) Stipulation and 
Order. Idaho Code section 12-120(4) allows the claimant "a 
reasonable amount to be fixed by the court as attorney fees." 
Therefore, the Court must now determine the reasonable amount of 
attorney fees which should be awarded. Rule 54(e) (3) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure outlines: 
In the event the court grants attorney fees to a party 
or parties in a civil action it shall consider the 
following factors in determining the amount of such 
fees: 
(A) The time and labor required. 
(B) The novelty and difficulty of the questions. 
(C) The skill requisite to perform the legal service 
properly and the experience and ability of the attorney 
in the particular field of law. 
(D) The prevailing charges for like work. 
(E) Whether the fee is fixed of contingent. 
(F) The time limitations imposed by the client or the 
circumstances of the case. 
(G) The amount involved and the results obtained. 
(H) The undesirability of the case. 
(I) The nature and length of the professional 
relationship with the client. 
(J) Awards in similar cases. 
(K) The reasonable cost of automated legal research, if 
the court finds it was reasonably necessary in 
preparing a party's case. 
(L) Any other factor which the court deems appropriate 
in the particular case. 
Register No CVPI98-00094B 
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The Court first finds that Plaintiff's counsel did not spend 
more time nor labor on this case than would be requisite with a 
case similar to this one. Cases in which the Plaintiff cannot 
recover more than $25,000.00 are difficult for a good attorney. 
While the recovery can never be very high, the discovery, the 
trial, and the preparation remain the same. Therefore, Mr. 
Robison had to spend this time and effort. 
The Court does not find that the case was somehow more novel 
nor the questions therein somehow more difficult than other 
automobile accident cases in which the only remaining issue is 
the nature and extent of the damages. This case did however have 
one issue not often found in these cases in the past, that of 
preparing to use and cross examine a biomechanical engineer. 
The Court finds nothing helpful to the Court's decision in 
consideration of the requisite skill of Mr. Robison to perform 
these legal services (very skilled, but needed to be in order to 
take any automobile damage case to trial), the nature and length 
of the professional relationship Mr. Robison had with his client, 
and/or the cost of research. 
The prevailing charges for such work, whether the fee was 
contingent or fixed, the time limitations, and the undesirability 
of this case, however, must be further discussed by the Court. 
Cases seeking $25,000 or less are not desirable cases, because 
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they require (of good lawyers) the same amount of work required 
of other cases between $50,000 and $100,000 in damages. Yet the 
recovery on a contingent fee basis for these low value cases 
causes the attorney to work the same number of hours for less 
money. Also, the ability to limit the attorney time on these 
cases is questionable. The depositions to be taken in these 
cases are controlled by both parties. The necessary preparation 
to be successful is not much different than with the higher value 
cases. A lawyer's decision whether to charge a contingent fee or 
an hourly fee is therefore a difficult one. With the contingent 
fee, the lawyer works for much less than he could on other cases. 
With the hourly fee, he has the chance of eating up (with his 
fee) any recoverable amount for his client. The lawyer and the 
client are therefore in a no-win situation in determining the 
charge for the attorney's work. 
Here, Mr. Robison changed an hourly retainer (first 
negotiated with his client) to a contingency fee because of these 
problems. He now seeks to be compensated on an hourly basis, to 
which the Defendant has objected because Mr. Robison has agreed 
to a contingent fee. The Court of Appeals, in Nalen v. Jenkins, 
113 Idaho 79, 81, 741 P.2d 366, 368 (Ct. App. 1987), held that an 
attorney fee awarded, pursuant to Rule 54(e) (3), may be higher or 
lower than what the party must pay their attorney under their 
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agreement. In fact, the Court held that to limit the amount 
awarded to such contingency fee, without consideration of other 
factors, was an abuse of discretion. 
In reviewing the legislative history of Idaho Code section 
12-120(4), the Court believes that the legislature enacted the 
provision to make certain that claimants could bring these cases 
and not lose their awards to their own attorneys for fees. The 
Court finds nothing in that history which would suggest that the 
legislature intended that attorneys only take these cases on a 
contingency basis, not take these cases on an hourly basis, or 
work lesser numbers of hours to bring these cases to court. The 
history only indicates that the legislature believed that 
plaintiffs should get compensated for the total amount they would 
need to pay their attorneys in order to bring these cases. 
Defendant first claims that this problem can be remedied 
by the attorney in drafting a fee agreement before he 
begins the case. However, the Court finds that, basing this 
decision on the agreement alone, would put too much emphasis on 
whether the attorney has thought about this problem before 
starting his case and drafted an agreement around it. Basing the 
decision on the agreement alone would also indicate to the legal 
community that an hourly fee written agreement should be drafted 
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in every situation (yet knowing that good lawyers would give up 
some of that fee in case of settlement or otherwise). 
Defendant next claims that, to award an attorney more than 
his contingent fee contract demands, is punishing the defendant 
for taking a case to trial. While that may be true, the Court 
finds Idaho Code section 12 120(4), as a whole, is intended 
to punish a defendant. It does not even allow attorney fees to a 
defendant, only to "a claimant" or "a plaintiff.'' Idaho Code 
section 12-120(4) only outlines when to allow such fees to the 
plaintiff. The legislature therefore seems to be saying that, if 
the defendant does not offer 90% of the plaintiff's award at 
trial, such defendant will be punished by paying attorney fees. 
To force a plaintiff's attorney to either not work too hard 
on low recovery cases or get less for the amount of time he 
spends on those cases cannot be a goal of this Court. However, 
this Court does not believe that recovery of attorney fees should 
be an alternative method of recovery for plaintiffs for their 
injuries. Instead, it should only be a recovery of that amount 
plaintiffs must pay their attorney. That has to be the 
legislative intent of this code section. 
Therefore, the Court finds that the cost bill submitted by 
Mr. Robison is the prevailing charge for this work. The Court 
finds that, simply because Mr. Robison changed his fee 
Register No CVPI98-00094B 
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arrangement with his client to a contingency fee to allow her to 
get some recovery in this case (rather than pay all of that 
amount to him for an hourly fee), should not affect the amount of 
fees recoverable in this matter. The Court finds that the 
circumstances of this case, brought under Idaho Code section 12-
120(4), make the contingency fee arrangement not an appropriate 
gauge to determine the amount of fees to be awarded in this case. 
The Court also finds that, given the Plaintiff's alleged 
medical expenses, the results obtained by Mr. Robison were near 
the top of the normal scale. Therefore, the time spent produced 
a favorable result. 
The Court therefore allows the Plaintiff $20,415.00 to be 
paid to Mr. Robison for time and labor required and/or to cover 
costs not recovered to bring this action. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED November 23, 1999. 
DOCKET-25 12-10-99 MJ 
Copies to: 
Jesse C. Robison 
Gary L. Cooper 
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Brendon C. Taylor 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
l 09 North Arthur - 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
(208) 232-2286 
(208) 232-2499 Telefax 
Idaho State Bar #6078 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MATHEW R. BENNETT and 
BENJAMIN L. WALTON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NANCY PA TRICK, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) Case No. CV-08-4528-PI 
) 
) 
) DEFENDANT'S POST-HEARING 
) BRIEF 
) 
) 
) 
) 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Nancy Patrick, by and through her counsel of record, 
Merrill & Merrill, Chartered, and hereby files his post-hearing brief on the issues of 
prevailing party, attorneys fees, and other post-trial matters. 
The Court is Given Discretion to Determine Whether Plaintiffs Waived their 
Claims for Attorneys Fees Pursuant to Idaho Code 12-120(4). 
At the hearing, Defendant argued that Plaintiffs waived their claim to attorneys fees 
under Idaho Code § 12-120( 4) because they each argued and presented evidence at trial that 
included significant new items of damages not stated in their demand letters. The section of 
Section 12-120( 4) upon which Defendant relies states: 
If the plaintiff includes in the complaint filed to commence the action, or in 
evidence offered at trial, a different alleged injury or a significant new item of 
damage not set forth in the statement of claim, the plaintiff shall be deemed to 
have waived any entitlement to attorneys fees under this section.1 
1ldaho Code§ 12-120(4). 
Defendant's Post-Hearing Brief 
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At hearing, the Court inquired about case law that held an increase in damages did not 
constitute a significant new item of damages. In Johnson v. Sanchez2, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals reviewed a district court decision finding that an increase in medical damages did 
not itself constitute a waiver of a plaintiffs claim for attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-
120( 4 ). The court determined that the district court's ruling would not be overturned because 
the decision was not an abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals held: 
Having reached this conclusion on the plain meaning of "significant new items 
of damage not set forth in the statement of claim," we cannot conclude that the 
district court abused its discretion in its findings. Where a trial court's findings 
are not clearly erroneous and where the trial court properly identifies and 
applies the law to the facts, then the trial court's exercise of discretion has not 
been abused. 3 
Thus, it is clear that this Court has discretion to determine whether the damages 
Plaintiffs presented constituted a significant new item of damages from what had been 
alleged in the demand letter. 
In the present case, each Plaintiff alleged significant new and larger damage claims 
at trial. In their demand letter, each plaintiff advised Defendant's insurer that he had 
completed care under Dr. West and the only future care was for over-the-counter pain 
reliever. Each stated his future medical bills as $2,500 for ongoing over-the-counter pain 
reliever. 
Defendant argued in her pleadings and at hearing that each Plaintiff asked for 
significant new damages at trial than what had been set forth in their pre-trial demand letter. 
Importantly, the nature of the claims for future and other medical damages were different. 
Not only did each Plaintiffs demands dramatically increase, but the kind of treatment 
changed as well. 
In Plaintiff Walton's case, his demand letter stated, "However, Benjamin Walton's 
injuries significantly improved from the chiropractic treatment administered by Dr. Henry 
West. He advises that at this point he still has only minimal residual pain and stiffness in his 
neck and some headaches that he treats with over-the-counter medication." That was the 
extent of Plaintiff Walton's claim for future medical care. __ However, at trial, he asked for an 
entirely different category of future medical special damages. He asked for over $7,000 in 
2Johnson v. Sanchez, 140 Idaho 667 ,99 P.3d 620 (2004). 
3/d. at 623,670 (citing Crawfordv. Pac[fic Car&Foundry Co., 112 Idaho 820, 
822, 736 P.2d 872, 874 (Ct.App.1987)). 
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future medical specials, including over $2,000 for physical therapy, muscle relaxers and 
trigger point injections. Defendant believes this significant change, which more than doubled 
Plaintiff Walton's special damages claim, to be significant. Defendant respectfully requests 
the Court exercise its discretion to deem the request for attorneys fees waived. 
In Plaintiff Bennett's case, Mr. Bennett asked the jury to award him multiple past 
medical bills for a new exacerbation of his old injury and future medical treatment 
necessitated by the exacerbation by Defendant's IME doctor. Dr. West testified that the new 
injury was in Mr. Bennett's sciatic area, and that his earlier treatment of Mr. Bennett was not 
recorded as being in his sciatic region. This new bill was nearly 10% of the admitted prior 
medical bills. More importantly, however, Plaintiff Bennett claimed he was not released 
from Dr. West's care, but would continue to need treatment on a "pm" basis, or as his 
condition warranted. This was a significant departure from Dr. West's earlier record 
releasing him from care. Indeed, Plaintiff Bennett argued to the jury that he would need 
future chiropractic care, and that his future medical expenses would be $5,088. This was 
more than double the $2,500 future special damages asserted in the 12-120 letter and at all 
times until a few weeks before trial. Thus, these significant new claims of past and future 
medical specials, added more than $2,750, to his earlier claim of $4,437.71 in medical 
specials past and future. Thus, Mr. Bennett has waived any claim for attorney fees under 
Idaho Code§ 12-120(4). 
Each Plaintiff also significantly increased the general damages amounts claimed at 
trial from the time of their pre-suit letter. Plaintiff Walton's general damages claim was 
nearly double. 
It is illogical that a plaintiff be allowed to assert damages that were nearly one-half 
(½) of the total ultimately presented to a jury in their pre-suit demand and then lock in the 
Defendant by the response her insurer makes to that demand and then offer new items that 
more than double some elements of damages at trial and expect the Court to award attorneys 
fees based on the insurer's response to the significantly lower damage demand presented 
prior to the lawsuit being filed. If an insurance company's response to the 12-120 demand 
was based upon the facts that a plaintiff had under $2,000 in prior medical bills, and that the 
plaintiff was released from care with the exception of over-the-counter pain medication, it 
is unfair and improper to hold that response to later include a claim for re-injury in 2010, and 
ongoing chiropractic treatment in addition to the over-the-counter pain medication. 
The cases interpreting 12-120( 4) state that the Court has authority to determine that 
the Plaintiffs have waived their 12-120 attorneys fees rights even if the Court determines the 
Defendant's Post-Hearing Brief 
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new items of damages to not be significant if it believes there to be a lack of good faith by 
the Plaintiff. 4 Defendant asks that this Court determine the changes to be significant, and the 
attorney fee claim be deemed waived, or alternatively to rule that the Plaintiffs waived their 
rights to attorneys fees by failing to act in good faith by asserting different damage amounts 
of significantly higher amounts at trial. 
This Court has Discretion to Determine the Prevailing Party under IRCP Rule 
54(d). 
IRCP Rule 54(d)(l)(B) provides: 
Prevailing Party. In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party 
and entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the 
final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the 
respective parties. The trial court in its sound discretion may determine that a 
party to an action prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and upon so 
finding may apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair and 
equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims involved in the 
action and the resultant judgment or judgments obtained. 
As clearly stated in the rule, the Court is given discretion to determine which party 
prevailed and is instructed to consider all claims and issues involved in the action and the 
relief sought by each party. The Court's exercise of discretion absent abuse is not to be 
disturbed by the appellate courts.5 Numerous cases uphold the Court's discretion in this 
matter. See Israel v. Leachman, 139 Idaho 24, 72 P.3d 864 (2003) (Court denied attorney 
fees to both parties, and the decision was upheld because it was determined to have been 
reached via reason). 
Defendant asks the Court to find her to be the prevailing party in light of the 
discrepancy of the amount Plaintiffs sought versus what the jury awarded. Conversely, in 
the event the Court fails to fine the Defendant as the sole prevailing party, the Defendant asks 
the Court to find that each party prevailed in part and deny that any party prevailed. 
The Court Should Cap Each Plaintiff's Award, if any, at $25,000 Because of the 
Bankruptcy Order and Stipulation. 
Defendant filed another affidavit showing the full stipulation and order. The Order 
incorporates the stipulation. The stipulation clearly provides that the Plaintiffs cannot 
recovery more than the policy limit of $25,000 per person, otherwise the Bankruptcy stay will 
be violated. 
4See Id. 
5Decker v. Homeguard Sys., 105 Idaho 158, 666 P.2d 1169 (1983). 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant respectfully requests the Court deny Plaintiffs' claims for additur, interest, 
costs and fees. 
DATED this 'J;rf- day of July, 2010. 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Brendon C. Taylor, the undersigned, one of the attorneys for the Defendant, in 
the above-referenced matter, do hereby certify that a true, full and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was this ~ day of July, 2010, served upon the following in the 
manner indicated below: 
Charles Johnson 
JOHNSON OLSON, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 1725 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1725 
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Brendon C. Taylor 
Jared A. Steadman 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
109 North Arthur - 5th Floor 
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P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
(208) 232-2286 
(208) 232-2499 Telefax 
ISB #6078 (BCT), #7804 (JAS) 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MATHEW R. BENNETT and 
BENJAMIN L. WALTON, 
Plaintiffs, 
) 
) 
) Case No. CV -08-4528-OC 
) 
vs. 
) AFFIDAVIT BRENDON TAYLOR 
) REGARDING BANKRUYfCY 
) ORDER AND STIPULATION 
NANCY PATRICK, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Bannock ) 
Brendon Taylor, being first duly sworn, deposes and states: 
1. I am one of the attorneys for the Defendant in the above entitled 
action and as such I make the following statements of my own 
personal knowledge and belief. 
Affidavit of Brendon Taylor Re: Bankruptcy Order and Stioulation 
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2. Defendant attaches hereto a true and correct copy of each of the 
following documents: 
Exhibit A: Order Granting Stipulation for Relief from Stay and that 
Bankruptcy Stay Does Not Apply to Personal Injury 
Claim Against Debtor's Insurance Carrier after 
Discharge ("Order") and 
Exhibit B: Stipulation Re: Automatic Stay Relief as to Creditors 
Mathew Bennett and Benjamin Walton ("Stipulation"). 
3. The Order signed by Judge Pappas incorporated the Stipulation by 
reference. 
4. The stipulation included the following language, "The Creditors 
(Walton and Bennett), in view of the fact that Debtor (Patrick) has 
filed a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy and that the alleged debt is a prepetition 
debt, agree that they will not pursue any course of action in state 
court that would result in Debtor being personally liable for any 
amount in excess of her pending insurance coverage with Allstate 
Insurance Company. Any judgment or settlement awarded to 
Creditors in the state court personal injury claim will only be 
attributable and payable by Debtor's insurance carrier Allstate 
Insurance Company and will be limited to the Debtor's insurance 
policy." See Paragraph 5, Page 2 of the Stipulation, Exhibit B. 
5. The Stipulation goes on to state, "Creditor's recovery in said action 
(the case before this Court, Bennett & Walton v. Patrick) will be 
limited to the policy limits of Debtor's Allstate insurance policy." 
See Paragraph 6, Page 3 of the Stipulation, Exhibit B. 
6. The policy limit of Debtor's Allstate insurance policy is $25,000 per 
person up to $50,000 total for bodily injury claims. See Affidavit in 
Support of Post-Trial Supplement previously filed. 
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7. Further, your affiant saith naught. 
DATED this .:1?~ day of July, 2010. 
(SEAL) 
NOTARY FOR IDA 0 
Residence: :=i3c1 bcl:C~ 
Commission expires: 1 ~ I 8'-~Cf4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Brendon C. Taylor, the undersigned, one of the attorneys for the 
Defendants, in the above-referenced matter, do hereby certify that a true, full and correct 
copy of the foregoing document was this 30-r--- day of July, 2010, served upon the 
following in the manner indicated below: 
Charles Johnson 
JOHNSON OLSON CHARTERED 
PO Box 1725 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1725 
Affidavit of Brendon Taylor Re: Bankruptcy Order and Stipulation 
0: \ 77\ 7783\Pleadin~s\affidavit-Brendon Tavlor5. wpd 4 56 
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[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[5Telefax 
-Page 3 
In Re: 
PATRICK, NANCY D. 
Debtor. 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
DISTRICT Of IDAHO 
Case No. 08-40764-JDP 
ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION FOR RELIEF 
FROM STAY AND THAT BANKRUPTCY STAY 
DOES NOT APPLY TO PERSONAL INJURY 
CLAIM AGAINST DEElTOR'S INSURANCE 
CARRIER AFTER DISCHARGE 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on January 14, 
2009 on the motion to vacate discharge and determine thac. the 
bankruptcy stay does not apply to personal injury claim against 
debtor's insurance carrier filed by creditors, Mathew R. Bennett 
and Benjamin L. Walton, through their counsel of record, Charles 
Johnson, on or about December 11, 2008 as Docket~ 23. The Court 
was advised that the parties had entered into a STIPULATION RE: 
AUTOMATIC STAY RELIEF AS TO CREDITORS MATHEW BENNETT AND BENJAMIN 
WALTON filed in this case as Docket# 28; and upon consideration of 
the record in this case and, good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
stipulation is granted by the Court. The provisions thereof are 
adopted as the order of the Court. 
IT IS fINALLY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
creditors, Mathew R. Bennett and Benjmain L. Walton, are granted 
relief from the stay and a determination that the stay does not 
apply after discharge to a pending automobile accident claim and 
State Court litigation for recovery of insurance proceeds, only, in 
the case of Mathew R. Benett and Benjamin L. Walton v, Nancy D. 
Pa trick; Bannock County Case No. CV-08-4 52 8-OC, in the above 
entitled bankruptcy case, pursuant to 11 O.S.C. § 362 and § 
ORDER 1 
457 
524 (a) (2). This claim in this case for personal injuries against 
.the defendant debtor will be defended and any award or judgment 
will be paid by her insurance carrier Allstate Insurance Company 
only and not the defendant and debtor Patrick personally after 
discharge (if any) in this case. 
There is no reason to delay entry of this order, which is 
effective immediately notwithstanding F.R.B.P. 4001 et seq. 
//End of Text// 
Dated: January 20, 2009 
~ Hon~D~ Pappas 
United States Bankruptcy Judge 
ORDER 
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Bnmdon C. Taylor, ISll #6078 
.land A. Steadman. ISB #7804 
MElUULL & ME1UtILL, CB'.AllTERED 
109 North AJ-thur· - ~ Floor 
P. O.Bax 991 
Pocatello, JdAho 83204-0991 
Telcpbona: (108) 2.32-2286 
Facsimflt: (lOS) '232-2499 
e-Enail: i!lt£,dm.an@m!r'r mandm~m I 1\co1n 
bt.@mer~bdmeJ"Till.com 
Att01 neys for Debto1 
UNITED ST A TES lJANKRUPTCY COURT 
DlSTRICT OF IDAHO 
916:39:13 Desc~RM005 
In Re: Caso No 08~764-JO'P 
P:\1RlCI<,NANCYD, Sl'll>ULATIONRE: 
AUroMATIC nAY RRI,IEF· AS 
TO C1UtDITORS MATBEW 
Debtor. B~·AND BENJAMIN 
WALTON 
___ ... ______________ ... 
Ihe t>ebtcr, N 11.'llcy D Patriek ("Debtoc"), through ber aounsc1 of ~d, Jated A Steadman, 
of Men ill and Men ill Oiatte:red and Kameron M V-oungblood. B&q .; And the Creditors, Ma.1£Lew R 
B6imett_and Benjamin L Walton ("Credltot.s") through thei:rcouncel of record Charles Johnson, of 
lobn£on Olson, Chmered; and tho Bankruptcy ltl.lS1et, R.. Sam Hoplctna etipulate and agree 
regud~ the automatic stay arul disclw ge of a c\aJm agiinst Debtot wing from alleged b\jw;e$ by 
Crerutors suswned in anau1omob0e accideatallegedly Cl~d by Debtor as follows: 
S nPut.A Ti ON Re: AIJ1"oMAT/C STA 'r' RELJt:P AS REGARDS W. TTHl!W BENNE7TAND BENJAMIN 
WAL TON'S P£RSONAL INJURY CLAIMS• 1 
Re·ceived Time Ja~. 13 4:15PM 
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L The c1editor, Mathew R. Bennett, at all times material bereto, was a resident of Pocatello. 
Bannock County, Idaho 
2 The Creditor, Benjamin I... Walton, at all times material hereto, was a resident of Pocatello, 
Bannock County, Idaho .. 
3. The Debtor, NancyD. Patrick, is the debtor inthiseaseandatall times material heteto, was 
a resident of Pocatello, Bannock County, Idaho She ts also the owner and chiver of a 
vehicle involved in a collision, which is the subjC(;t of a stat$ court personal inju1y action 
filed by~ Creditors .. 
4.. The Debt01; Nanoy D Patrick, filed a Cbapt0r 7 petition in banlallptcy on August 28, 2008 
~b.e OebtOt was allegedly unaware (lf the claim until after. the petition had been filed .so the 
Creditors are not listed in the appropriate bankruptcy schedules.. Hence, the Creditors were 
ucaware of' the debtor's pending bankroptcy. 
S l he Creditor&, in view of the fact that Debtor has filed a no asset·Cbapter 7 bankzuptcy and 
that the alleged debt is a ptepetition debt. agree that they wru not pmsue any comse of aotion 
in state co?Ut that wotild result in Debto? being personally liable fot any amount in excess of 
her·. pending il\Slllance coverage with Allstate lnsuran~ Company Any judgment 01 
iettlement nwardcd to Creditors in the st11te court peisonal injury claim wt1l only be 
atnibutable to and payable by Dobtot's insurance Clllrier Allstate Insumnce Contpany and 
will be limited to the Debtor's insurance policy. Any eltCtSS judgment 01 judgment not 
oovered in Debtor's insu1ance policy will not be collec;ted from Debtor personally or from 
het petSOnal assets. 
6 Debto11 in view of case law regarding illsurance companies' liability despite a debtor's 
discharge, agrees to a lifting and teimination of the automatic stay before and aftei discharge 
STfPULAilON Re; AUTOMATIC STAY R=LISFAS REGARDS MA TTHcW Bl=NNeTT ANO BENJAMIN 
WAL TON'S PeRSOf.JAL INJURY CLAIMS~ 2 
- Received Time Jan.13.- 4:~5PM 
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to allow Crodito~ 10 ])Ut'SUe tbeit; claim in the case of Mathew R Bennett and Benjamin l. 
JYaltarf y Nancy D PaJridc; Bannock County Case Numbet 08..4S28-0C, including 
discovexy, aeposilions, settlement conferences, and trial. Credi1ors may only pu1sue lhat 
claim insofar as Debrot· s insutance compaey, Allstate lll6lllance Coinpany, is resppmible for 
payment although Debtor will be ava11able for testimony and her name will temain.-011 the 
pleadings: D~tor and her personal assets \l/111 not be per$Q11ally~sible f01anypaymont 
to Creditors. Creditors' teeovety in said aGtion wi11 be limiteii to the policy limits c,f 
Debtor's Allstate insurance policy. Atiy sum awiuded CreditotS, but not paid by ~tot's 
insuzance company will be disebarged es a pc1so11al obligation t>fthe debtot, assuming 
Debtor is granted discbargei in the banlctuptcy .. 
Dated this_ day of Januaty 2009 
JOHNSON OLSON, CHAlUBlmI.) MEnILL, 
S11PrJLA T70N RE: AUT'OMATIC srAY RELIEF AS REGARD$ MATTHcW BENNSTT ANO BENJAMIN 
_ WAttON S PERSONAL INJURY CLAJMS ·• 3 
Receivea Time Jan.13 4:25PM 
--------- ... ·-------- .... ···-----4 1 
Charles Johnson 
JOHNSON OLSON CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 1725 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1725 
Telephone: (208) 232-7926 
Facsimile: (208) 232-9161 
ISB No. 2464 
E-Mail: cjlaw@cableone.net 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MATHEW R. BENNETT and 
BENJAMIN L. WALTON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NANCY PATRICK, 
Defendant. 
) Case No. CV-08-4528-PI 
) 
) 
) RESPONSE AND OBJECTION TO 
) DEFENDANT'S POST-HEARING BRIEF and 
) AFFIDAVIT ON BANKRUPTCY STIPULATION 
) 
) 
) 
) 
______________ ) 
The plaintiffs, Bennett and Walton, through counsel of record, 
hereby file this objection to defendant's post hearing brief and 
affidavit of Brendan Taylor regarding bankruptcy order and 
stipulation. These documents were filed late after the hearing, 
the award of attorney's fees under Idaho Code 12-120 (4) are not 
discretionary under the circumstances of this case, and the failure 
to award attorney's fees would be an abuse of discretion. 
A. POST HEARING MATERIALS NOT TIMELY FILED. 
The defendant's post-hearing brief and affidavit of Brendan 
Taylor were filed late and well beyond the period of time allowed 
for an objection under IRCP 54 (d) ( 6) , and the case law cited in the 
Plaintiff's OBJECTION AND RESPONSE AND THE DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION 
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TO DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES 
dated July 20, 2010. These arguments should have been made before 
the hearing took place on these issues. Therefore, the defendants' 
post hearing brief and affidavit of Brendan Taylor should be 
stricken and not considered by the court. 
B. IDAHO CODE§ 12-120 (4) MANDATORY AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Idaho Code Idaho Code 12-120 (4) provides for a mandatory 
award of attorney's fees as follows: 
12-120. Attorney's fees in civil actions - (4). 
In actions for personal injury, where the amount of 
plaintiff's claim for damages does not exceed twenty-five 
thousand dollars ($25,000), there shall be taxed and 
allowed to the claimant, as part of the costs of the 
action, a reasonable amount to be fixed by the court as 
attorney's fees. For the plaintiff to be awarded 
attorney's fees for the prosecution of the action, 
written demand for payment of the claim and a statement 
of claim must have been served on the defendant's 
insurer, if known, or if there is no known insurer, then 
on the defendant, not less than sixty (60) days before 
the commencement of the action; provided that no 
attorney's fees shall be allowed to the plaintiff if the 
court finds that the defendant tendered to the plaintiff, 
prior to the commencement of the action, an amount at 
least equal to ninety percent (90%) of the amount awarded 
to the plaintiff. (Emphasis supplied) . 
This section is mandatory and attorney fees "shall be taxed 
and allowed to the claimant" in this case. Therefore, under this 
section, the plaintiffs, and not defendants, are entitled to an 
award of costs and attorney's fees. See Gonzalez v. Thacker, 
Idaho_, 2009 Opinion number 1, (January 21, 2009; a copy of this 
decision is attached because it has not yet been reported in the 
official court reporters for a better citation. 
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In this case, the defendants did not tender before the 
commencement of the action, at least 90% of the amount awarded to 
the plaintiff. The plaintiffs complied in all other material 
respects with the statute. 
In this case there was no different alleged injury, and 
certainly no significant new item of damages claimed. The total 
amount awarded was less than $25,000.00, the claims were all 
exactly the same (past and future medical expenses, lost wages, 
pain and suffering). There was only a slight adjustment in 
Plaintiff Walton's medical damages, which were based primarily on 
the defendant's own medical expert I. M. E Dr. David Simon. There 
is no case that has ever held a $2,500.00 claim to be so 
significantly different that attorney's fees must be denied, 
especially where the total award is less than $25,000.00. 
Therefore, under the circumstances of this case, it would be 
an abuse of discretion to deny costs and attorney's fees to Walton 
and Bennett at all. See Johnson vs. Sanchez, 140 Idaho 667, 99 
P.3d 620 (2004); Harris vs. Alessi, 141 Idaho 901, 909-910, 120 
P.3ct 289 (2005); Contreras vs. Rubley, 142 Idaho 573, 576-577, 140 
P.3ct 1111 (2006) 
Finally, the provisions of IRCP 68(b) are similarly mandatory. 
If the adjusted award obtained by the offeree is more than the 
offer, the offeror must pay those costs, including attorney's fees 
incurred before and after the making of the offer. 
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C. ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
Finally, the plaintiffs take the position that to deny them 
costs and attorney's fees in this case would be an abuse of 
discretion. The jury clearly intended that the plaintiffs receive 
the entire amount of their verdict, without a reduction for any 
kind of court costs or attorney's fees. If the court grants costs 
and attorney's fees the plaintiffs will not have the benefit of 
their bargain and their contracts agreed in the stipulation that 
defendants pay their medical bills. 
The defendants control their fate and could have made a 
reasonable pre-filing offer under Idaho Code 12-120(4) or a 
reasonable offer of judgment under IRCP 68(b) with attorney's fees 
to be set later by the court. The defendants instead adopted a 
strenuous scorched earth defense, spending far more on costs than 
there was at stake. This defense philosophy is wholly designed to 
discourage plaintiffs from pursuing legitimate claims in court, and 
can only be ameliorated if the defendants' insurance carrier adopts 
a more reasonable approach to an early settlement of claims before 
litigation is filed, and more reasonable offers of judgment after 
the filing of litigation. Public policy clearly favors an award of 
costs and attorney's fees to the plaintiffs in this case. 
DATED and signed this 4th day of August, 2010. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document by placing the same in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Brendon C. Taylor 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991 
on this 4 th day of August, 2010. 
Licensed Lawyer 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 34534 
MARTIN GONZALEZ, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
SHAUN THACKER, individually; TERRI 
REININGER, individually; and DOES I-V, 
unknown parties, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Boise, November 2008 Term 
2009 Opinion No. 1 
Filed: January 21, 2009 
Stephen Kenyon, Clerk 
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Canyon County. Honorable James C. Morfitt, District Judge. 
The decision of the district court is reversed. 
Holzer Edwards, Chartered, Boise, for appellant. Kurt Holzer argued. 
Powers Thomson, P.C., Boise, for respondents. Raymond Powers argued. 
HORTON, Justice. 
This appeal stems from a district court's award of attorney fees to the defendants in a 
personal injury action. Appellant Martin Gonzalez (Gonzalez) appeals the district court's award 
of attorney fees to respondents Shaun Thacker, Terri Reininger, and Does 1-V (collectively 
referred to as Respondents). The district court concluded that Respondents were entitled to 
attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(4), which pertains to attorney fees in personal injury 
actions. Because we hold that only plaintiffs 1 may be awarded attorney fees under LC. § 12-
120( 4 ), we reverse the district court's award to Respondents. 
We also conclude that counterclaimants who successfully advance claims may also be entitled to attorney 
fees under I.C. § 12-120( 4) in certain circumstances, as will be discussed infra. In such cases, the plaintiff may have 
attorney fees awarded against him or her. However, for convenience purposes, unless the context of the discussion 
indicates otherwise, this opinion will refer to "plaintiffs" in a broader sense, rather than using the more unwieldy 
phrase "parties successfully advancing a claim falling within I.C. § 12-120( 4)." 
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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In late 2004, while driving an automobile, Thacker pulled out from a stop sign into the 
path of a vehicle in which Gonzalez was riding, injuring Gonzalez and causing him economic 
and non-economic damages. In May 2005, Gonzalez sent a demand letter to Respondents asking 
for damages "in excess of $13,000." In February 2006, Respondents offered to settle Gonzalez's 
claim for $18,100. Gonzalez filed a complaint in June 2006, and Respondents answered in 
August 2006. In February 2007, the case went to a Small Lawsuit Resolution Act (SLRA) 
evaluator, who found Thacker to be 100% at fault for the accident. The evaluator awarded 
Gonzalez economic damages in the amount of $10,735.57 and $2,000 in non-economic damages. 
The parties accepted the decision of the evaluator without seeking a trial de novo, and in May 
2007 the district court entered a judgment for Gonzalez for $12,725.57.2 In August 2007, the 
district court relied on this Court's plurality opinion in Gillihan v. Gump, 140 Idaho 264, 92 P.3d 
514, (2004) (Gillihan II), to determine that LC. § 12-120(4) does not preclude an award of 
attorney fees to defendants in personal injury cases in which the plaintiffs claim for damages 
does not exceed $25,000. The district court entered an order granting Respondents "attorney 
fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(4) as requested" in the amount of $4,636.50. The district court 
then amended and reduced Gonzalez's judgment to $8,089.07. Gonzalez timely appealed. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When an award of attorney fees depends on the interpretation of a statute, the standard of 
review for statutory interpretation applies. BECO Const. Co., Inc. v. J-U-B Eng'rs, Inc., 145 
Idaho 719, 726, 184 P.3d 844, 851 (2008). The interpretation of a statute is a question of law 
over which this Court exercises free review. State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829, 25 P.3d 850, 852 
(2001). 
III. ANALYSIS 
This case hinges on the interpretation of LC.§ 12-120, and more specifically on the use 
of the word "claimant" in the first sentence of LC.§ 12-120(4). One way to interpret the statute 
is to conclude that subsection four alone governs attorney fees in personal injury cases where the 
amount of plaintiffs claim does not exceed $25,000 and mandates an award only to parties who 
have successfully advanced their claims in such cases-not defendants. Under this 
2 We recognize that the award of economic and non-economic damages should equal $12,735.57. However, 
the evaluator stated that the total award was $12,725.57 and judgment was entered for the lesser sum. 
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interpretation, the word "claimant" in subsection four refers to the plaintiff in the personal injury 
action. The Idaho Court of Appeals, in Gillihan v. Gump, 140 Idaho 693, 99 P .3d 1083 (Ct. App. 
2003) (Gillihan I), and two members of this Court, dissenting in Gillihan II, have understood LC. 
§ 12-120( 4) to operate in this way. A plurality of this Court in Gillihan II, however, held that 
subsection four operates in tandem with subsection one, and that nothing in the former precludes 
an award of attorney fees to defendants under the latter. In the plurality's view, the word 
"claimant" in subsection four refers to either the prevailing plaintiff or defendant in the small 
personal injury action who is claiming attorney fees. 
Critically, the plurality, unlike the Court of Appeals, failed to address the fact that, prior 
to passage, the legislature amended the phrase "prevailing party" to "claimant" in LC. § 12-
120( 4). H. Am. to H.B. No. 708 (1996) (deleting "prevailing party" and inserting "claimant"). 
The plurality opinion, however, is not binding on this Court. Osick v. Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. of 
Idaho, 122 Idaho 457, 460, 835 P.2d 1268, 1271 (1992). We must now decide the proper 
interpretation of I.C. § 12-120 and whether the district court erred in awarding attorney fees to 
Respondents pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(4). 
A. The district court erred when it awarded attorney fees to Respondents under LC. § 12-
120(4). 
In interpreting a statute, it is this Court's duty to ascertain and give effect to legislative 
intent by reading the entire act, including amendments. George W Watkins Family v. 
Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 539-40, 797 P.2d 1385, 1387-88 (1990). If the language of the 
statute is clear, the Court should apply the plain meaning of the statute. Jen-Rath Co., Inc. v. Kit 
Mfg. Co., 137 Idaho 330,335, 48 P.3d 659,664 (2002); Payette River Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Bd 
Of Comm 'rs of Valley County, 132 Idaho 551, 557, 976 P.2d 477, 483 (1999). If, however, a 
statute lends itself to more than one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous. Carrier v. Lake 
Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84, 142 Idaho 804, 807-08, 134 P.3d 655, 658-59 (2006). The 
meaning of LC. § 12-120 has spawned litigation and several appeals that have divided both the 
Court of Appeals as well as this Court. Based on this history, it is fair to say the statute is 
ambiguous. When a statute is ambiguous, the Court should consider not only the literal words of 
the statute, but also the reasonableness of proposed constructions, the public policy behind the 
statute, and its legislative history in order to discern and implement the intent of the legislature. 
Hayden Lake Fire Prof. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388, 398-99, 111 P.3d 73, 83-84 (2005); 
Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State Insur. Fund, 134 Idaho 130,134,997 P.2d 591,595 (2000). 
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LC. § 12-120 states in relevant part: 
(1) Except as provided in subsections (3) and ( 4) of this section, in any 
action where the amount pleaded is twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) or 
less, there shall be taxed and allowed to the prevailing party, as part of the costs of 
the action, a reasonable amount to be fixed by the court as attorney's fees. For the 
plaintiff to be awarded attorney's fees, for the prosecution of the action, written 
demand for the payment of such claim must have been made on the defendant not 
less than ten (] 0) days before the commencement of the action; provided, that no 
attorney's fees shall be allowed to the plaintiff if the court finds that the defendant 
tendered to the plaintiff, prior to the commencement of the action, an amount at 
least equal to ninety-five percent (95%) of the amount awarded to the plaintiff. 
(4) In actions for personal injury, where the amount of plaintiffs claim for 
damages does not exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000), there shall be 
taxed and allowed to the claimant, as part of the costs of the action, a reasonable 
amount to be fixed by the court as attorney's fees. For the plaintiff to be awarded 
attorney's fees for the prosecution of the action, written demand for payment of 
the claim and a statement of claim must have been served on the defendant's 
insurer, if known, or if there is no known insurer, then on the defendant, not less 
than sixty (60) days before the commencement of the action; provided that no 
attorney's fees shall be allowed to the plaintiff if the court finds that the defendant 
tendered to the plaintiff, prior to the commencement of the action, an amount at 
least equal to ninety percent (90%) of the amount awarded to the plaintiff. 
The plurality in Gillihan 11, applying the rules of statutory construction stated above, 
concluded that subsection four does not preclude an award of attorney fees to a defendant. It 
opined that subsection one governs personal injury actions where the plaintiff's claim for 
damages does not exceed $25,000 to the extent it is not modified by subsection four. Gillihan II 
at 267, 92 P.3d at 517. The plurality concluded that subsection four simply changes two parts of 
subsection one ( concerning the specific requirements for plaintiffs to receive an award of 
attorney fees). Id. Under this view, in subsection four, the use of the word "claimant" in the 
phrase "there shall be taxed and allowed to the claimant ... attorney's fees," means attorney fees 
shall be taxed and allowed to either a plaintiff or defendant claiming attorney fees in an action 
meeting the other requirements of the statute. Id. 
There are two problems with this view. As Judge Lansing pointed out in Gillihan I, the 
first is that: 
The opening words of subsection (1) make it clear that it does not apply in 
cases that are subject to subsection ( 4 ), and the opening words of subsection ( 4) 
establish that it governs "[i]n actions for personal injury, where the amount of 
4 
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plaintiffs claim for damages does not exceed twenty-five thousand dollars 
($25,000)." 
Gillihan I at 696, 99 P.3d at 1086. The two subsections do not govern together in personal injury 
actions, and to read them as though they do, as Gonzalez points out, is to edit the statutory 
language of LC.§ 12-120. The plurality's interpretation is strained, and both parties in this case 
have agreed (although Respondents reversed their position at oral argument) that once subsection 
four applies, subsection one no longer governs. The parties do dispute the meaning of the word 
"claimant" in subsection four. 
Under the plurality's view, as Chief Justice Eismann points out in the Gillihan II dissent, 
the word "claimant" in subsection four must be synonymous with the idea of "prevailing party." 
This is because, in order for the word "claimant" in subsection four to refer to either the 
defendant or plaintiff, it must also signify that such a defendant or plaintiff has prevailed in the 
personal injury action, since losing parties do not recover attorney fees under Idaho law. See 
Gillihan II at 271, 92 P.3d at 521 (Eismann, J., concurring in dissent). This leads to the second 
problem with the plurality's construction of the statute: It assigns the word "claimant" in 
subsection four a meaning synonymous with "prevailing party," without explaining why the 
legislature bothered to substitute the word "claimant" for "prevailing party" prior to the 
subsection's passage. See H. Am. to H.B. No. 708 (1996) (deleting "prevailing party" and 
inserting "claimant"). 
The legislature may have been varying its diction. However, we decline to interpret the 
substitution this way, because "where an amendment is made it carries with it the presumption 
that the Legislature intended the statute thus amended to have a meaning different than 
theretofore accorded it." State ex rel. Parsons v. Bunting Tractor Co., 58 Idaho 617, 619, 77 
P.2d 464, 466 (1938) (holding change of word "shall" to "may" prior to bill's passage indicates 
legislative intent to make purchases upon bids permissive rather than mandatory); see also In re 
Garrett Transfer & Storage Co., 53 Idaho 200, 201, 23 P .2d 739, 740 (1933) (holding 
elimination of provisions prior to passage of bill requiring a certificate of convenience and 
necessity indicates legislature intentionally omitted such provisions); In re Segregation of School 
Dist. No. 58 from Rural High School Dist. No. 1, 34 Idaho 222, 224, 200 P. 13 8, 140 (1921) 
(holding removal of word "unanimous" from bill prior to passage demonstrates legislative intent 
to change law from requiring board unanimity to segregate school districts to requiring only 
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majority); Beker Industries Inc. v. Georgetown Irr. Dist., 101 Idaho 187, 191,610 P.2d 546, 550 
(1980) (holding legislature's removal of language allowing director to approve change in nature 
of water use prior to bill's passage can only be interpreted as intent that director not have that 
power). In this case, there can be "no reasonable explanation for that amendment except as an 
expression of legislative intent that only plaintiffs would be entitled to recover attorney fees in 
small personal injury cases." Gillihan I at 697, 99 P.3d at 1087. 
Respondents, however, pose a question: If the legislative intent was that only plaintiffs 
be allowed to recover attorney fees under subsection four, why did the legislature not simply use 
the word "plaintiff" rather than "claimant" in that provision and make that intent explicit? 
Although the legislative history yields no definitive answer, a reasonable conclusion is that the 
legislature used the word "claimant" to account for those situations in which defendants who 
assert a counterclaim, and who thus would have been called "plaintiffs" had they filed suit first 
but are instead called "defendants-counterclaimants," are not precluded from recovering attorney 
fees simply because the other party filed first. 
Both the Gillihan I and Gillihan II courts, as well as the parties in this case, recognize 
that the purpose behind I.C. § 12-120 is to affect the bargaining power of the parties in small 
civil cases in order to facilitate an efficient and early settlement if possible. Each party is able to 
argue that its reading of the statute best serves public policy. The complexities of settlement 
negotiations, however, including the parties' relative bargaining strengths and empirical evidence 
of the reasonableness of parties at settlement, are queries best left to the legislature. "The 
legislature has the resources for the research, study and proper formulation of broad public 
policy." Anstine v. Hawkins, 92 Idaho 561, 563, 447 P.2d 677, 679 (1968). While it is true that 
I.C. § 12-120 is ambiguous on its face, when readers consider the statute in light of the 
legislative substitution of "claimant" for "prevailing party," the least strained interpretation 
employing the plain meaning of the statute prevails. The law as written instructs that, where 
subsection four governs, subsection one does not, and only plaintiffs are allowed an award of 
attorney fees under subsection four. This Court "must follow the law as written ... , [and] [i]f it 
is socially or economically unsound, the power to correct it is legislative, not judicial." John 
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Neill, 79 Idaho 385, 405, 319 P.2d 195, 206, (1957) (citations 
omitted); see also Anstine, 92 Idaho at 563, 447 P.2d at 679. Therefore, we reverse the district 
court's award of attorney fees to Respondents under LC.§ 12-120(4). 
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Although we reverse the district court's decision, we are mindful that the district judge 
applied the legal principle announced in the lead opinion in Gillihan II. Generally, the lower 
courts are obligated to abide by the decisions of this Court and the Court of Appeals. State v. 
Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 986, 842 P.2d 660, 665 (1992). It is only because the reasoning in 
Gillihan II was not adopted by three members of this Court that it was not controlling precedent. 
Osick, 122 Idaho at 460, 835 P.2d at 1271. There is nothing in the record that suggests that 
counsel for Gonzalez alerted the district court that Gillihan II was not binding precedent. 
B. Respondents are not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
Respondents have asked this Court for attorney fees on appeal pursuant to LC. § 12-12 I. 
Under LC. § 12-121, attorney fees are awarded to the prevailing party only if the Court 
determines that the appeal was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without 
foundation. Garcia v. Windley, 144 Idaho 539, 546, 164 P.3d 819, 826 (2007). Because 
Respondents have not prevailed in this appeal, they are not entitled to an award of attorney fees. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We hold that LC. § 12-120( 4) alone governs attorney fees in personal injury actions 
where the amount of plaintiffs claim does not exceed $25,000 and allows for an award of 
attorney fees only to plaintiffs in such cases. We reverse the district court's award of attorney 
fees to Respondents. Costs, but not attorney fees, are awarded to Appellant. 
Chief Justice EISMANN, Justices BURDICK, J. JONES and W. JONES, CONCUR. 
7 
47~ 
FILED 
BANNOC/'{ COUNTY 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
201DA~H 3• 26 
3Y ~ 
--;.:;0-;:-;EP~U~TY~CL"=E-=--=R K-=---
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MATHEW R. BENNETT and BENJAMIN 
L. WALTON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NANCY PATRICK, 
Defendant. 
Case No: CV-2008-0004528-PI 
AMENDED 
JUDGMENT ON VERDICT 
This cause came on regularly for trial on June 2 through June 4, 2010. The parties 
appeared by and through their attorneys. Charles Johnson represented both Plaintiffs. 
Brendon Taylor represented Defendant. A Jury of twelve (12) persons was regularly 
impaneled and sworn to try said cause. Witnesses on the part of plaintiff and defendant 
were sworn and examined. After hearing evidence, the arguments of counsel and 
instructions of the Court, the Jury retired to consider their verdict. The Jury subsequently 
returned a verdict awarding monetary damages to each Plaintiff. See the Special Verdict, 
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filed on June 4, 2010. 
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law and by reason of the premises aforesaid, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment be 
entered in this matter in favor of Plaintiff Mathew R. Bennett and against Defendant 
Nancy Patrick in the TOTAL AMOUNT of $5,065.11, which amount includes costs in the 
matter of$ 728.49. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment be 
entered in this matter in favor of Plaintiff Benjamin L. Walton and against Defendant 
Nancy Patrick in the TOTAL AMOUNT of $10,671.63, which amount includes costs in the 
matter of$ 789.70. 
No attorney fees are awarded to any party. 
DATED this ZF-t~ day of August, 2010. 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF-SERVICE 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the d() day of August, 2010, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the 
manner indicated. 
Charles Johnson 
Johnson Olson Chartered 
P.O. Box 1725 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1725 
Brendon C. Taylor 
Merrill & Merrill, Chartered 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991 
C2J U.S. Mail 
D Overnight Delivery 
D Hand Deliver 
D Fax: 232-9161 
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D Fax: 232-2499 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MATHEW R. BENNETT and 
BENJAMIN L. WALTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NANCY PATRICK, 
Defendant 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CV-08-4528-PI 
DECISION ON POST-JUDGMENT 
MOTIONS 
This matter came before the Court on July 26, 2010, on the Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter 
Judgment and Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees, and Defendant's Motion for Costs and 
Reduction to Judgment. Charles Johnson of Johnson Olson Chartered appeared on behalf of the 
Plaintiffs, Mathew R. Bennett and Benjamin L. Walton. Brendon C. Taylor of Merrill & Merrill, 
Chartered appeared on behalf of the Defendant, Nancy Patrick. Stephanie Morse was the Court 
Reporter. The Court heard oral arguments from all parties and took the matter under advisement. 
The Court has reviewed the oral arguments and the file and now issues its decision on all 
pending motions. 
Facts Pertinent to Pending Motions 
On April 29, 2010 the Defendant made an Offer of Judgment to the Plaintiff Mathew R. 
Bennett in the amount of $3,432. Later, on May 18, 2010, the Defendant made another offer to 
the Plaintiff Bennett in the amount of $4,432. On June 2nd, 2010 this case went to a jury trial for 
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3 days. After all evidence was presented and submitted to the jury, the jury unanimously 
awarded to Plaintiff Bennett damages in the amount of $3,978.47. 
On April 29th, 2010 the Defendant made an Offer of Judgment to the Plaintiff Benjamin 
L. Walton in the amount of $6,484. The jury unanimously awarded to Plaintiff Walton damages 
in the amount of $10,030.92. 
The Court entered a Judgment on Verdict on June 7, 2010. All parties filed post-
judgment motions, each of which will be discussed below. 
Additur and Pre-Judgment Interest 
On June 18th, 2010, the Plaintiffs timely filed a Motion to Alter and Amend Judgment 
and for Additur; and a Motion for Pre-Judgment Interest. 
1. The Request for Additur. Plaintiff Bennett asks the Court for $1,000 for future 
medical care for his future chiropractic care and non-prescription pain medication. Additionally, 
both Plaintiffs ask the Court to double the amounts awarded by the jury for pain and suffering. 
Additur is defined by the Idaho Supreme Court: 
[w]hen the trial court believes that the jury award was based on substantial and 
competent evidence, but the damage award was based on passion and prejudice, a 
new trial or additur is appropriately granted under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5). When 
determining if the jury award was proper, the trial court is not to merely substitute 
its opinion for that of the jury, but is to look to the disparity and determine if the 
disparity shocks the conscience of the court. This standard is subjective, based on 
the trial court's belief that the amount of the award was inadequate or excessive. 
Collins v. Jones, 131 Idaho 556, 961 P .2d 64 7 (1998). 
The Court having reviewed the motion for additur, finds that the jury award was based on 
substantial and competent evidence and the award was not based on passion and prejudice. 
Plaintiffs claim that the pain and suffering component of the verdict was umeasonably small and 
against the weight of the evidence and appears to have been prompted by defense counsel's 
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statements that worker's compensation insurance existed, speculation by the jury as to seat belts 
and air bags from defendant's closing argument, or other unidentified factors. However, the 
Court instructed the jury that insurance was not relevant to this case and could not be considered. 
The Court further instructed the jury that any alleged failure to use a seatbelt is not a defense to 
liability or damages. Finally, the only reference to airbags in the Defendant's closing argument 
was a reference to the airbag in Defendant's vehicle not deploying, inferring that the impact was 
minimal when Defendant collided head-on into the side of Plaintiffs' vehicle. This reference 
was based upon the photographs admitted in evidence. The verdict regarding pain and suffering 
is not against the weight of the evidence. Furthermore, although the award is much lower than 
what Plaintiffs had asked for, this disparity does not shock the conscience of the Court, therefore, 
the Plaintiffs motion for additur in denied. 
2. The Request for Prejudgment Interest. Both Plaintiffs also ask for pre-judgment 
interest on the medical bills incurred from October 18th, 2007, the date of the accident, to June 
7th, 2010, the date of the judgment under Idaho Code §28-22-104. Mathew R. Bennett seeks 
pre-judgment interest in the amount of $530.15 and Benjamin L. Walton seeks pre-judgment 
interest in the amount of $851.01. The Defendant stipulated to pre-judgment interest in the 
amounts requested by the Plaintiffs and the Court finds that the requested pre-judgment interest 
is appropriate and should be awarded. Therefore, the Court grants Plaintiffs motion for pre-
judgment interest. 
Remittitur 
On June 21, 2010 the Defendant timely filed a Motion for Reduction to Judgment. 
Defendant Patrick asks the Court to reduce Plaintiff Bennett's award by $172 because 
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Defendant/Plaintiff's insurer1 paid the cost of the medical bills from Mountain View Family 
Medicine prior to trial. The Defendant also asks the Court to reduce Plaintiff Walton's award by 
$1,000 ($917 from Portneuf Medical Center and $83 from Pocatello Radiology), because the 
Defendants/Plaintiff's insurer paid the cost of these medical bills prior to trial. Thus, 
Defendant's motion is a motion to prevent double recovery. 
The Court reviews such a motion pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-1606, which states: 
... a judgment may be entered for the claimant only for damages which exceed 
amounts received by the claimant from collateral sources as compensation for the 
personal injury or property damage, whether from private, group or governmental 
sources, and whether contributory or noncontributory. Evidence of payment by 
collateral sources is admissible to the court after the finder of fact has rendered an 
award. Such award shall be reduced by the court to the extent the award includes 
compensation for damages which have been compensated independently from 
collateral sources" 
The Court having reviewed the motion for remittitur finds that Plaintiffs Bennett and 
Walton have previously received compensation from a collateral source for some medical bills, 
evidence of which has been provided to the Court by the Defendant. Therefore, the Court grants 
Defendant's Motion for Remittitur. 
Prevailing Party 
All parties are claiming that they are a prevailing party in this case.2 The standard of 
review to determine a prevailing party is: 
... the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result 
of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial 
court in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an action prevailed in 
part and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs 
between and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all 
1 Allstate represented the Defendant. The Plaintiffs were also insured by Allstate. Apparently, the pre-trial medical 
payments were made by Allstate under the medical payment provision of Plaintiffs' policies. 
2 Plaintiffs each seek their attorney fees under LC.§ 12-120(4) and their costs. Defendant seeks her costs but 
recognized that LC.§ 12-120(4) is not available to prevailing Defendants. See Gonzalez v. Thacker, 148 Idaho 879, 
231 P.3d 524 (2009). 
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issues and claims involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments 
obtained. 
Crump v. Bromley, 148 Idaho 172, 174,219 P.3d 1188, 1190 (2009). 
The Court, in exercising its discretion and after comparing the jury verdict to the Offer of 
Judgments made by the Defendant, finds that Plaintiff Walton is a prevailing party. The Offer of 
Judgment in the amount of $6,484 is less than the jury verdict even after making the reduction to 
the verdict for the collateral source. 
The issue of the prevailing party as between Bennett and Patrick is much more difficult. 
The Court in determining whether Plaintiff Bennett was the prevailing party looks to l.R.C.P. 
68(b), basing the decision on a comparison of the Offer of Judgment and the "adjusted award": 
The adjusted award is define[ d] as (1) the verdict in addition to (2) the offeree's 
costs under Rule 54( d)(l) incurred before service of the offer of judgment and (3) 
any attorney fees under Rule 54( e )( 1) incurred before service of the offer of 
judgment. Provided, in contingent fee cases where attorney fees are awardable 
under Rule 54( e )(1 ), the court will pro rate the offeree's attorney fees to determine 
the amount incurred before the offer of judgment in reaching the adjusted award. 
In applying the first step of the standard, the Court looks to the verdict. The jury verdict 
awarded Plaintiff Bennett a total of $3,978.47 (The jury verdict total included a stipulated past 
medical amount of $1,878.47, past lost earnings in the amount of $600, and non-economic 
damages in the amount of $1,500). The verdict has been reduced by the Court to prevent double 
recovery. The reduced verdict is $3,806.47. However, the verdict has also been increased by the 
award of pre-judgment interest in the amount of $530.15. Thus, under the first step, the adjusted 
verdict is $4,336.62. 
The second step of the standard is to determine the plaintiffs costs incurred under Rule 
54( d)(l) before service of the Defendant's offer of judgment. In making this determination, the 
Court notes that Bennett claims the May 18, 2010 Offer of Judgment is not timely. However, 
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trial began on June 2, 2010. May 18 is 15 days before the start of trial. IRCP 68 requires an 
Offer of Judgment to be made at least 14 days before trial. The May 18th Offer of Judgment is 
timely and will be the offer used to determine the prevailing party. 
Plaintiff is asking for $994.54 in costs incurred before service of the May 18 Offer of 
Judgment. The Court attributes to Plaintiff as pre-Offer of Judgment costs the following; $44 for 
the Bannock County Clerk Filing Fee, $20 for Bannock County Sheriff (Service Fee), $98.91 for 
the deposition of Nancy Patrick, $118.08 for the deposition of Mat Bennett, $27.50 for the 
subpoena of Dr. Simons, and $20 for Bonneville County Sheriff to serve the subpoena on Dr. 
Simons. The attributed costs are $328.49. All other costs are not attributed for purposes of 
determining the prevailing party because they are either inappropriate or denied under the 
discretion of the Court. 3 The total amount of the adjusted award through step two equals 
$4,665.11, which is greater than the May 18th Offer of Judgment. Bennett prevailed over the 
Offer of Judgment even if attorney fees are not included. 
The final step is to determine in a contingent fee case, where attorney fees are awardable 
under Rule 54( e )( 1 ), the pro rated plaintiffs attorney fees incurred before the offer of judgment. 
This step will not be performed because Bennett is deemed the prevailing party even without 
considering the attorney fees issue through step two. Therefore, Bennett and Walton are the 
prevailing parties. Patrick is not a prevailing party. 
Costs 
All parties have filed motions for costs. The Court finds that the defendant was not a 
prevailing party. Defendant is not entitled to costs. Both Plaintiffs, as prevailing parties, are 
entitled to costs. 
3 Further explanation will be found in the section on cost 
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1. Costs as a Matter of Right. Plaintiffs are entitled to costs as a matter of right under 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C). Plaintiff Walton shall be awarded costs in the amount of $789.70. $44 for 
the Bannock County Clerk Filing Fee, $20 for Bannock County Sheriff (Service Fee), $98.91 for 
the deposition of Nancy Patrick, $129.29 for the deposition of Benjamin Walton, $27.50 for the 
subpoena of Dr. Simons, $20 for Bonneville County Sheriff to serve the subpoena on Dr. 
Simons, $400 for the expert witness fee of Dr. Henry West, incurred after the offer of judgment, 
but awarded as a matter of right, and $50 for the witness fee of Ron Rutton, also incurred after 
the offer of judgment but awarded as a matter of right. 
Plaintiff Bennett shall be awarded costs in the amount of $728.49. $44 for the Bannock 
County Clerk Filing Fee, $20 for Bannock County Sheriff (Service Fee), $98.91 for the 
deposition of Nancy Patrick, $118.08 for the deposition of Mat Bennett, $27.50 for the subpoena 
of Dr. Simons, $20 for Bonneville County Sheriff to serve the subpoena on Dr. Simon, and $400 
for the expert witness fee of Dr. Henry West, incurred after the offer of judgment, but awarded as 
a matter of right. 
Discretionary Costs. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D): 
Discretionary Costs. Additional items of cost not enumerated in, or 
in an amount in excess of that listed in subparagraph (C), may be allowed 
upon a showing that said costs were necessary and exceptional costs 
reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed 
against the adverse party. The trial court, in ruling upon objections to such 
discretionary costs contained in the memorandum of costs, shall make 
express findings as to why such specific item of discretionary cost should 
or should not be allowed. In the absence of any objection to such an item 
of discretionary costs, the court may disallow on its own motion any such 
items of discretionary costs and shall make express findings supporting 
such disallowance. 
In discretionary costs, Plaintiff Walton asks for $140. 98 and Plaintiff Bennett asks for 
$231.29. In order to recover discretionary costs, the moving party must show that the requested 
Case No. CV-08-4528-PI 
DECISION ON POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS 
Page 7 of 16 
483 
costs were necessary, exceptional, and reasonably incurred. Auto. Club Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 124 
Id. 874, 880-81(1994). Where the prevailing party fails to make such a showing, discretionary 
costs should be denied. Roe v. Harris, 128 Id. 569 (1996) (affirming denial of costs for 
photocopying and long-distance phone calls because plaintiff failed to make showing that costs 
were necessary and exceptional). 
The Court has reviewed the discretionary costs and denies the award for those costs for 
the following reasons. Although the costs being sought were necessary and reasonable, most 
everything that is done with regard to litigation is necessary and reasonably. The costs however 
must also be exceptional. The Court does not find that the discretionary costs were exceptional, 
but rather the costs sought are part of the cost of overhead. Therefore neither plaintiff will be 
awarded discretionary costs. 
Attorney Fees 
Plaintiffs seek attorney fees under LC.§ 12-120(4). The Defendant filed a memorandum 
in opposition to attorney fees. Idaho Code § 12-120( 4) states: 
(4) In actions for personal injury, where the amount of plaintiffs claim for 
damages does not exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000), there shall be 
taxed and allowed to the claimant, as part of the costs of the action, a reasonable 
amount to be fixed by the court as attorney's fees. For the plaintiff to be awarded 
attorney's fees for the prosecution of the action, written demand for payment of 
the claim and a statement of claim must have been served on the defendant's 
insurer, if known, or if there is no known insurer, then on the defendant, not less 
than sixty (60) days before the commencement of the action; provided that no 
attorney's fees shall be allowed to the plaintiff if the court finds that the defendant 
tendered to the plaintiff, prior to the commencement of the action, an amount at 
least equal to ninety percent (90%) of the amount awarded to the plaintiff. 
The term "statement of claim" shall mean a written statement signed by the 
plaintiffs attorney, or if no attorney, by the plaintiff which includes: 
(a) An itemized statement of each and every item of damage claimed by the 
plaintiff including the amount claimed for general damages and the following 
items of special damages: (i) medical bills incurred up to the date of the plaintiffs 
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demand; (ii) a good faith estimate of future medical bills; (iii) lost income 
incurred up to the date of the plaintiffs demand; (iv) a good faith estimate of 
future loss of income; and (v) property damage for which the plaintiff has not 
been paid. 
(b) Legible copies of all medical records, bills and other documentation pertinent 
to the plaintiffs alleged damages. 
If the plaintiff includes in the complaint filed to commence the action, or in 
evidence offered at trial, a different alleged injury or a significant new item of 
damage not set forth in the statement of claim, the plaintiff shall be deemed to 
have waived any entitlement to attorney's fees under this section. 
The Court, in determining whether Plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees, looks to the 
aforementioned statute as well as case law from the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of 
Appeals. There are three factors to evaluate in determining whether § 12-120( 4) is applicable and 
mandates an award of attorney fees. 
The Court must first determine whether § 12-120( 4) applies to the case for purposes of 
attorney fees. "Subsection ( 4) applies where 'the amount of plaintiffs claim for damages does 
not exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000)."' Cox v. Mulligan, 142 Idaho 356, 357, 128 
P.3d 893 (2005). Plaintiffs must have made a statement of claim in the amount of $25,000 or 
less sixty days before filing the Complaint. In Plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees, they have 
attached a document, which is the demand letter to Allstate Insurance Company, dated July 9, 
2008 (Exhibit 161 ), which is more than sixty days prior to the filing of the Complaint. The letter 
demands $20,000 for Plaintiff Bennett and $23,000 for Plaintiff Walton, each of which is less 
than $25,000. Defendant attached to her documents Plaintiffs' Statement of Claims that 
accompanied the demand letter. The Defendant has made no objection to the validity of the 
submitted demand letter or the Statement of Claims. Thus, at least initially, LC. § 12-120(4) 
applies to this case. 
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The second factor is to determine if the allegations in the complaint includes a different 
alleged injury or a significant new item of damage not set forth in the statement of claim. Id. 142 
Idaho at 358. If so, then Plaintiffs have removed their case from the applicability of LC. § 12-
120(4). Id. 
The Court, having reviewed Plaintiffs' Complaint, finds that the Plaintiff Bennett asked 
for special damages in the amount of $4,537.71, and general damages in an amount of more than 
$10,000, but less than $25,000. Plaintiff Walton asked for special damages in the amount of 
$4,192.92 and general damages in excess of $10,000 but less than $25,000. 
The Court understands each Plaintiff to be asking for general damages in the amount of 
no more than $25,000. However, the Complaint does not state that total damages will be less 
than $25,000. When adding in the special damages, each Plaintiffs demand would surpass the 
LC. § 12-120(4) maximum of $25,000. Although the Complaint does not include a different 
alleged injury or a significant new item of damage not set forth in the statement of claim, the 
Plaintiffs Complaint does not comply with §12-120(4) in that each Plaintiff asks for more than 
$25,000. Thus, Plaintiffs removed their case from the applicability of the statute when they filed 
their Complaint. 
The third and final factor is whether the Plaintiffs included in evidence offered at trial, a 
different alleged injury or a significant new item of damage not set forth in the statement of 
claim. 4 The Court has reviewed the evidence offered at trial and finds that the Plaintiffs have 
not alleged a different injury from that in the statement of claim, but Plaintiffs have included in 
their evidence offered at trial a significant new item of damage not set forth in the statement of 
claim. 
4 Although the Court has already held that Plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney fees because their Complaint alleges 
more than $25,000 per Plaintiff, the third factor will nevertheless be addressed. 
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The Plaintiffs provided to the Court their demand letter dated July 9th, 2010, that was 
given to the Defendant's insurer. 5 The statement of claims for Plaintiff Bennett was in the 
amount of $20,600 and for Plaintiff Walton $23,200. During the trial, the Plaintiffs presented 
evidence of $30,734.47 in damages for Plaintiff Bennett and $41,252.72 for Plaintiff Walton. 
The Court finds a significant difference in the amounts asked for from the time of the demand 
letter/statement of claim to the evidence offered at trial. The difference in damages leads the 
Court to believe that what is being asked is a significant new item of damage that was not set 
forth in the statement of claim. LC.§ 12-120(4) was intended to encourage parties to settle when 
a claim for personal injury is less than $25,000. 
The statute was also written to give attorneys the opportunity to recover fees in small 
cases, i.e., if they keep the claim under $25,000. This is necessary to attract good attorneys, such 
as Mr. Johnson, to handle small cases. The statute is plain on its face when it states: 
In actions for personal injury, where the amount of plaintiffs claim for damages 
does not exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000), there shall be taxed and 
allowed to the claimant, as part of the costs of the action, a reasonable amount to 
be fixed by the court as attorney's fees. 
When a plaintiff asks for more than the statutory amount, the plaintiff forfeits recovery of fees. 
The Plaintiffs did this twice, the first time in the complaint and the second time during trial. 
This Court recognizes that there is a presumption that damages may increase after the 
statement of claim is rejected by a defendant. The Idaho Court of Appeals stated: 
Idaho Code Section 12-120(4) presumes that the amount of damages may change 
from the time the statement of claim is drafted to the date of trial. For instance, 
the statute requires that the plaintiff include a "good faith estimate'' of future loss 
of income. It does not require that the plaintiff list the precise amount that will 
later be presented at trial. In personal injury cases ... it may be years after the 
statement of claim is submitted before the case reaches trial and the parties 
5 Plaintiff did not include the statement of claims in the documents they submitted to the Court; however, the 
statements are attached to the Affidavit of Brendon C. Taylor. 
Case No. CV-08-4528-Pl 
DECISION ON POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS 
Page 11 of 16 
487 
present evidence of damages. Even if a plaintiff submits a statement of claim with 
his or her good faith estimate of damages, at the time of trial the plaintiff may 
have incurred more damages that were not earlier foreseen and may have a more 
accurate estimate of the amount of future damages because of intervening 
developments. 
Johnson v. Sanchez, 140 Idaho 667, 670, .99 P.3d 620, 623 (Ct. App. 2004). Although the Court 
of Appeals acknowledges that increases in damages may incur over time and in the course of 
litigation, there is still a necessity to see if the offering evidence of different amounts of damages 
constituted a significant new item of damage. This is made clear by the Court of Appeals 
language: "Thus, we must determine whether the offering evidence of different amounts of 
damages in this case constituted a significant new item of damage." Id. 
In making that determination, the trial court and Court of Appeals in Johnson concluded 
that the damages sought at trial did not constitute a significant new item of damage. However, 
there is nothing in the Court of Appeals' decision to suggest that the plaintiff sought damages in 
excess of $25,000. Instead, the Court of Appeals notes that one witness speculated that future 
medical bills could run anywhere from $15,000 to $100,000 and that the plaintiffs attorney did 
not specify any amount for general damages in his closing argument. Id. at 669, 99 P.3d at 622 
(emphasis added). Nothing is said in the decision as to whether the plaintiffs attorney specified 
an amount for special damages in closing. The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion by holding that any increase in the amount of damages sought at trial 
over the amount sought in the statement of claim was not significant. 
Here, the Court sees the increase in damages that the Plaintiff sought during trial as a 
significant new item of damages that was not set forth in the statement of claim. Bennett, in his 
statement of claim, sought a total of $20,600 in damages, which is less than the cap of $25,000. 
At trial, he sought $30,734.47, which exceeds the cap. The new amount at trial was almost 50% 
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higher than what was in the statement of claim. Walton, in his statement of claim, sought a total 
of $23,200.00, which is less than the $25,000 cap. At trial, he sought $41,252.72, which exceeds 
the cap. The new amount at trial for Walton was almost 100% higher than what was in his 
statement of claim. Therefore, under either the second or third factor, the Plaintiffs waived the 
applicability of LC.§ 12-120(4). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that the purpose behind LC. § 12-120 is to 
affect the bargaining power of the parties in small civil cases in order to facilitate an efficient and 
early settlement if possible. Gonzalez v. Thacker, 148 Idaho 879, 231 P.3d 524 (2009). 
Allowing plaintiffs to recover attorney fees in a case that is no longer a small civil case does not 
effectuate that policy. However, enabling plaintiffs to retain good attorneys even in small cases 
does effectuate that policy. Good attorneys would have little incentive to represent plaintiffs in 
small cases unless there was the promise of a statutory award of attorney fees if they win. Cases 
in which the plaintiff cannot recover more than $25,000 are difficult for a good attorney. While 
the recovery will not be high, the discovery, the trial, and the preparation remain the same as for 
a bigger case. This makes the small civil case undesirable to good attorneys because the 
recovery on a contingent fee basis for these low value cases causes the attorney to work the same 
number of hours for less money. If the potential recovery is greater than $25,000, then good 
attorneys will take the case because they can get a decent contingency fee award. If the potential 
recovery is less than $25,000, then good attorneys will not take the case because they cannot get 
a decent contingency fee award. The legislature has tried to increase a plaintiffs bargaining 
power in small cases by making them attractive to good attorneys with the promise of an award 
of attorney fees in addition to the damages awarded so that the attorney fees do not swallow up 
the damage award. That attractiveness is not necessary in larger cases. 
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Plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees is denied in that this case does not fit under LC. § 12-
120(4). 
Conclusion 
The Court having reviewed the motions for Additur, Remittitur, Prevailing Party, Costs 
and Attorney Fees, now holds: 
With regard to Additur: The jury award was based on substantial and competent evidence 
and not on passion and prejudice. The award does not shock the conscience of the Court. 
Therefore the Plaintiffs Motion for Additur is DENIED. 
With regard to pre-judgment interest: Each Plaintiff is awarded pre-judgment interest on 
the stipulated medical amounts. Walton is awarded $851.01 and Bennett is awarded $530.15. 
With regard to Remittitur: Pursuant to Idaho Code §6-1606 damages awarded by the jury 
that equal damages already received by the claimants from a collateral source shall be removed 
from the verdict by the Court so compensation for damages are independent to those of the 
collateral sources. Plaintiffs have received compensation from a collateral source for certain 
medical bills, provided to the Court by the Defendant (Defendant's Motion for Reduction to 
Judgment). Therefore the Defendants Motion for Remittitur is GRANTED. Walton's verdict is 
reduced by $1,000 and Bennett's verdict is reduced by $ 172. 
With regard to the Prevailing Party: The prevailing party is at the discretion of the Court 
with consideration of the final judgment in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. 
219 P.3d 1188, 1190. The Court has determined that Plaintiff Bennett is the PREVAILING 
PARTY against Patrick. The Court has also determined that Plaintiff Walton is the 
PREY AILING PAR TY against Patrick. 
Case No. CV-08-4528-PI 
DECISION ON POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS 
Page 14 of 16 
490 
With regard to Costs: I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C) are costs that are awarded as a matter ofright. 
I.RC.P. 54(d)(l)(D) are costs that are discretionary by the Court to award. The Court finds that 
both Plaintiffs have prevailed over Defendant therefore, as a matter of right, Plaintiff Bennett is 
awarded $728.49 in costs and Plaintiff Walton is awarded $789.70 in costs. The Court 
determined that the discretionary costs by both Plaintiffs are not exceptional and reasonably 
incurred and are not awarded those costs. Therefore, Plaintiffs Motion for Costs is GRANTED in 
part and DENIED in part. 
With Regard to Attorney Fees: Attorney fees are not awarded to any party. Plaintiffs 
removed this case from LC. § 12-120( 4) by seeking an amount in their Complaint of more than 
$25,000 each and by asking for an even greater amount at trial. 
Amended Judgment: Based upon this decision, the Court will enter an Amended 
Judgment that awards the following items: 
Jury Vedict 
Prejudgment Interest 
Collateral Source 
Costs 
Total Amended Judgment 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Walton 
$10,030.92 
$ 851.01 
($ 1,000.00) 
$ 789.70 
$10,671.63 
DATED this z..rt'k day of August, 2010. 
Bennett 
$3,978.47 
$ 530.15 
($ 172.00) 
$ 728.49 
$5,065.11 
i: :;)P9t~%-
~c.NYE 
District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MATHEW R. BENNETT and 
BENJAMIN L. WALTON, 
) Case No. CV-08-4528-PI 
) 
) 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
) MOTION FOR RELIEF AND RECONSIDERATION 
) OF DECISION ON POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS 
) DENYING ATTORNEY'S FEES 
NANCY PATRICK, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
__________ ) 
The plaintiffs, Mathew R. Bennett and Benjamin L. Walton, 
through counsel of record, hereby file this Motion for Relief and 
Reconsideration of the "Decision on Post-Judgment Motions" denying 
attorney's fees to the plaintiffs under Idaho Code§ 12-120(4). 
This motion is based on the pleadings and documents on file in this 
case. This motion is made pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure 11 (a} (2) (B), 59(a) (7), 60(b) (6), and otherwise under the 
legal and equitable powers of the Court. This motion is also 
supported by the attached Brief in Support of Motion. 
This motion is based on the fact that there was no 
"significant new i tern of damage claimed not set forth in the 
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statement of claim" in either "the complaint or the evidence 
offered at trial in this case." The damage claims were all exactly 
the same in the statement of the claim, complaint and evidence 
offered at trial (past and future medical bills, lost income, pain 
and suffering). The closing argument (which is not evidence) for 
increased damages for pain and suffering (on these same old claims) 
was not a new item of damage, and is allowed under the statute and 
case law. 
WHEREFORE, the plaintiffs Bennett and Walton move the Court to 
reconsider the DECISION ON POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS so that the 
plaintiffs' legitimate and valid claims for costs and attorney's 
fees under $25,000.00 will be awarded by the Court. 
DATED this 7th day of September 2010. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document by placing the same in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Brendon C. Taylor 
Jared A. Steadman 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204 0991 
on this 7 th day of September 2010. 
Licensed Lawyer 
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Charles Johnson 
JOHNSON OLSON CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 1725 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1725 
Telephone: (208) 232-7926 
Facsimile: (208) 232-9161 
ISB No. 2464 
E-Mail: cjlaw@cableone.net 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MATHEW R. BENNETT and 
BENJAMIN L. WALTON, 
) Case No. CV-08-4528-PI 
) 
) 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
) MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT TO CONFORM 
) CONFORM TO EVIDENCE UNDER IRCP lS(b) 
NANCY PATRICK, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
__________ ) 
The plaintiffs, Mathew R. Bennett and Benjamin L. Walton, 
through their counsel of record, hereby file this Motion to Amend 
Complaint to Conform to Evidence Under IRCP 15(b). The plaintiffs 
note that the Verified Complaint was filed for an amount under 
$25,000.00 and sought attorney's fees under Idaho Code section 12-
120 (4), as stated specifically in the prayer paragraphs A and B, 
last sentence and paragraph C on attorney fees. However, the 
decision on post-trial motions, raises ( for the first time) an 
issue that over $25,000.00 was sought in the complaint, even though 
this claim was not raised by the defendant Nancy Patrick or her 
insurer. Thus, the plaintiffs move to amend their complaint under 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15 (b) to conform to the evidence, 
since the amount awarded by the jury was under $25,000.00. 
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The only amendment sought is amendment to paragraph F of the 
prayer to state that, "since the total amount sought in this case 
is under $25,000.00." This amendment is based on the fact that 
this issue was tried by the express and prime consent of the 
parties, this amendment conforms strictly to the evidence, can be 
made "at anytime, even after judgment," and there was no prejudice 
to the defendant, since the amount in dispute in this case was 
under $25,000.00, and the jury did not award over $25,000.00. 
Therefore, the plaintiffs move to amend the complaint to make 
it even more clear that the total amount they sought in this case 
was under $25,000.00 per plaintiff, for an award of attorney's fees 
under Idaho Code§ 12-120(4). 
DATED this 9th day of September 2010. 
Charles Johnson 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document by placing the same in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Brendon C. Taylor 
Jared A. Steadman 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991 
on this 9th day of September 2010. 
Licensed Lawyer 
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Brendon C. Taylor 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
109 North Arthur - 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
(208) 232-2286 
(208) 232-2499 Telefax 
Idaho State Bar #6078 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MATHEW R. BENNETT and 
BENJAMIN L. WALTON, 
) 
) Case No. CV-08-4528-PI 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION AND BRIEF IN 
vs. 
NANCY PATRICK, 
) OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
) RELIEF AND RECONSIDERATION OF POST-
) JUDGMENT MOTIONS DENYING 
) ATTORNEY'S FEES AND PLAINTIFFS' 
) MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT TO 
Defendant. ) CONFORM TO EVIDENCE UNDER IRCP 
___________ ) 15(B) 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Nancy Patrick, by and through her counsel of record, Merrill 
& Merrill, Chartered, and objects to Plaintiffs 'Motion for Relief and Reconsideration of Decision 
on Post-Judgment Motions Denying Attorney's Fees and Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint 
to Conform to Evidence Under IRCP 15(b), pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rules ll(a)(2)(B), 15(b), 54, 
59(a)(7) and 60(b)(6), Idaho Code§ 12-120(4) and other legal precedents before this Court. In 
support of this objection, Defendant relies on all records in the Court's file and requests oral 
argument on the same. 
Defendant hereby objects to Plaintiffs' motions and responds to the individual allegations 
by the Plaintiffs as follows: 
I. The Court Properly Found that Plaintiffs' Complaint Did Not Conform to 
Idaho Code§ 12-120(4), and Constituted a Waiver of Claim to Attorney Fees 
Under that Section. 
Idaho Code § 12-120 provides the basis for an award of attorneys fees in cases where, "the 
amount pleaded is twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) or less."1 Idaho courts have interpreted 
this requirement strictly, holding that a prevailing party cannot claim an entitlement to attorney fees 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120 unless damages of $25,000 or less have actually been pled.2 The 
1ldaho Code§ 12-120. 
2Cox v. Mueller, 125 Idaho 734, 874 P.2d 545 (1994). 
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Idaho Supreme Court further advised personal injury plaintiffs should allege, within their claims for 
damages in their complaints, that their claim for damages does not exceed the limit established by 
Idaho Code§ 12-120.3 
This Court correctly found Plaintiffs' Complaint alleged damages in excess of $25,000, 
which in itselfremoved Plaintiffs' case from the applicability ofldaho Code§ 12-120. Specifically, 
in the Complaint, Plaintiff Walton asked for special damages of $4,192.92 together with general 
damages up to $25,000. Plaintiff Bennett likewise pled special damages of$4,53 7. 71 together with 
general damages of up to $25,000. Thus, the total amount pled by each Plaintiff was over $25,000. 
Plaintiffs cite Cox v. Mulligan, 142, Idaho 356, 128 P .3d 893 (2005) as authority supporting 
the argument that a plaintiff was not required to plead his claim to be under $25,000 in his 
complaint. This holding is clearly a departure from the holding in Cox v. Mueller, but it is clearly 
distinguishable from the facts before this Court. In Cox v. Mulligan, the issue presented was that the 
Plaintiff failed to make a claim of any specific dollar amount in his complaint. Under those facts, 
the Idaho Supreme Court held that if the demand made upon the Defendant or his insurer claimed 
damages ofless than $25,000, the complaint need not specifically say the amount in controversy was 
under $25,000. However, in the case before this Court, the amount pled was above $25,000. Rather 
than an omission of a dollar amount in the complaint, Plaintiffs Walton and Bennett each sought 
damages in excess of $25,000 in their prayer. Thus, their claims remove their case from 
consideration under Idaho Code § 12-120. 
Plaintiffs allege Defendant never objected to their claims for attorney fees on this specific 
ground. Defendant made a general objection claiming that Plaintiffs were not entitled to attorney 
fees under Idaho Code § 12-120. However, it is permissible for the Court to exercise its own 
discretion in deciding whether it is appropriate to award attorney fees. In Long v. Hendricks, the 
court held that even if a party fails to timely object to a motion for attorney fees, it did not preclude 
the court from exercising its discretion in deciding whether to make an award.4 Whether Defendant 
argued this legal precedent before the Court or the Court itself identified the applicable issue oflaw, 
the Court appropriately ruled in upholding the law. 
Plaintiffs next extrapolate the idea that Defendant did not object to Plaintiffs' claim for 
attorney fees upon the grounds that the claims in Plaintiffs' Complaint exceeded $25,000 for each 
Plaintiff; and consequently, Defendant should not now be able to object to those provisions. 
Plaintiffs further argue that the Motion to Amend Complaint should now cure the defects. As stated 
above, the Court has the right to make its own determination that the Complaint alleged damages 
in excess of the $25,000 cap required by Idaho Code§ 12-120. Furthermore, IRCP Rule 15(a) 
3/d. 
4Long v. Hendricks, 114 Idaho 157, 754 P.2d 1194 (1988). 
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provides that Defendant's right to object has not yet been waived. Thus this objection, set forth more 
fully below, is timely and should be considered in denying Plaintiffs leave to amend their Complaint 
as requested. 
II. The Court Properly Found Plaintiffs Offered Significant New Items of Damages 
at Trial Not Set Forth in the Statement of Claim. 
The Critical portion of Idaho Code § 12-120 regarding new items of damage is stated as 
follows: 
If the plaintiff includes in the complaint filed to commence the action, or in evidence 
offered at trial, a different alleged injury or a significant new item of damage not set 
forth in the statement of claim, the plaintiff shall be deemed to have waived any 
entitlement to attorneys fees under this section.5 
Plaintiff alleged significant new and larger damage claims at trial. In their demand letter, 
each plaintiff advised Defendant's insurer that he had completed care under Dr. West and the only 
future care was for over-the-counter pain reliever. Each stated his future medical bills as $2,500 for 
ongoing over-the-counter pain reliever. 
At trial, Plaintiff Walton asked for over $7,000 in future medical specials, including over 
$2,000 for physical therapy, muscle relaxers and trigger point injections. This amount alone was 
greater than 2/3 of Plaintiff Walton's prior medical expenses, and of a nature completely different 
than what had been discussed in the 12-120 letter. Furthermore, the other future medical expenses 
nearly doubled, from $2,500 at all times until a few weeks before trial, to $4,972.80 at trial. This 
increase of greater than $4,500 is a significant and new claim that requires the Court to deem 
Plaintiff Walton's 12-120 claim waived. More significantly, Plaintiff Walton's claim went from 
$23,200 in the pre-suit demand, to $41,252.72 at trial. This increase in damages nearly doubled, 
Plaintiff Walton's claim. Thus, Defendant respectfully requests this Court find Plaintiff Walton's 
12-120 claim to be waived by this significant increase. 
At trial, Plaintiff Bennett asked the jury to award him for a new exacerbation of his old 
injury. However, Dr. West testified that the new injury was in Mr. Bennett's sciatic area, and that 
his earlier treatment of Mr. Bennett was not recorded as being in his sciatic region. This new bill 
was nearly 10% of the admitted prior medical bills. More importantly, however, Plaintiff Bennett 
claimed he was not released from Dr. West's care, but would continue to need treatment on a "pm" 
basis, or as his condition warranted. This was a significant departure from Dr. West's earlier record 
releasing him from care. Indeed, Plaintiff Bennett argued to the jury that he would need future 
chiropractic care, and that his future medical expenses would be $5,088. This was more than double 
the $2,500 future special damages asserted in the 12-120 letter and at all times until a few weeks 
before trial. Thus, these significant new claims of past and future medical specials, added more than 
$2,750, to his earlier claim of $4,437.71 in medical specials past and future. More significantly, 
Plaintiff Bennett's total claim went from $20,600 pre-suit to $30,734.47, a fifty percent (50%) 
5Idaho Code§ 12-120(4). 
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increase in damages claimed. Thus, Mr. Bennett has waived any claim for attorney fees under Idaho 
Code§ 12-120(4). 
Clearly, Plaintiffs' assertion that the injuries each suffered has always been the same and that 
they have not made any claim for new items of damages is inaccurate. Plaintiffs argue the damage 
claims asserted in closing argument were not evidence. Defendant first notes that Plaintiffs argued 
for the admission of the summaries showing damages totaling $30,734.47 for Plaintiff Bennett and 
$41,252.72 for Plaintiff Walton as exhibits at trial. Plaintiffs testified to the increased amounts of 
special damages sought and offered testimony of medical witnesses in support of these positions. 
Plaintiffs likewise testified to the increased general damages based upon the increase in medical 
special damages, including future treatment not anticipated at the time Plaintiffs made their pre-suit 
demand. Plaintiffs likewise argued to the jury that they were entitled to damages in the specific 
amounts stated herein. Consequently, their arguments that they offered no evidence of new items 
of damage is disingenuous. The Court correctly found Plaintiffs not only made new damage claims 
at trial, but that their claims were significant. 
Plaintiffs assert the portions of Idaho cases cited affirm their position that they are allowed 
to increase their damage claims without waiving their rights to attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-
120. Defendant proposes the Court correctly interpreted Johnson v. Sanchez, 140 Idaho 667, 99 P. 3d 
620 (2004), in its decision. Plaintiffs cite a section of Johnson where the court articulates its 
obligation to give plain meaning to the statute. Defendant is of the position that this Court did just 
that by finding Plaintiffs each presented significant new items of damages at trial, thereby waiving 
claims for attorneys fees under Idaho Code § 12-120. 
In the cases cited by Plaintiffs, the differences considered were far less significant. In 
Contreras v. Rubley, 142 Idaho 573, 130 P .3d 1111 (2006), the court determined the addition of a 
$2,500 claim on a $20,000 claim was not significant.6 More importantly, in Johnson the appellate 
court held, "Where a trial court's findings are not clearly erroneous and where the trial court properly 
identifies and applies the law to the facts, then the trial court's exercise of discretion has not been 
abused."7 Defendant respectfully requests the Court uphold its ruling that Plaintiffs presented 
significant new items of damages that removed their cases from qualification under Idaho Code § 
12-120. 
III. The Court Should Deny Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform to 
Evidence Under IRCP 15(b) 
Plaintiffs moved for an amendment of their Complaint to cure the defect in the pleading in 
an obvious attempt to qualify for attorneys fees under Idaho Code § 12-120. Notwithstanding IRCP 
Rule 15(b) allowing amendments of pleadings to conform with evidence after a judgment. This 
6Contreras v. Rubley, 142 Idaho 573, 130 P.3d 1111 (2006). 
7Johnson v. Sanchez, 140 Idaho 667, 99 P.3d 620 (2004) 
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motion for amendment is too late. First, the motion is solely made for the purpose removing the 
pleading obstacle to enable Plaintiffs to potentially qualify for attorneys fees under Idaho Code § 
1 2-120. All motions for attorneys fees and costs are late at this juncture. Whether Defendant had 
raised the issue in her initial objection or whether the Court raised the issue in its decision, the 
motion to amend would still have been filed outside of the time allowed to move the Court for an 
award of attorneys fees under IRCP Rule 54(e). 
More importantly, the motion claims to be made on the basis that it seeks to conform the 
pleadings to the evidence offered at trial. This is simply not true. The motion seeks to add language 
that states the Plaintiffs did not seek damages in excess of $25,000 at trial. That is clearly not true. 
The exhibits moved for admission by Plaintiffs outlining their damages refute this assertion. When 
Plaintiffs could not get the exhibits admitted, they offered the claims for damages through their own 
testimony and that of medical care providers. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs argued specifically in 
closing that they were entitled to damages in excess of $25,000 each. 
Plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that the relief sought in their motion is proper. They 
offer as evidence, the fact that the outcome was under $25,000 for each Plaintiff as proof. However, 
Defendant submits the Plaintiffs must each show that they no longer were pleading amounts in 
controversy of$25,000 or less. They cannot do this because they offered no evidence that they were 
departing from the earlier pleading to limit their damage claim further. Conversely, every bit of 
evidence offered at trial showed that they were asking for greater damages than they originally 
sought in their Complaint. The testimony of increased special damages, including a significant 
increase in future medical damages and an increase in pain and suffering show that Plaintiffs were 
not decreasing the amount of damages originally pled. 
Defendant would now be prejudiced if Plaintiffs were granted leave to amend. Defendant 
could not cross-examine Plaintiffs as to the top amount each believed he was entitled to recover, and 
offer the statement of damages prepared by their counsel and offered as an exhibit as evidence that 
they were not in fact asking to lower their damage claims. For these reasons and those set forth 
above, the Court should deny Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform to Evidence Under 
IRCP 15(b). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant respectfully requests the Court deny Plaintiffs' motions to reconsider and amend 
complaint and award Defendant her attorney fees incurred in defending these matters further under 
Idaho Code § 12-121. 
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DATED this 204<.. day of September, 2010. 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Brendon C. Taylor, the undersigned, one of the attorneys for the Defendant, in the above-
referenced matter, do hereby certify that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION AND BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
RELIEF AND RECONSIDERATION OF POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS DENYING 
ATTORNEY'SFEESANDPLAINTIFFS'MOTIONTOAMENDCOMPLAINTTOCONFORM 
TO EVIDENCE UNDER IRCP 15(B) was this 70-rl day of September, 2010, served upon the 
following in the manner indicated below: 
Charles Johnson 
JOHNSON OLSON, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 1725 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1725 
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Charles Johnson 
JOHNSON OLSON CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 1725 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1725 
Telephone: (208) 232-7926 
ISB No. 2464 
FILED 
BANNOCK COUNTY 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
20IOS~8:36 
3Y DEPUTY CLERK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MATHEW R. BENNETT and 
BENJAMIN L. WALTON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NANCY PATRICK, 
Defendant. 
) Case No. CV-08-4528-PI 
) 
) 
) PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
) OBJECTION TO COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES 
) and SUPPLEMENTATION OF THE RECORD 
) 
) 
) 
______________ ) 
The plaintiffs, Mathew R. Bennett and Benjamin L. Walton, 
through their counsel of record, hereby submit to the Court this 
Response to Defendant's Objection to Costs and Attorney's Fees and 
Supplementation of the Record by filing the attached highlighted 
excerpts from the Idaho Supreme Court Reports on the four key cases 
cited by the parties: Cox v. Mulligan, Cox v. Mueller, Johnson v. 
Sanchez and Contreras v. Rubley. 
DATED this 23 rd day of September 2010. 
Charles Johnson 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document by placing the same in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Brendon C. Taylor 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991 
on this 23 rd day of September 2010. 
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Lloyd E: COX, Plaintiff-Appe.llant, 
v. 
Valorie L. MULLIGAN a_nd Charles 
Cates, Defendant.s-
Respondents. 
No. 30940. 
Supreme Cow-t of Idaho, 
Twin Falls, November 2005 Term. 
Nov. 22, 200§._ 
Rehearing D~nied Feb .. 9, ~6. 
Backgy-ound: · Injured motorist, who 'Was 
awarded damages of $8,287.05 in personal 
injury action, requested award of attorney 
fees. The · Di;tric.t Court, Ftflh · Judicial 
District, Cassia County, Monte B. Carlson, 
J., denied motion. Motorist appeaJed. 
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Eismann, 
J., held tha:t: 
(1) motorist was not required to plead for 
damages of less than $25,000, a.nd 
(2) motorist ieqltir!!d" :~1(h · ~tathnent .of 
claim :requirements of· attorney fee 
statute. 
Reversed and remanded. 
I. Automobiles e:,,251 
Injured J"(lotorist was not required to 
plead an amount of damages of less t.han 
$25,000 in personal injury action to be eligi-
ble for attorney fees, under statute authoriz-
i.Dg award of attorney fees to prevailing party 
in personal Injury acUons, where motorist 
complied wjth proV1sion of attorney fees stat-
ute that required motorist to make demand 
for damages t.o defendant's insurer prior to 
trial, motorist made demand for damages in 
accordance with the statute, aod motorist 
was awarded damages of less than $25,000. 
J.C. § 12-120(4). 
2. Automobiles ~251 
Motorist's statement of claim to driver's 
insurer complied with requirements of attor-
1. At lhe rime Co:r v. MLU.IJer was decided. Idaho 
Code § 12-121(1) included a provision stating_ 
Except as provided in subsection (.3) of this 
section. in any acnon where the arnoun1 plead-
ney iee statute, as required for motorist's 
eligibility .for award oi attorney fees jn per-
sonal injury action in which motorist pre-
vailed and his · damages. were less than 
$25,000; motorist sent letter t.o insurer that 
itemized his claimed damages including spe-
cial and general damages, and insurer was 
sent copies of aU medical bills. I.C. § 12-
120(4). 
Parsons, Smith. & St.one, Burley, for appel-
lant. William A. Parsons-argued. 
Montgomery Law Offices and Wilbur T. 
Nelson, Boise, for respondents. Wilbur T. 
Nelson argued. 
EISMANN, Justice. 
· This is an appeal from the district court's 
refusal i.o award Lhe prevailing plaintiff attor-
ney fees pursuant'·to Idaho Code§ 12-120(4). 
We ·reverse I.he district <;c:mrl and award _at-
tomey fees on appe'a1. 
I. ANALYSIS 
While driving a car owned by Charles 
Cates, Valorie Mulligan ·collideq with the rear 
of. Lloyd- Cox's car; injuring him. : He sued 
Ms. Mul)jgan and Mr. Cates, -and the jury 
awarded him $2,287.05 -in special damages 
and $6,00Q,OO in ·general ~amages, for -a. tot.al 
award o(:.$8,~.05_. Following the jury trial, 
Cox requested an award . of attorney fees -
pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(4). The 
district court denied · the award because Cox 
dld not include in his complrunt an allegatior, 
that his damages did not exceed $25,000. In 
hls complrunt, he sought "(s)pecial damages 
of $2,640.61 and such further amount as may 
be proved at trial" and "[g)eneral damages as 
proved at trial." We reverse because Idaho 
Code § 12-120(4) does not require that plain-
tiff plead damages of $25,000.00 or less. 
In denying the award of att.omey (ees, tbe 
district court relied upon Cox v. Mueller, 12.;> 
Idaho 734, 874 P.2d 545 (1994). In that case 
we reconciled Idaho Code § 12-120(1), 1 
ed is twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) or 
less, there shall be taxed and allowed to the 
prevailing party. as pan of che costs of the 
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and special damages show that the "amount 
of plaintiffs claim for damages" · is the 
amount set forth in the st.atement of claim, 
not the amount pied in the complainL 
Under subsection (4) of Idaho Code § 12-
120, the allegations in the complaint are rele-
vant only if they include. a different alleged 
injury or a significant new item of damage 
not set forth in the sl2.tement of claim. The 
last sentence of subsection (4) provides that 
in such circwnstance, the plaintiff will be 
deemed to have waived any entiUe~~nt to 
attorney fees und~r that section. 
The Defendanus contend that the wording 
of subsection (1) indicates that ius pleading 
requirement also applies to subsection (4). 
They point to t.tie first septence, which states, 
"Except _as provided in su_bse~i9ns (3) and 
(4) _of this section, in any actiori' where the 
amount pleaded is twenty-five t,housand dol-
lars (~,000) or. less, there shall be t.axed 
and allowed to the prevailing party . ... a 
reasonable· amount . . . as attorney's fees." 
The phrase "[e}xcept as provided in subsec-
tions (3) and (4) of this section" sh~ that 
tho_se . subsections are exempted : from the 
pleading requirement of subsection_ (1), _not 
incorpgrated _into it. That i~ consistent "".)_th 
how we have interpreted Idaho Code § 12-
120. We have not ·11~d · that the pl~ding 
req~em~_t of ~ubsection' (1) app·u~. -~ the 
awai.·ding of attorney fe'es under subsection 
(3). Leflunich v. Key Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 141 
Idah9 362, 109 P,3d. 1104' ,(2005); G-ilnter v. 
Mu7Phy's'"r..,ounge,' L.LC,, 14l· Idaho .16, 105 
P.3d 6'76 (2005); Meikle v. Watson, 138 Idaho 
680, 69 P .3d 100 (2003). H the first sentence 
of subsec"tio~- (1) _does not 'm'~e its 'pleading 
requiremenl applicable to subsection (3), 
then it likewise does not make it applicable to 
su~ectio_!). (4j. . . . . 
The Defendanus argue that the pleading 
requirement ·or subsection (I) is e·ssential to 
pul del'e~clari't.;; o'n notice that the piaii\tiff is 
seeking attorney fees. We .disagree. Under 
subseclion (1), the complaint would include 
an allegation that ,the c!amages sought do not 
exceed $25,000.00.' Und.er sµbsect.ipl') (4), the 
st.atemenl of claim would include an itemized 
lisl of damages that . did ' not'- . exceed 
$25,000.oo:·: The allegation)n the complaint 
required by subsection (1) would not provide 
any greater notice than the allegations in Ute 
slatement of claim served UJ1der subsectio~·· ' 
(4). 
The Defendants moved to disallow ~ -:-
Cox's· request fo~ attorney f~es on t~ -~ 
grounds: (1) his complaint did not allege th.at :· 
the damages . sought did not exceea 
$25,000.00; (2) his statement of'claim did n~i ) 
comply with the statute; and (3) th.~ docu. , 
ments he submitted in support o'f his claun .' 
for attorney fees did not include. the rnedi~ ·. 
bills included with his statement of claiiii. : 
We have already rejected their first ground :,. 
for disallowing Mr. Gox's requested att.omd· .. ~ 
fees. We v.ill now consider the other two: ::'. 
, ... ,.. , 
. ~ [2] 'I'he Defendants cont.end that Mr: _ 
Cox's statement of claim did not comply wiUi 
.Idaho Code § 12-120(4), which requires that' 
a statement of claim include; ,• 
. 
( a) An itemized · statement of each . aiid: 
every item of damage claimed by the plainl i· 
tiff including the amount claimed for gen; · 
·era]· damages and tlie. following items oi 
special damages: (i) medicaJ .. ~ills i.neurre<j ' 
-up to the date of the plaintiffs· deff!~; 
(ii) a good faith estimate of.fu~e medical 
bills; (iii) losl income incurred ·up to t.l!e 
. date of the plaintiffs demand; (Iv) a gocid 
faith estimate of future .16'ss~of.incomf and 
(v) property damage for which 'the pl:untiff 
has not been p'ald. ' ' ' ' ,, . ·\ 
(b) kgi~le copies of all medical re<;o'r<lf 
bills and· other documentation pertinent IJJ 
the plaintiff's· alleged damages',\·_ ·· .. ··, 
• ' ' ~. 1 • ' •• • , ' ' • 
In Lhis case, on June .12, 2002, -Mr . . Cox's 
attorney submitted a letter to· the I>efen-." 
dants' insurer . in ~hich 'he··. dernande4, 
$11,645.90 to settle i'vlr. Cox's clairi/ .,The 
' \ letter, addressed to the i_nsurance . adjuster;· 
include1Hhe foHowing: -- · ·· · 
As you know, on July 12, 2001, you( 
insured slammed ' into the back· of Lloyd 
Cox, causing damage to his _ciµ-:·.whlch·y~! 
subsequenUy pa.id for, and cau~·ed Mr. ~ -
to have injury·to his neck and lower back:-
. ,j 1 
.... Mr. Cox JS now ·al:;19ut a. year from the. 
. accident and he still ·has pain in the -neck 
with less pain in the back. Obvious~, h~· 
doesn't have a lot of° objective niedi~ inju-
ries, and most of them are_ subjective. :.·. 
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COX v. MUELLER 
Cite u I 25 Idaho 7H 
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Wash.2d 785, 733 P .2d 960 (1987). In partic-
ular, Cox contends that a plaintiff who pre-
vails in a persor.&I injury action_ is entitled lo 
mandatory at.torney fees pursuant to J.C. 
§ 12-120(1) as long as the plaintiff somehow 
oolified the defendant before trial that att.or-
ney fees pursuant to this statute would be 
sought. For e.'Cample, Cox suggests that a 
plaintiff can notify the defendant in the plain-
tiffs answers to lhe defendant's special Inter-
rogatories. Cox also argues that the issue of 
attorney fees under this stawte may be im-
plicitly tried al trial, even if not pied initially 
or by an amendment to the pleadings. 
We are unpersuaded by Cox's arguments. 
Beckmann does not serve as precedent for 
the decisions of this Court, nor is its rule of 
law persuasive in light of this State's statuto-
ry scheme. fnstead, we agree with the solu-
tion to the problem posed by these two stat-
utes that was adopted by the Court of Ap-
peals in Currwi:nsky v. Lieske, 122 Idaho 96, 
831 P 2d 564 (Ct.App.1992). In Czerwiruky, 
the Court of Appeals concluded that to com-
ply with both statutes, a personal injury 
plaintiff should generally allege in his or her 
complaint that the jW'isdictional amount es-
tablished for filing the action is sat.lsfied. 
I .R.C.P. 9(g). To invoke the entitlement to 
attorney fees pursuant to l.C. § 12-120(1), 
the complaint should also allege that the 
plaintifrs claim for damages does not e."<ceed 
the limit established by l.C. § 12-120(1) and 
that the plaintiff is entitled to an award of 
attorney fees pursuant to this statute. Czer-
winsky v. Lieske, 122 Idaho at 99, 831 P.2d 
at 567. Since this allegation will not specify 
the precise amount of damages claimed by 
the plaintiff, it will not violate I.C. § 5-336. 
We are convinced that the rule oullined in 
Czerwins/cy is more sound than every con-
ceivable alternative and accordingly, we 
adopt it here. 
Cox argues that the compromise reached 
in Czerwinsk;y elevates form over substance 
and Is unfair to personal injury plaintiffs with 
smaU damage claims. We disawee. Writing 
a demand Jetter, answering a defendant's 
interrogatories, and other methods of notify-
ing a defendant that a personal iajury plain-
tiff upon prevailing will seek mandatory at-
torney fees under J.C. § 12-120(1) are an 
inadequate substitute for a proper pleading. 
The obvious purpose of I.C. § 12-120(1) is to 
discourage litigation, since the statute re-
quires the defendant t.o be notified of the 
plaintiffs claim against defendant for at least 
ten days before a complaint can even be filed . 
In the event that a complaint is filed, the 
statute again encourages early settlement by 
requiring that the pleadings warn the parties 
that this statute will be invoked for mandato-
ry attorney fees. Notification at a lat.er date 
simply does not comply with LC. § 12-120(1) 
or meet the substantive goal of early settle-
ment. 
Indeed, the facts of this case illustrate the 
weakness of Cox's argumenL On August 17, 
1992, Mueller submitted to Cox special inter-
rogatories, requesting Cox t.o specify all dam-
ages claimed. Cox answered as to some of 
the damages claimed. Mueller learned of 
Cox's fulJ claim and t.hat Cox would seek I.C. 
§ 12-120(1) attorney fees only after Mueller 
filed a Motion to CompeJ and the trial court 
ordered Cox's counsel to comply with Muel-
ler's discovery request. This occun-ed nine-
teen days before trial, completely thwarting 
the purposes of the time frame in I.C. § 12-
120(1). We therefore conclude that a plAi.n-
tiff must comply with the literal mandate of 
LC. § 12-120(1) to be awarded attorney fees 
upon prevailing. Ii the pleading require-
ment prejudices a personal injury or other 
claimant., this is a result of the wording of 
J.C. § 12-120(1) and is a matter for the 
legislature, no~ th.is Court. 
Since I.C. § 12-120()) and our decision in 
PanC{)ast place a premjum on the pleadings, 
statements made during a litigant's closing 
argument should not be construed as a waiv-
er of a prevailing party's entitlement to at-
torney fees under this statute. The district 
court in this case erred in so holding. If a 
litigant., after pleading the statute and dam-
ages of $25,000 or less, offers evidence of 
greater damages, the district court has wide 
discretion tn permitting amendment of the 
pleadings to conform to the proof. See 
Obray v. Mitchel~ 98 Idaho 533, 537, 567 
P.2d 1284, 1288 (1977) (citations omitted). A 
closing argument on it.<; own, however, does 
not warrant amendment of the pleadings. 
0 
:·,.. ., ., ... ... -... .,. .. ; ... ,,._ . r 
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99 P.3d 620 
Jeannette· JOHNSON, Plaintiff..: 
Respondent., 
v. 
Samuel SANCHEZ, .Defendant-Appella.nL· 
and . 
Jane Doe Sanchez, DeferidanL 
. . ·, ' 
No. 29918. 
Court of Ap~sJ's of Idaho. 
OcL 4, 2004. 
~ackground: Rear-ended driver brought 
action against rear-en,dij'lg driver for medi-
cal bills, lost income, and general damages 
resulling fi:om - soft-tissue . injuries . . The 
District Court, First Judicial District, Koo--: 
te.nai County, George R. Reinhardt, III, J., 
entered judgment upon-jury. verdic~_ ,in . fa-
vor of rear-ended driver, and ·awarded her 
$24,434.80 in atlorney fees. Rear-ending 
driver appealed attorney fee award . . 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Perry, 
J., held that: 
(1) addressing an issue of first impression, 
driver's offering of evidence at trial of 
damage amounts different than those 
listed in her statement of c~m did not 
constitute a signi.ficanynew item of 
damage that waived h~r,.-enlltlement to 
attorney fees, and 
..... . 
(2) district court did not abuse its cliscre-
tion in awarding attorney fees of 
$24,434.80. 
Affirmed. 
1. Statutes.e:=>181(1), 205 
When interpreting a statute, Court of 
Appeals will construe the statute as a whole 
to give effect to the legislat.ive intenL 
2. Statutes e=>181(2), 188 
The plain rnearung of a statute will pre· 
vaiJ unless clearly expressed legislative mtent 
is contrary or unless plain meaning leads Lo 
absurd results. 
3. Automobiles li:=>251 
Rear-ended driver's offering of evidence 
at - trial of damage amounts different than 
those·_listed in her .statemenl of claim did nol 
constitute a significan't.. new it.em of damage 
that waived her entitlement t.o allorney fees 
under- ,statut,e providing for award of attor-
ney fees in. personal injury actions in which 
statement. of claim for damages not exceed~· 
ing-.$25,000 is served on defendant's insurer 
at" least .60 days before commencement of 
action, unless plaintiff offers evidence at trial 
of a significanl new item of damage, where 
driver only offered evidence with respecl to 
those items already listed in lhe statement of 
the case, and did so in good faith. LC. § 12-
120(4). 
4. Appeal and Error e=>946 
Where a trial court's findings are not 
clearly erroneous and where the trial court 
properly identifies and applies the !aw to the 
facts, , then· the tnal. court's exercise of discre-
tion _has not been abused. 
5. Costs e=:>194.25 
Under statute providing for award of 
attorney fees in personal injury adions in 
which st.at.ement of claim for damages, in-
cluding good failh estimates of future medi-
cal bills and future lo~.t'~come, not exceeding 
$25,ooo-is · served on defendant's insurer at 
least 60 days before commencement of ac-
tion, unless pfaintiff offers evidence al trial of 
a: significant new item of damage, court· may 
preclude an award of attorney f~es. bMed 
upon plaintiff's lack of good faith even if no 
significant new items of,damage are present-
ed at t.riaL , I.C. § 12--l20(4). 
6. _ AppeaJ an~ Error e:>946 
When a trial court's discretionary deci-
sion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate 
court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to de-
t.err'nine: (1) whelher the·lower court correct-
ly perceived the issue as one of discretion; 
(2) whether the lower court acted within the 
boundaries of such discretion and consistenl-
\y with any legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices before it; and (3) whet.her 
the court reached its decision by an exercise 
of reason. 
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7. Automobiles <e:=>251 
District court did not abuse its discre-
tion in awarding attorney fees of $24,434.80 
to rear-ended driver in personal injury ac- . 
tion; cow-t correctly perceived the issue as 
one of discretion, acted within the boundaries 
of that discretion, considered ailidavit and -
det.ailed billing records of driver's ·counsel 
and factors set forth in court rule governing 
attorney fee awards, and reached its decision 
by exercise of reason. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 
54(e)(3). 
Brady Law, Chtd., Boise, for appeUanl 
Glenda M. Talbutt argued. · 
Owens, James, Vernon Weeks, Coeur d'Al-
ene, for respondent. · Leander L. James, IV 
argued. 
PERRY, Judge. 
Samuel Sanchez appeals· n-om the district 
court's order and amended judgment award-
ing attorney fees to Jeannetl.e Johnson p1.1r-
suanl to I.C. § 12-120(4). We affirm. · · 
I. 
. '~ , 
In· October 1999, Johnso.n's vehicle ""'.cl-5 
rear-ended at a high ral.e -of- speed by San-· 
chez .. As a result of the accident, :Johnson 
sustained soft-1.issue,.injurles :that. required 
medical -treatmenl . In May 2001, Johnson 
submitted -a "statement.of .claim"·:P~UiUJL to 
I.C. § 12-120(4) to -Sanchez's -insurance~, 
er. Th~ statement or claim outlined ..John-
son's damages, including medical bills, future 
medical bills, lost income, arid :general ,dam-
ages. In tlle staLetnent of daim, Johnson 
demand~d $22,500 _for settlement of _the 
claims. In !!,ddition, Johnson included narra-
tive summaries of her damages and proyided 
copies_ of her medical r-e<;9rd~ and _.bills to 
date and pho_tographs of the accident scen_e. 
Johnson waited more . than sixty days and 
then f5,led a corpplaint against Sanchez $eek· 
ing damages not exceeding _$25,000 . . 
I. The disirict coun awarded°-'John.son colas, in-
1er~1. and at\orncy fees. however, Sanche:t does 
After filing I.he complaint, Johnson filed an 
offer of settlement pursuant t.o LC. § 12-301 
·- . ' 
in which she offered to settle her claims for 
$20,000. The parties did not reach a settle-
ment and a trial was held. During the trial, 
Johnson pre~ented testimony and argument 
to I.he jury reflecting her damages in an 
amount great.er than the amount demanded 
in her statement of claim. A jury rel.urned a 
verdict in fa~or 'of John.son in the amount of 
$21,126 in special and general damages. 
Johnson fi1ed a memorandum of costs, in, 
t.erest, and attorney fees pursuant lo I.C. 
§ 12-120(4). Sanchez filed a motion lo disal-
low attorney fees on the ground that Johnson 
had waived her right lo attorn.ey · 'rees by 
asserting ''significant new item[s] of damage" 
during' the trial.· After hearing argument on 
the issue, the district court awarded Johnson 
$24,434.80 for attorney fees. I ·simchez ap-
peals. · · 
Sanchez argues that Johnson waived her 
right to seek attorney fees by submitting 
significant new it.ems of damage during the 
trial that were not set forth in the statement 
of claim. Alternatively, Sa!!chez argues that 
the district court abused its discretion in 
determining the amount of attorney fees t.o 
award Johnson. 
. n: 
ANALYSIS 
A. ·waiver-of Attorney- Fees 
Sanchez asserts that Johnson waived her 
right to seek · attorney ·tees by submitting 
evidence and Lestirnony to the jury showing 
damages in an amount above that .tisLed in 
the statement of claim. Idaho Code Section 
12-120(4) provides: 
In actions for personal injury, where the 
- amoUJlt of plaintiffs claim for damages 
doe_s not .exceed twenty-five thousand dol-
lars ($25,000), there shall be truced and 
allowed to Lhe claimant., as part of the 
costs of the action, a reasonable amount to 
be fixed by the court as attor-ney's fees. 
For the plaintiff to be awarded attorney's 
fees for-the prosecution of the action, wrilr 
not challenge the award of costs and interest on 
appeal. 
I 
. I 
. . : J 
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ten demand for payment of the claim and a 
statement of claim must have been served 
on the defendant's insurer, if known, or if_ 
there is no known insurer, then on the 
defendant, not less. than sixty (60) days 
before the commencement of the action; 
proyjded that no attorney's fees shall be 
allowed to lhe plaintiff if the court finds 
thal the defendant tendered t.o the plain-
tiff, prior lo the commencement of the· 
action, an amount at Jeasl equal to ninety 
percent (90%) of the amount awarded to 
the plaintiff. _ 
The term "statement of claim" shall 
mean a written statement signed by the · 
plaintiffs· atto'n1ey, or if no attorney, by" 
the plaintiff which includes: 
(a) An itemized statement of each and · 
every item of dartlage claimed by the plain-' 
tiff including the a.mount claimed for gen-": 
eral damages and the following items of 
special damages: (i) medicru bills incurred 
up to the date of the plaintiff's demand; 
(ii) 'a good faith estimate of future medical 
bills; (iii) lost irioome incurred up to the 
date of the plaintiffs demand; (iv) a good 
faith estimate of future loss of income; and 
(v) property damage for which the plaintiff 
has not been paid. 
(b) Legible copies of all medical records, 
bills and other documentation pertinent lo 
the plaintiff's alleged damages, 
( ff the plaintiff includes in the complaint filed to commence the action, or in evi-
1 dence offered al trial, a clifferenl alleged [\ ! injury or a significant new item of damage 
\ 'Ml set fonh in 1M statement of claim, the 
plai.ntiff shall be deemed to have waived 
l. any entitlement -to ai:tcmiey's fees under 
- this section. 
(Emphasis-added.) 
(1, 2] At issue in this case is lhe applica-
tion of the italicized portion of that stab.lte. 
The interpret.ation of a statute is an issue of 
law over which we exercise free review. 
Zen.er v. Velde, 135 Idaho 352, 355, 17 P .3d 
296, 299 (Ct.App.2000), When interp,:-eting a 
statute, we will construe the statute as a 
whole to give effect lo the legislative intenl 
George W. Walkins Family v. Messmger, 
118 Idaho 537, 539-40, 797 P.2d 1385, 1387-
88 (1990); Zener, 135 Idaho at 355, 17 P.3d 
al 299. .The plain meaning of a statute will 
prevail unless ·clearly expressed legislative 
intent is contrary or unless plain meaning 
leads lo absurd . results. Watkins Fami-!,y, 
iiii T~aho at 540, 797 P.2d at 1388; Zener, 
135 lcbho at 35.5, ~ 7 P.3d al 299. 
Sanchez · contends that under the plain 
meaning of "significant new item of damage," 
when Johnson presented evidence at trial as 
to ·damages for amounts greater than those 
listed· in the statement of claim, Johnson· 
waived her entitlement to attorney fees. As 
Sanchez explains, in· Johnson's statement of 
cla:im-,-: Johnson·, submitted damages in the, 
amount of $3,500 for future m"eclical bills. 
However, · at tria:I Johnson presented :video-
tape deposition - testimony· of.-.. a: doctor who 
speculated . in; response . lo -- an open-ended . 
question that Johnson's- future medical ·bills -
could· cost as little as $15,000' but could reach· 
as high as $100,000. Adclitionally, Johnson 
listed damages for lost income as $288 in the 
statement of claim but, al trial, submitted 
evidence of lost income of $1,900. Also in the 
sta~ment o{ claim, Johnson listed $16,400 for 
gene
0
ral . damages but., during closing . argu: 
IT)ents, johnson'i attorney did not specify.an 
amounl Sanchez argues that these increas: 
es are significant new items of damage be-
e.a~ they, involve an amounl substantially 
greater than that originally demanded. 
Sanchez raised the issue of whether signifi-
can4 new items of damage were offered at 
trial in his motion to disallow attorney fees, 
In addressing the motion, the district court 
stated: 
Having reviewed the evidence, as well as 
the statement of. claim,· it is this Court's 
detemtination tbat [Johnson] did not offer 
evidence at trial of a different injury or of 
a significant new item of damage. . Howev-
er; there is no doubt that [Johnson] did 
submit· evidence at trial which would have 
permitted the jury lo award an amount of 
damages iri excess of the amount set forth 
in the statement of claim. Even if one 
were to classify such evidence aa constitut-
ing a "new item. of damage," the amount in 
que8tion was such lhat it did not constitute 
a "significant" new item of dam.age. Based 
on the foregoing, it is the determination of 
this Court that [Johnson) did not waive 
C 
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attorney fees and is, pursuant to the provi- . 
sions _of J.C. § 12-120(4), entitled to I.he 
same. 
(3) No Idaho _case law exists construing 
the phrase "significant ·new item of damage 
not seL forth in the statement of claim." 
However, LC. §. 12-120(4)(a). ouLlines the re-
quirements for a statement· of claim, which 
includes a st.a.t.emen.t.·. for general damages 
and certain "items'~ of. special damages such 
as medical bills·and future lost wages·.· John-
son complied with lhe requirements in .I.C. 
§ 12-120(4)(a). At •trial, . Johnson . did not. 
present evidence of -items , nol listed . in the. 
statement of-claim, such-as property damage. 
Johnson .. only-_ offered evidence with respect 
to .those items alre.uly listed in the -statement 
of -claim.- Nevertheless, Johnson ·provided, 
ev.idence of an increased amount of damage~. 
Thus, we must..'cletertnine whether the offer-
ing eviden~ of different amounts of .damages 
in this· case·· constituted a significant new item 
of damage. 
[4) Idaho :·¢ode S?ction ·:i~~20(4) ·:pre~' 
sumes that the amount of'·darnages 'may'· 
change troh{the time the statement· of claim· 
is' 'drafted to 'the :date of trial. : For instahci/ 
the sbtute reqliires that ·the plaintiff includ~ ' 
a ' '.good 'f.:uth estimate" otfuture 'medical bills 
and of future 'Joss ··of 'income·. It ·does . not ' 
require that ·the . plaintiff . list . the precise 
amollnt that wilJ:later :be presented -at trial. 
In personal injw-y cases"such ll.S -this one, it 
may be .years ·after' the statement of claim ls. 
submitted before the case reaches lrial and 
the parties present evidence of damages. 
Even if a plaintiff submits a statement of 
claim with hls-·or her'. good faith ·estimate ·of 
damages, at the· time of, trial the plaintiff may 
have incurred .more _damages that were not 
earlier foreseen. and may· have a .rnore.:,accu-
rate estimate ·of the amount -.of future dam-
ages because of intervening developments. 
Therefore, although Johnson presented evi-
dence of an increased·amow,t of damages al 
trial, this does nol in itself constitute a waiv-
er of attorney fees. Having -reached this 
conclusion on· the plain meaning of "signifi-
cant new items of damage not set forth in the 
statement of claim," we cannot conclude that 
Lhe district court abused its discretion in ju; 
findings. Where a trial court's findings are 
not clearly erroneous and where the trial 
court properly identifies and applies the law 
to the facts, then the trial cow-L's exercise of 
discretion has not been abused. Crawford v. 
Pacific Car & Foundry Co., 112 ·Idaho ·820 
822, 736 P.2d 872, 874 (Ct.App.1987). · · ' 
• I • :, I , . ; 
(SJ However, I.his conclusion does not 
preclude a t.riA1 cotµt from finding, -based on 
t.he presenui.tion,_of-eyidence . at trial of an 
increase tn. th~ amoll!'t of damages, that the 
plaintiff did not p~v,ide a good faith estimate 
in his or her statement of claim .. ,T.he_ good 
faith language .found in the statu~ protects 
against abuses of lhe statute, such as the 
purposeful \Ylthholding of a!l ~levant medic.a.I 
bills or anlicipated Mu.re _damage~. ·_ Thus, 
even thoµgh a c;ist.ric~ court may find. that 
Lti~re. were no sigrufie:anl ne;,,., items or"dam-
age presented at !.rial .that were not se't forth 
in the statement. of ·.claun, the district co~ 
may still preclude _an.'award of attorney fe:es 
based upon the· plaintiffs lack ·.of good 'faith. 
Such is not ~he ~ here:_ W~ conclude that 
a plaintiffs iJicrease 'in 'ttie 'amount ·or. dam-
ages., o~e~. time. do~s 'n~ conit:iblte a . waiver 
of attorn~y fees and, therefore . .;e ~ the 
district court's .award of ,at.~~ey 'fees to 
JohnsOn. · · · 
B. ' Abuse 9f Discretion 
[6, 7) Sanchez argues, 'in· the alternativ~ 
that the district court abused its ruscretion in 
detei-mining the amount.,of attorney .fees ·to 
award ·Johnson pursuant to .I.e. § ·'12--120(4), 
When a trial court's discretionary decision is 
reviewed .on a'ppeal, the appellate _court con-
ducts a mulll-liered Inquiry to determine: (1) 
whether lhe -lower court correctly perceived 
the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether 
the lower court acted within the. bol.Ujdaries 
of such disc,retion anc,I <;onsistenUy_ with any 
legal standµds ~pplicable .. to ".l)le ._specific 
choices before it; . and (3) wneth~ the court 
rea~hed its •. ~ecislon' PY. an. e~~;ci~~ 6,f reason. 
Sun VaUey Shappi,ng .Ctr.,· Inc.· v. "ida.h-0 
Power Co., 'f 19 Idaho 87, .. 94, 803 P.2d 993 
1000 (1991) .. · . '.'···. . ' 
In this case, ,- the district court awarded 
Johnson attorney fees in ·,the amount of 
$24,434.80. It is, undisput.ea that the district 
court correclly perceived .lhe issue as one of 
= 
···~ 
. ,. 
-~ ..... 
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clisc~tion, but Sanche~ co~tends that there is C. Costs and Attorney Fees on Appeal 
no evidence that the rust.tict court considered 
all of the factors set forth in I.R.C.P. 
54(eX3).2 Sanchez also argues that the facts 
support the conclusion that the dist.rid court 
did not reach its decision by- &ll exercise of 
reason. 
In it.s order awarding costs and · attorney 
fees, t_he district court stated: 
Th.is Court has reviewed tbe affidavit· of 
(Johnson's] counsel with reference to ·the . 
amount of claimed attorney fees, as well a.s 
those factors set forth in J.R.C.P. 54(e). 
Having considered· 'those matters, and 
recognizing the issue to be one of discre-
tion, [Johnson] is hereby aw~ded ~ttorney 
fees, wh.ich this· Court determines to be 
reasonable, in the sum of $24,434.80. 
' ... 
Thus, the district ·court specifically repre-
sented that it reviewed the affidavit of Johri-
son's counsel and the fact.ors set forth in 
Rule 54.(e)(3). -· The affidavit submitted by 
Johnson's counsel contained a narrative of-
counsel's billing practices and a description · 
of the work com'plet.ed in Johnson's c:.ise. In'-
the affidavit. counsel addressed the factors 
set forth in Rule 54(e)(3) and attached de-
tailed billing records in support· of Johnson's 
claim for attorney fees. Considering the (ill\· 
trict court's orde~. the affidavit submitted by' 
Johnson's counsel and the reeord before ·us, 
we conclude that the district cow-t correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted 
with.in the boundaries of that discretion and 
' ' 
reached its decision by exercise of reason. 
Therefore, the district court did not abuse its 
di.screlion in awarding attorney fees to John-
son In lhe amount of $24,434.80. 
2_. Idaho Rule of Civil Prncedw-e 54(e)(3) provides 
that, in Lhe event the court granis attorney fees in 
a civil action, it must consider the folloY1o-ing 
factors in determining the amount of such fees: 
(A) The lime 8J1d labor ~uired. 
(B) The novelcy and difficulty of the ques-
tions. 
(C) The skill requisite to perform the I eg;i.l 
service properly and the experieuce and abiliiy 
of the anorney in the particular field of law. 
(.D) The prevaihng charges for J[ke work. 
(E.) Whether lhe fee i.s fuced or contingent. 
(F) The time limitat.ions imposed by the 
client or the circumstances of the case. 
Jo~son ·ie-qu~t.s costs ari attorney fees 
on appeal pw-suant to I.C. § 12-120(4) and 
I.AR. 41. .. This Court upheld the ·award of 
attorney fees below under r:c~ § 12-120(4). 
Therefore, Johnson is .e.ntitled to an awartl of 
costs and attorney feel; on appeal. See Mil-
ler v. SL Alplv:Yrt,sus Regional Medical Ctr., 
Inc.., 139 Idaho 825, 839, 'B/7 P.3d 934, 948 
(2004). 
Ill. 
· · CONCLUSION -
Th'{ ·· distric.t, court's determination that 
John-~on hail" riol presen~ "sigrµficwt new 
items· of damage"_ is supported b/the record, 
arid therefore . there was not a waiver of 
attorney fees UJ1der J.C. § lZ-120(4). · ·Adcli-
tioruilly,_ the .disttjct court did not abuse its· 
discretion in determining the amount of at-
t;o:71ey (e,es to a\"l(ard Johnson· pursuant to 
LC. 'f 12-1_20(4) ... Accordingly; the· district 
court.is order . awarding costs and attorney 
fees to Johnson is affirmed. We award costs 
and attorney fees to Johnson on appeal. 
. Chief Judge LANSING and Judge 
GUTIERREZ, concur. 
(G) The amount lnvolved and the resullS ob-
tained . 
(H) Tlie undesirability of the case. 
(I) The cature and length of the prQfcs.sional 
relatio.nsbip with the client. 
(J) Awards in sjrnJlar cas.e.s. 
(I() The reasonable con of automated legal 
research (Computer As.sistcd Legal R=arcb), 
if the COU(t finds it was reasonably ncc=ry 
in preparing a party's case. 
(L) fury other factor which the coun deems· 
appropriate in lhc particular case. 
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damages and t.he folloWlng it.ems of special· it is ·d.ifficull t.o see how a lack of awareness 
damages: (i) medical · bills incurred up to· of damage to the car . played.- any part io 
the. date of the plaintiff's demand; (ii) a Rubley's insurer's , refusal tc setUe _prior to 
good faith estimate of future medi~l bills; the comniencemen~ of the suiL We affinn 
(iii) lost income incurred up to the date.of I.he district court's award of attomey fees to 
.the plaintiffs demand; (iv) a good fait.h Contreras . made pursuant lo I.C. ·. ~ 12-
estirnat.e of future loss of income; and (v) 120(4). 
pro-pe-rty da:rr1-age for which the plaintiff 
has not.been paid, 
I.C. § 12-120(4) (emphasis added). Rubley, 
argues Contreras waived his right lo claim 
attorney fees because he did not make any 
claim for property damage in his Statement 
of Claim, yet sought,re.imbursemenL of $2,500 
for his cai:---:-a ·"significant new it.em of dam-
age~'-at trial. Ultimalely, the jury awarded 
Contreras $2,500 for properly damage, in 
addiLion lo other damages. 
Here, Lhe property damage claimed by; 
Contreras was new because it was not ex-
pressly included in his Statemeiit' ~f Clai'~ ·to 
Rubley's insurer, as required by· LC. § l2-
120(4)(a)(v). Conb-eras did include photos of 
the lolaled car with his Statement of Claim, 
but this was done simply tci'show the severity 
of the collision, as· Contreras' attorney noted, 
"I have also ·enclosed pictures of my clienl's 
vehicle, which indicates this was a violent 
co II ision.'' AJso, the pol ice acciden L report 
accompanying the Statement of Claim esti~ 
mated $5,000 ·of damage Lo ihe car, but lltls 
does not qualify as sufficient statement of a 
claim for this property damage. 
Even though evidence ~f the property 
damage was ne~. it is not significant, enough 
to constitute a waiver of Contreras' right lo 
attorn~y fees. Contreras' origma} Statement 
of Claim to Rubley's insurer on june 18, 
2002, sought $20,000 In damages. The insur-
er disclaimed liability for the accident and 
made no tender Lo respondents in an at.tempt 
Lo set.tJe the case. We agree with the 'disl.rict 
court -that the $2,500 car was nol necessarily 
a significant it.em of dam~e when compared 
to the ·~o.ooo demand' ma.de in the State-
ment of Claim·. A.a Rubley's insurer dis-
claimed any liability by concluding Sieban-
thaler was 100% responsible for the accident., 
2. While the cause ol ac1ion of negligence is com-
prised of duly, breach, cause and harm. the dis-
trict court and the panics use the 1erm negli-
gence tc:i refer to the duty and breach elemenJs 
only. This distinction between negligence and a 
8. Requests for Admission 
. f 6]' Rubley denied a request to admit 
,;negligence" 2 (duty and breach of .duty) as 
well as various requests relating lO wheth~~: 
her negligence · caused the accidenl The dis-
trict court awarded attorney fees to Baeza 
Martinez p~~~nl to ·Rule 37(c). because· it 
co~cl4ded Rubley · unre~onably denied she 
was negligent, e)though th'e court emphasized 
it i:vas. reaso.~bi_e .for Rubley lo deny _causa-
tion.. Rllbley claims the dist.net court erred 
b~ause .'i~.ubley had a reasonable belief, in 
p_revaili~g: on the negligence issue' at trial_ 
.. [7] : Attorney f~es ~l~~g t.o req·~~s~ fo~ 
admissi.~n submitted under I.R.C~. 36(a) ·.~ 
governed . by Ru,le 37(c). Baif,ey, . 139 Idaho 
at 753,. 86 P.3d at 467; I.R.C.P. 37(c) .. Under 
R~le.37(cJ; . . . . . . . 
f w ]here .. .c . one party. fails· to admit the 
truth of a matter as requested, and the 
. opposing party subsequently proves the 
. ' truth of the '' matter' the court "shall:' 
, awarq ''th~ reasonable expenses" inCWTed. 
The r.vle Is m~datory, s~ject ~nly ~ the 
_ four ~xceptions _set forth_ in the rule iuielf: 
. (l) that the request was held .objectionable 
purs_uant to Ru le. 36(a); (2) Lha t the admis-
sion sought was not '. 'of substantial irnpor-. 
tance";, (3) _th.at failure to admit was based 
. upon a reasonable ... beUef in prevailing on 
.. the issue; or ( 4) other good reason . . 
R~e v. Posey, 1'14 Idaho 890, 892, 761 P.2d 
1242, 1244' · (Ct.App.1988);· LR.C.P. 37(c). 
Whet.her 3IIY of the ex2eptions. apply is com-
mitted fo the sound d.lscretion of the district 
court. Ruge, 114 Idaho at. 892, 761 P.2d at 
1244:· · Here, ·the district court found excep-
L1on (3)"did _not app!y because, among other 
full cause of act.ion for neglige:nce has. been rec-
ognized i.ri Idaho, See Roberrson V. Richards. 11 s 
Ida.ho· 628,633. 76_9 P.2d SOS, 510 (1987) (''It is 
essential t.hat negligence exislS before the proxi-
mate cause issue rises.") 
512 
i:-o 
- 1.-
BAiWOC!\ COUNTY 
CLERr, OF THE COURT 
2010 SEP 28 PH ~: 3 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MA THEW R. BENNETT and BENJANIIN 
L. WALTON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NANCY PATRICK, 
Defendant. 
Case No: CV-2008-0004528-PI 
MINUTE ENTRY & ORDER 
THE PAR TIES came before the Court on the 27th day of September, 2010 for a 
hearing on Plaintiffs Motions. Charles Johnson appeared in person on behalf of the 
Plaintiffs. Brendon Taylor appeared in person on behalf of the Defendant. Stephanie Morse 
was the Court Reporter. 
At the outset, the Court heard oral argument from the parties regarding Plaintiffs 
Motion to Amend to Conform to Evidence and Motion for Relief and Reconsideration of 
Decision on Post Judgment Motions Denying Attorney Fees. 
Thereafter, the Court ruled that the Motion to Amend to Conform to Evidence was 
filed timely but is DENIED. The Motion for Relief and Reconsideration of Decision on 
Post Judgment Motions Denying Attorney Fees is also DENIED. The Judgment entered in 
Case No.: CV-2008-0004528-PI 
MINUTE ENTRY & ORDER 
Page 1 of 2 
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this matter will stand. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this Z. 2~ day of September, 2010. 
~\ ' 
'::-= ~~%--
DAVID C. NYE ,,.. ~ef 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
-;Z./\ 1h 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~ day of September, 2010, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the 
manner indicated. 
Charles Johnson 
Johnson Olson Chartered 
P.O. Box 1725 
Pocatello, Idaho 83 204-1725 
Brendon C. Taylor 
Merrill & Merrill, Chartered 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, Idaho 83 204-0991 
Case No.: CV-2008-0004528-PI 
WIINUTE ENTRY & ORDER 
Page 2 of2 
~ U.S. Mail 
D Overnight Delivery 
D Hand Deliver 
D Fax: 232-9161 
~ U.S. Mail 
D Overnight Delivery 
D Hand Deliver 
D Fax: 232-2499 
Deputy 
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Charles Johnson 
JOHNSON OLSON CHARTERED 
419 West Benton 
P.O. Box 1725 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1725 
Telephone: (208) 232-7926 
Facsimile: ( 2 0 8) 2 32-9161 
ISB No. 2464 
E-mail: cjlaw@cableone.net 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MATHEW R. BENNETT and ) Case No. CV-08-4528-PI 
BENJAMIN L. WALTON, ) 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
NANCY PATRICK, ) 
) 
Defendant/Respondent. ) 
___________ ) 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT NANCY PATRICK AND HER ATTORNEY 
BRENDON C. TAYLOR; AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The plaintiffs/appellants Mathew R. Bennett and Benjamin 
L. Walton, through their counsel Charles Johnson, appeals against 
the above named defendant/respondent, Nancy Patrick, to the Idaho 
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals from the AMENDED JUDGMENT ON 
VERDICT entered in the above-entitled proceeding on August 25, 2010 
and from the order denying the Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief and 
Reconsideration of Decision on Post-Judgment Motions Denying 
Attorneys Fees dated September 28, 2010; Honorable District Judge 
David C. Nye presiding. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 1 
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2. The party plaintiffs have a right to appeal to the Idaho 
Supreme Court, and that the Judgments and Orders are appealable 
judgments and orders under and pursuant to Rules ll(a) (1), ll(a) (7) 
and otherwise at law. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the 
appellants then intend to assert in the appeal; provided, any such 
list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellants from 
asserting other issues on appeal, are as follows: 
a. Whether the complaint complied with Idaho Code § 12-
120 (4) or alleged a claim in excess of $25,000.00? 
b. Whether the decision to deny the Motion to Amend the 
Complaint was an abuse of discretion? 
c. Whether the complaint prayed for an amount less than 
$25,000.00 in substantial compliance with Cox v. Mulligan, 142 
Idaho 356, 128 P.3d 893 (2005)? 
d. Whether there was any new significant item of damage not 
set forth in the appellants' original claim? 
e. Whether the plaintiffs/appellants offered any evidence 
(as opposed to argument) of any new item of damage at trial? 
f. Whether the Court should have awarded attorney's fees 
under the case law of Johnson v. Sanchez, 140 Idaho 667, 99 P.3d 
620 (Ct.App.2004), Contreras v. Rubley, 142 Idaho, 573, 576-577, 
130 P.3d 1111 (2006), and Harris v. Alessi, 141 Idaho 901, 909-910, 
120 P.3d 289 (2005)? 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 2 
516 
4. Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of 
the following portions of the reporter's transcript record? No. 
5. Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes. (a) 
(b) The appellants request the preparation of the 
following portions of the reporter's transcript in electronic 
format: 
The reporter's standard transcript as defined by Rule 25(c), 
I.A.R. supplemented by the following which shall be included: 
Closing Arguments of Counsel at the Trial; and 
Transcript of the hearing held on July 26, 2010. 
6. The appellants 
included in the clerk's 
request the following documents to be 
(agency's) record in addition to those 
automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.: 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Affidavit dated April 10, 2009; 
Defendant's Response in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Affidavit of Nancy Patrick dated April 27, 2009; 
First Amended and Renewed Motion for Summary Judgement and attached 
deposition of Nancy Patrick dated November 18, 2009; 
Memorandum of Costs and Affidavit of Charles Johnson in Support of 
Motion for Costs and Fees dated January 5, 2010; 
Decision on Costs and Attorney Fees dated March 12, 2010; 
Stipulated Joint Pre-Trial Memorandum dated May 14, 2010; 
Motion for Costs and Attorney fees of the Prevailing Party on Jury 
Verdict and Judgment on the Verdict, and Memorandum of Costs and 
Affidavit of Charles Johnson in Support of Motion for Costs and 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 3 
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Attorney fees dated June 18, 2010; 
Plaintiff's Objection and Response to Defendant's Objection to 
Plaintiffs' Post Trial Motions for Additur, Interest, Costs and 
Attorneys Fees dated July 20, 2010; 
Plaintiffs' Objection to Supplement to Defendant's Post Trial 
Motions and Responsive Pleadings dated July 26, 2010; 
Response and Objection to Defendant's Post-Hearing Brief and 
Affidavit on Bankruptcy Stipulation dated August 4, 2010; 
Motion for Relief and Reconsideration of Decision on Post-Judgment 
Motions Denying Attorney's Fees and Brief in Support of Motion 
dated September 7, 2010; 
Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform to Evidence under IRCP 15(b) 
dated September 9, 2010; 
Defendant's Objection and Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion 
for Relief and Reconsideration of Post-Judgment Motions Denying 
Attorney's Fees and Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint to 
Conform to Evidence under IRCP 15(B) dated September 20, 2010; and 
Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Objection to Costs and 
Attorney's Fees and Supplementation of the Record dated September 
23, 2010. 
7. The appellants formally request the following additional 
documents, charts, or pictures offered or admitted as Exhibits to 
be copied and sent to the Supreme Court: None. 
8. I certify: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 4 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on 
the reporter and clerk at 
(b) The est 
address set out below. 
fee for preparation of the rter' s 
transcript wi be paid on receipt. 
(c) The estimated fee r preparat of the c k's record 
in the amount of $100.00 has been paid. 
(d) appellants' filing fee s been paid. 
(e) That se has been made upon l parties in this case 
required to be served pursuant to Rule 20. 
WHEREFORE, the appel s Mathew R. Bennett and Benjamin L. 
Walton appeal and request the Court's decisions be reversed and 
they be awarded costs and attorney s. 
DATEJ this 4th day of October 2010. 
Attorney for Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY IFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document, by placing the same in the United States mail, 
pos prepaid, addressed as f lows: 
Brendon C. Taylor 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991 
Bannock County Court Reporter 
Attn: Stephanie Morse 
624 East Center Street, Room 218 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
on this 4th day of October 2010. 
NOTICE OF 
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Brendon C. Taylor 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
109 North Arthur - 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
(208) 232-2286 
(208) 232-2499 Telefax 
Idaho State Bar #6078 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MATHEW R. BENNETT and BENJAMIN L. ) 
WALTON, ) Case No. CV-08-4528-PI 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT 
VS. ) 
) 
NANCY PATRICK, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
) 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record, Charles Johnson, to 
hereby submit that the Judgment in the above-entitled matter has been satisfied via payment from 
Defendant to Plaintiff Benjamin Walton and his attorney in the amount of $10,671.63, and 
payment from Defendant to Plaintiff Mathew Bennett and his attorney in the amount of $5,065.11. 
Plaintiffs reserve the right to pursue an appeal on the issue of the District Court's denial 
of their request for attorney fees, subject to the stipulation of the parties filed in United States 
Bankruptcy Court, Case No. 08-40764. 
DATED this 61~ day of October, 2010. 
Satisfaction of Judgment 
7783/ea 
JOHNSON OLSON, CH 
Charles Johnson 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Page 1 
Defendant acknowledges Plaintiffs' reservation from the Satisfaction of Judgment of the 
Plaintiffs' rights to appeal the issue of attorneys fees as set forth herein. 
DATED this _.f:C_ day of October, 2010. 
CERTIFICATE OF SER VICE 
I, Charles Johnson, the undersigned, one of the attorneys for the Plaintiffs, in the 
above-referenced matter, do hereby certify that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing 
Satisfaction of Judgment was this __ day of October, 2010, served upon the following in the 
manner indicated below: 
Brendon C. Taylor 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
Fax 208-232-2499 
Satisfaction of Judgment 
7783/ea 
Charles Johnson 
J:i?1 
[_J U.S. Mail [_J Hand Delivery 
[_] Overnight Delivery [_J Telefax 
Page 2 
Brendon C. Taylor 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
109 North Arthur - 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-099 l 
(208) 232-2286 
(208) 232-2499 Telefax 
Idaho State Bar #6078 
Attorneys for Defendant 
t~~. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MA THEW R. BENNETT and 
BENJAMIN L. WALTON, 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants, 
) 
) District Court Case No. CV-08-4528 
) Supreme Court No. 38138-2010 
) 
VS. 
) STIPULATED NOTICE OF REQUEST FOR 
) ADDITIONAL RECORDS AND 
) TRANSCRIPTS 
NANCY PATRICK, ) 
) 
Defendant/Respondent. ) 
---------------) 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED CLERK, RECORDER, PARTIES, AND THE 
PARTIES' ATTORNEYS, 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. Respondent and Appellants in the above-entitled proceeding hereby request, 
pursuant to Rule 19, I.A.R., the inclusion of the following material in the reporter's transcript 
and the clerk's record in addition to that required to be included by the I.A.R. and the notice of 
appeal, and to the extent the records and transcripts were not previously requested by Appellants. 
Additional transcripts and records are requested to be provided in both hard copy and electronic 
format. 
2. Reporter's Transcripts: 
A. Reporter's transcript for hearing dated September 27, 2010. 
B. Reporter's transcript for all hearings held the week of June 7-11, 2010. 
3. Clerk's Records (dates identified are those set forth in the clerk's record as date 
of recording): 
A. Affidavit of Brendon Taylor and attached Exhibit A, dated De_cember 21, 
2009. 
B. Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on Liability, 
dated January 4, 2010. 
Stipulated Notice of Request for Additional Records and Transcripts 
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C. Defendant's Objection to Plaintirfs' Motion for Costs and Attorneys Fees 
on Summary Judgment as to Liability. 
D. Defendant's Motion for Costs, dated June 21, 2010. 
E. Defendant's Memorandum for Costs, dated June 21, 2010. 
F. Defendant's Motion for Reduction to Judgment, dated June 2L 2010. 
G. Affidavit of Brendon C. Taylor with attachments, dated June 21, 2010. 
H. Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Reduction to Judgment, 
dated July 6, 2010. 
I. Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendant's Motion for Costs, Dated July 6, 2010. 
J. Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Motions for Additur, 
Interest, Costs and Attorneys Fees, dated July 7, 2010. 
K. Supplement to Defendant's Post-Trial Motions and Responsive Pleadings, 
dated July 22, 2010. 
L. Affidavit in Support of Post-Trial Supplement, dated July 22, 2010. 
M. Plaintiffs' Supplemental Objection to Defendant's Motion for Costs, dated 
July 26, 2010. 
N. Supplemental Authority on Attorneys Fees, dated July 30, 2010. 
0. Defendant's Post-Hearing Brief, dated July 30, 2010. 
P. Affidavit of Brendon Taylor Regarding Bankruptcy Order and· Stipulation 
and attachments, dated July 30, 2010. 
Q. Amended Judgment on Verdict, dated August 25, 2010. 
R. Decision on Post-Judgment Motions, dated August 25, 2010. 
S. Minute Entry and Order, dated September 28, 2010. 
T. Satisfaction of Judgment, dated October 28, 2010. 
4. Trial Exhibits and Proposed Exhibits: 
A. Plaintiffs Exhibit 65 (Admitted). 
B. Plaintiffs Exhibit 68 (Admitted). 
C. Plaintiffs Exhibit 122 (Admitted). 
D. Plaintiffs Exhibit 145 (Admitted). 
E. Plaintiffs Exhibit 150 (Admitted). 
F. Plaintiffs Exhibit 151 (Not Admitted). 
G. Plaintiffs Exhibit 153 (Not Admitted). 
H. Defendant's Exhibit A-5 (Admitted). 
I. Defendant's Exhibit A-6 (Admitted). 
Stipulated Notice of Request for Additional Records and Transcripts 
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5.. I ce1tify that a copy of this stipulated notice of request for additional reco1ds and 
transcripts has been served on each court reporter of whom a transcript is requested as named 
below at the address(es) set out below and that the estimated number of additional pages being 
requested is less than 100 .. The cost for the additional records and transciipts reque~ted herein rt--
shall be paid by Defendant/Respondent. 
6. I further ce1tify that this request for additional record has been served upon the 
clerk of the district coUit and upon all patties required to be seIVed pursuant to Rule 20 . 
Brendo 
DATED this . u!: day of October, 2010. 
JOHNSON OLSON CHARTERED 
Stipulated Notice of Request for Additional Records and Tlanscripts 
7783/ea 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Brendon C. Taylor, the undersigned, one of the attorneys for the Defendant/Respondent 
in the above-referenced matter, do hereby certify that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing 
Stipulated Notice of Request for Additional Records and Transcripts was this ~<"tlay of 
October, 2010, served upon the following in the manner indicated below: 
Charles Johnson [6'0,s. Mail 
JOHNSON OLSON, CHARTERED [_] Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 1725 [_] Overnight Delivery 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1725 [_] Telefax 
Bannock County Court Reporter 
Attn: Stephane Morse 
624 East Center Street, Room 218 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
Bannock County Court Clerk 
Attn: Dale Hatch/Diane Cano 
624 East Center Street, Room 218 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
Stipulated Notice of Request for Additional Records and Transcripts 
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[_]JJ.S. Mail 
~Hand Delivery 
[_] Overnight Delivery 
[_] Telefax 
[_];6.s. Mail 
[]'Hand Delivery 
[_] Overnight Delivery 
[_] Telefax 
Page 4 
TRIAL EXHIBITS AND PROPOSED 
EXHIBITS REQUESTED IlY Brendon C. 
Taylor, Attorney for Defendant: 
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THE -ST CLINIC 
CHlROPRAC'nC, AC\JPUNCTUR.t 
NATURA.t. Mii;OIQNE 
John.son & Olsen Chtd. 
419 West Whitman Street 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
May 27, 2008 
• 
Wm: 
EMAIL! 
Arm: CharlesJohnson 
RE: Mathew Bennett• 
Dear Mr. Johnson, 
• 
Please find enclosed a final billing for the above captioned. He was rel.eased on 5-24• . 
2008. He DO longer hM any complainls. Tbc:n: is no pcnnanent partial impairment.· :He 
is symptomatic and the pain is pre-traumatic stat11$. ·· 
Very 1ruly yours, 
Henry O. West, Jr., D.C. 
Diplomate, American Board of Chiropractic Orthopedists 
Diplomate, North American Academy of Impairment Rating Physicians 
HGW/mb 
Enclosure 
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BENNETT, MA THE DOB:- D NRY G. WEST, JR. 
5-24-08, 
Mathew has no complaints. He feels good. He has retained his pre-traumatic status. He 
is released today with no further appointments scheduled. 
HGW 
2-5-10, He is complaining of low back pain eccentric to the right over the right 
sacroiliac joint. He was doing fine until he had an IME in Idaho Falls and in the Figure 4 
testing it aggravated the right sacroiliac joint. The IME was on 2-2-20 I 0. Supine 
position the right leg is comparably longer. He will be given a right anterior innominate 
subluxation side posture adjustment. 
HGW 
2-8-10, This is a follow up visit from his recent exacerbation resulting from an 
Independent Medical Evaluation. He is improving with his symptoms. He still has some 
soreness of low back. He will be treated with manipulative therapy, side posture, 
ultrasound and electrical stimulation. We will see him PRN. 
HGW 
BENNETT, MATHE' DOB: - D ~NRY G. WEST, JR. 
5-24-08, 
Mathew has no complaints. He feels good. He has retained his pre-traumatic status. He 
is released today with no further appointments scheduled. 
HOW 
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WALTON, BENJAMIN DOB: DR. HENRY G. WEST, JR. 
11-24-07, We treated the patient with electrical stimulation, ultrasound and manipulative 
therapy 3-4 body regions. 
HGW 
2-22-08, I reviewed the cervical MRI that was taken on 2-19-08. There is a minor posterior 
broad based disc bulge at C4-5 and at CS-6. Benjamin Is not working construction at this time. 
We treated the patient with electrlcal stimulation, ultrasound and manipulative therapy 3-4 
body regions. 
HGW 
4-28-08, He is feeling better. There is no numbness In his fingers. He is not working 
construction at the present time. This has been helpful to allow cllnical healing. 
HGW 
5-7-08, He is not working construction at the present time. This has been helpful to allow 
clinical healing. We treated the patfent with electrical stimulation, ultrasound and manipulative 
therapy, 
HGW 
EDIBIT 
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David C. Simon, M.D. • Board Certified 
2B 60 Channing Way, Suite 213 • Idaho Falls, ID 83404 • (208) 535-4420 
backarid~ctpain. 
artlvilis HN!jfl!JliM. 
Ele~ 
[wlaoon 11111El 
Examinee: 
Date of Birth: 
Date of Injury: 
iai'alton 
1011snoo7 
Date of Examination: 02/02/20 I 0 
Examining Physician: David C. Simon, M.D. 
Client: Brendan Taylor 
INTRODUCTION 
'; .,· 
This 31-year-old., right-handed male was referred for an independent medical ewluation (1MB) 
by the above client. The independent medical examination process was explained to the 
examinee, and he understands that no patient/treating physician relationship was established. 
Mr. Walton was advised that the information provided would not be confidentiai and a report 
will be sent to the requesting client. 
Mr. Walton was cooperative. The history was obtained from the_ex.aminet (who was a fair 
historian) and from the medical records that had been provided. the information he provided 
was consistent with the medical records provided. Accompanyin·g Mr. Walton was h.iB btother-
in-law. A questionnaire and pain inventories were completed by the ex.aminee. Mr. Walton 
reported no new difficulties occurring dwing the examination. 
mSTORY 
Preexisting Status 
He reports that he had a broken ann in 199 l and then an iajury to his hand in. 2004. He denies 
any prior back or neck problems or any prior motor vehicle' accidents before 10/18/07. 
lnjnry 
He reports that he was involved in a motor vehicle accident on 10/18/07. He was a seatbe1ted 
driver in a Toyota truck that was hit by another vehicle on the pa&sen&er side. He states that 
this popped his truck up in the air. He states that immediately following the injury he bad 
nausea plus stiffness of his neck. He states that the police and ambulance came to the scene but 
he drove himself to the emergency room in his truck. 
I~"&;,., 145 
Clinical History 
He was evaluated in the PortneufEmergency Room on 10tt8/07. It wasiloted that he had been 
in a motor vehicle accident and initially afterwards he had helptdditect traffic without pain 
then in about 10-15 minutes he developed increasing stiffuess of neck and low back. X-rays of 
the lumbar spine showed ''mild straightening which could be associated with muscular spasm." 
The x-rays of the cervical spine were also notable for straightening of cervical lordosis but 
were otherwise normal. He was diagnosed with a cervical spine sttain and lumbar spine strain. 
On 10/26/07, he was evaluated by Richard Maynard, b.O. It was notetftitat he had been in a 
motor vehicle accident and initially he had had headaches and tingHng in his hands but those 
were improved. He still had pain and stiffness in his low back but his neck was improving. He 
was started on Flexeril. 
He was re-evaluated on 11/9/07. He was still feeling sore and tight but not as bad. He was 
instructed to follow up in two weeks if not entirely better. 
On 11/21/07, he sought treatment from a chiropractor, Henry West .. llis chief complaint was 
l~w back pain. He _also was co~laining of neck pain! and ~ome ~ling-~ his :finge~ps of his 
nghl}1a,nd, The chiropractor's-diagnoses were-"A..cute,GerV!cal,s1de,l~,tnJUty; bmclual- - · · . 
radiculoneuropathy and acute lumbar torsional strain." He also felt that the clinical 
examination "indicates a cervical disc protnision and a lumbar disc protrusion''. He felt that an 
MRI was indicated for confirmation. 
An MRI of the cervical spine was one on 2/19/08. This showed a mirtor posterior broad based 
disc bulge at C4-5 and CS-6 but no disc protrusion. There was mild reversal of the normal 
cervical lordosis. 
Mr. Walton underwent a few treatments with the chiropractor through sn/08; 
Current Status 
He reports continued pain in his back more. than his neck. He reports the pain is intermittent 
and minor but is made worse with lifting heavy things and made better with ibuprofen. On a 
scale from O (no pain) to 10 ( excruciating pain), the examinee reports the pain how is a 2. 
During the past month the pain averaged 2, with a high of 4 and a low of 0. 
He reports that he has pain and stiffness frm thing in the morning lilid lie tries to stretch it out. 
He gets occasional headaches in both temple areas about 1-2 times per motith. Occasionally, 
his right hand falls asleep. 
Occupational ffistory 
He works for his own drywall business. 
Social History 
The examinee lives in Pocatello with family. He describes his typical day as "dtywaU finisher, 
laborer". He smokes one pack of cigarettes per day. 
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Past Medical ffistory 
Medical: 
Surgery: 
Medication: 
Allergies: 
He denies any other chronic medical problems. 
Negative 
Ibuprofen 1000 mg twice daily 
None known 
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION 
General Observations 
The examinee is a muscular, healthy-appearing male. 
Behavioral Observations 
The examinee was pleasant, cooperative and attentive. Affect was normal During the visit, he 
appeared comfortable. There was no significant pain behavior. There were no significant non-
phy~iologic findings noted. 
Cardiovascular 
There is no edema in the upper extremities. Radial pulses are 2+ bilaterally. Skin tempetature 
is normal. 
Gait 
Normal and non-antalgic. No assistive device is used. 
Musculoskeletal 
Toe shoulders are noticeably asymmetric with the left shoulder higher than tire right. There is 
no scoliosis but it appears that the asymmetry is related to the tight upper trapezius ntuscle 
being shorter than the left. There is tenderness to palpation in the right upper ttapezius muscle 
and at one point I found a trigger points that refei:red symptoills to the right upper extremity. 
There is no instability of the shoulder joint. Catpal ~ofi test is ttrildly positive on the 
right side. Phalen's test is mildly positive on the right side. Straight leg raise is negative but he 
has poor flexibility. Patrick's test is mildly positive on the right side and he is poor and 
flexibility, right more than left. No joint instability is noted. 
Range of Motion 
Cervical spine range-of-motion is notable for pain with extension more th!lli flex.ion. With 
spine flexion, he did report some pain in his upper lumbar Imd lower thomcic spine. 
Skin 
No rashes, lesions, ulcers or abnormal pigmentation is present. 
3 
Neurological 
Coordination is normal. Deep tendon reflexes are 1 + in bilateral uwer. extremities and 2+ in 
bilateral lower extremities. Manual muscle testing was performed; no focal weakness was 
appreciated. Sensation is decreased to pinprick in the right median n~e distribution. Mental 
status is grossly intact. 
PAIN STATUS l:NVENTOlUES 
Pain Urawing 
The examinee completed a pain drawing, using symbols to describe sensations. This drawing 
did not reveal findings suggestive of symptom :magnification. 
Short Form McGill Pain Questionnaire 
The. McGill-Pijin Q~c;s~c;>nnaire. spe,cifies .I 5 pPtc;ntial pain,de~pt9t!t,.1b~ e:x~e~ rates the _. 
intensity of each descriptor on a scale of 0 to 3. The total of all descriptors was 24. The total of 
the 11 somatic descriptors was 18, averaging 1.6 and the total of the 4 affective descriptors was 
6, averaging 1.5. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Diagnoses 
' ' 
1. Motor vehicle accident on 10/18/07 (neatly 2½ years ago). He bas mild tesidual symptoms 
possibly due to myofascial pain and possibly due to facet p;un. He ddeS not appear to be 
exaggerating his symptoms. These problems are likely related to the 10/18/07 motor 
vehicle accident. This assumes that he did not have any of these problems prior to the 
motor vehicle accident. I did not have any medical records from prior to the motor vehicle 
accident to verify this. 
Mr. Walton would likely benefit from some physical therapy followed by a home exercise 
program. In my opinion, this would work better than chiropractic treatment. A 
prescription muscle relaxer may also be helpful. Trigger- pt)ilit injections could be done if 
subsequent evaluations reveal ongoing trigger points. F'or facet paifi, facet injections or 
medial branch blocks can sometimes be done, however his symptoms seem to be too mild 
and too intermittent to consider this invasive procedute. · 
2. Probable carpal tunnel syndrome on the right side. this would not be telated to the motor 
vehicle accident but would more likely be related to his work activities. 
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Causation 
Discussed above, based upon the available information,, to a reasonable degree of medical 
probability, there is causal relationship between the.examm.ee•s cuttent neck and back 
complaints and the subject motor vehicle accident. However, if any pre-existing medical 
records are found which show that he did have ptoblems prior to the accident, the issue of 
causation will need to be reconsidered. 
The above analysis is based upon the available infortnatioo. at this time. including the history 
given by the examinee, the medical records and tests provided, the restilts of pain status 
inventories, and the physical findings. It is assumed that tht material provided is correct. If 
more information becomes available at a later date, an additional tepurt Iffi\y be requested. 
Such information may or may not change the opinions rendered in this evaluation. 
The examiner's opinions are based upon reasonable medical probability and are totally 
independent of.the clumt. -Medicine,is_bQth,an.att and-a-seience; and-altoough an,individual-
may appear to be fit for work activity, there is no guarantee that the person will not be re-
injured or suffer additional injury. Comments on a.pptOpriatet:tss bf,c:are are professional 
opinions based upon the specifics of the case, and should not be gerldraliZed, not necessarily be 
considered supportive or critical of, the involved providers or disciplines. Arty medical 
recommendations offered are provided as guidance, and not as medical orders. 
Thank you for asking me to see this examinee in consultation. If you have any further 
questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. 
Sincoe ~ 
DaV1d C. Simon, M.D. · 
5 
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-MATTHEW R. B:ENNETT EIIBT' 
UPDATED DAMAGES SUMMARY I -PAST MEDICAL BILLS l 5~ 
Portneuf Medical Center 10/18/07 $291.00 
(Exhibit 11) 
Portneuf Medical Center 11/20/07 $631.84 
( Exhibit 27) 
Portneuf Medical Center Physical Therapy $316.00 
11/26/07 through 11/27/07 
(Exhibit 39) 
Portneuf Medical Center Physical Therapy $116.00 
12/06/07 
( Exhibit 41) 
Mountain View Family Medicine (Dr. Evan Holmstead) $191. 60 
10/30/07 and 11/29/07 
(Exhibit 55) i 
West Chiropractic (Dr. Henry West) $310.00 
04/14/08 through 04/16/08 
(Exhibit 66) 
Shopko Pharmacy Prescriptions $81.27 
10/18/07 through 04/21/08 
(Exhibit 71) 
TOTAL PAST MEDICAL (not disputed) $1,937.71 
West Chiropractic (Dr. Henry West) $168.00 
02/05/10 through 02/08/10 
(Exhibit 69) *Subsequent Treatment 
Future Medical Bills; estimated to be $20.00 a month for $2,500.00 
pa in medication for rest of life expectancy plus future 
estimated medical and chiropractic care as necessary 
TOTAL MEDICAL $4,605.71 
LOST WAGES 
Lost Wages of $2 6. 00, an hour, for the date accident for $2,600.00 
two and a half weeks at eight hours a day (100 hours) 
PAIN AND SUFFER.ING 
Pain ~nd Suffering (estimated three times bills) or $13,500.00 
Past pain and suffering of one dollar per hour for six 
months (or 12 hours x 180 days) equals $2,160.00, plus 
Pain and suffering of ten cents per hour for two years 
and discounted life expectancy of 21.20 (12 X 365 X 23.20 
X. 10) equals $10,161.60; For a total of $12,321.60 
TOTAL DAMAGES $20,537.71 
TOTAL DAMAGES WITH SUBSEQUENT TREATME?:36 $20,705.71 
• • 
MATTHEW R . llllNNIITT 
MEDICAL BILLS SUMNAAY 
M&DICAL BILLS 
Portneuf Medical Cenler 10/18/07 $291.00 
( Exhibit 11) 
Portneuf Medical Center 11/20/07 5631.,aq 
( Exhi b it 27 ) 
Portneuf Medical Center Physicol Therapy $316.00 
1 1/26/07 and 11/27 /07 
(Exhibit 39) 
Portneuf Medical Center Physic al Therapy $116.00 
12/06/07 
( Exhi bi t 41) 
Mountain View Family Medic i ne (Dr. !\van Holmstead) $191.60 
10/30/07 and 11/29/07 
< e xhibit 55 ) 
West Chiropractic (Dr. Henry West) $310.00 
04/14/08 through 04/16/08 
(1::xhibit 66) 
Shopko Pharmacy P rescriptions 522.03 
10/18/07 through 12/20/07 
(Exhibit 71) 
TOTAL MEDICAL BILLS TBR00GB NAY 2008 $1 , 878 . • 7 
West Chiropractic (Dr . Henry West) $168.00 
02/05/10 through 02/08/10 
(E xhibit 69) ~subsequent Treatment 
TOTAL MEDICAL BILLS THROUGH FEBROARY 2010 $2,046 . G7 
MATTHEW R. BENNETT 
MEDICAL BILLS SUMMARY 
MEDICAL BILLS 
Portneuf Medical Center 10/18/07 
{Exhibit 11) 
Portneuf Medical Center 11/20/07 
(Exhibit 27) 
Portneuf Medical Center Physical Therapy 
-11/26/07 and 11/27/07 
(Exhibit 39) 
Portneuf Medical Center Physical Therapy 
12/06/07 
(Exhibit 41) I 
Mountain View Family Medicine (Dr. Evan Holmstead) 
10 /30/07 and 11/29/07 
(Exhibit 55) 
West Chiropractic (Or. Henry West) 
04/14/08 through 04/16/08 
(Exhibit 66) 
Shopko Pharmacy Prescriptions 
10/18/07 through 04/21/08 
( Ex h ib i t 71 ) 
TOTAL MEDICAL BILLS THROUGH MAY 2008 
West Chiropractic (Dr. Henry West) 
02/05/10 through 02/08/10 
(Exhibit 69) *Subsequent Treatment 
TOTAL MEDICAL BILLS THROUGH FEBRUARY 2010 
ExtBT 
l ~ ~·lJ / 0 
I 1so 
$291.00 
$631.84 
$316.00 
$116.00 
$191.60 
$310.00 
$81.27 
$1,937.71 
$168.00 
$2,105.71 
0 0 l _ _________ .._---:Mll:T:T:HE=il--:R:--.--:BEliNE::=TT:--'"L...C..-7,-........ 
t-------------u_PD_ N_TED __ DAMAGE ___ s_ s_~ ___ Y ____ ~, 
-PAST MEDICAL BILLS- _ _ .,_,.,_ • .,_._ 
~--------------------""-----Portneuf Medical Center 10/18/07 
( Exhibit 11) 
Po rtneu f Medical Center 11/20/07 
(Exhibit 27) 
Portneuf Medica l Center Physical Therapy 
11/26/07 through 11/27/07 
(Exhibit 39) 
Portneuf Medical Center Physical Therapy 
12/06/07 
( Exhibit 41) 
Mountain View Family Medicine (Dr. Evan Holmstead) 
10/30/07 and 11/29/07 
(Exhibic 55) 
west Chiropractic (Dr . Henry West) 
04/lq/08 through 04/ 16/08 
(Exhibit 66) 
Shopko Pharmacy Prescriptions 
10/18/07 through 04/21/08 
(Exhibit 71 l 
TOTAL PAST MEDICAL (not disputed) 
West Chiropractic (Dr. Henry West} 
02 /05/10 t hrough 02/08/10 
(Exhibit 69) 'Subsequent Treatment 
,uture Medical Bills; estimated to be $20.00 a month for 
pain medication for rest of life expectancy plus f ut ure 
estimated medical a nd chiropractic care as necessary 
I TOTAL MEDICAL 
LOST WAGES 
Lost Wages of $26 . 00 , an hour, for the date accident for 
two and a half weeks at eight hours a day (100 hours} 
PAIN ANO SUFFERING 
?ain 4nd Suffering (estimated t hree times bi l ls) or 
Past pain and suffering o f one dollar per hour for six 
months (or 12 hours x 180 da ys) equals $2, 160 . 00, plus 
Pain and suffering of t en cents per hour for cwo years 
and discoun<ed life expectancy o f 21.20 (12 x 365 x 23.20 
x.10) equals $10 , 161.60; For a <otal of $12,321.60 
$291.00 
$631. 84 
$316.00 
$116 .00 
$191.60 
$310 . 00 
$81.27 
$1,937.71 
$168 .00 
$2,500.00 
$4 ,605.71 
$2,600.00 
$13,500.00 
TOTAL OAIQ.GES $20,537. 71 
TOTAL DAMAGES WITH SUBSEQUENT TREA~'fo',,_ ________ ,_ __ s_2_0_,_1_o_s _. 7_1_, 
BENJAMIN L. WALTON 
DAMAGES SUMMARY 
MEDICAL BILLS 
Portneuf Medical Center 10/18/07 $917.00 
(Exhibit 90) 
Primary Care Specialists (Dr. Richard Maynard) L $202.42 
10/26/07 and 11/09/07 
(Exhibit 104) 
West Chiropractic $703.00 
11/21/07 through 05/07/08 
(Exhibits 123-124) 
Idaho Medical Imaging 02/19/08 (MRI) $1,170.50 
(Exhibit 133) 
Radiology Physicians of Idaho (MRI diagnostic) $38.00 
(Exhibit 91) 
TOTAL PAST MEDICAL $3,030.92 
Future Medical Bills; estimated to be $20.00 a month for $2,500.00 
pain medication for rest of life expectancy; plus future and $3,525.00 
medical care as necessary per Dr. David Simon for: 
Physical Therapy, per session (four sessions) $ 525.00 
Muscle Relaxers, per pill {included in above estimate) 
Trigger Point Injections, per injection x 3 of $3,000.00 
TOTAL MEDICAL 
I 
$9,055.92 
LOST WAGES 
Lost Wages for one week from the date accident ($30 hr) $1,200.00 
-
PAIN AND SUFFER.ING 
Pain and Suffering {est three times medical bills) or $27,000.00 
Past pain and suffering of one dollar per hour for six 
months {or 12 hours x 180 days) equals $2,160.00 plus 
Pain and suffering of twenty cents per hour for two years 
and discounted life expectancy of 20.72 years {12 X 365 
X .20 X 22.72) $19,902.72 For a total of $22,062.72 
TOTAL $37,255.92 
I 153 
___ 540 ___ _ 
BENNETT, MA THE DOB:- DR. NRY G. WEST I JR. 
5-24-08, 
Mathew has no complaints. He feels good. He has retained his pre-traumatic status. He 
is released today with no further appointments scheduled. 
HGW 
S41 
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THE ST CLINIC • CHIROPRACTIC. ACUPUNCT\IR£ 
~TIJRALMltOICINE 
.Johnson & Olsen Chtd. 
419 We.st \Vhitnian Street 
Pocatello/ ID 83204 
May 27, 2008 
. 
ATTN: .CbwesJobnson 
RE: Mathew Bennett• 
. . 
, · Dear Mr. Johnson, 
•. 
Please find enclosed a final billing for tbe-.bove captioned. HeWllS rcie~ed.<m 5:~,t";·};, 
. 2008. He no longer has any complaints. There is no perlll811ent pa~tiali,inp~rme.n),:;lf~, j;};?.,1 
is symptomatic and lhe pain is pre-traumatic suuu,. ' · ' . \1· 
Very truly yolllll, 
Homy G. West, Jr., D.C. 
Pip[o!Jlllle, American Board of Chiropractic Orthopedists 
Diplomate. North American Academy of Impaim!eot Rating Physicians 
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IN THE DISTRICT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOC~,,;- ·,-. 
_ V,i.Jf!~ C 
... ..t~ .. 
MATHEW R. BENNETT and 
BENJAMIN L. WALTON 
vs. 
NOTICE 
OF 
LODGING 
NANCY PATRICK 
DOCKET NO. 38138-2010 
The following transcript(s) in the above-entitled appeal consisting of 
527 pages was lodged with the District Court Clerk on 
December 7th, 2010: 
1. Standard transcript of jury trial held June 2-4, 2010, including closing 
arguments. 
2. July 26, 2010 Hearing 
3. September 27, 2010 Hearing 
via: 
( x) Hand-Delivery 
( ) U.S. Mail 
DATED this 7th Day of December, 2010. 
STEPHANIE MORSE, RPR, CSR 
cc: Karel Lehrman and Klondy Loertscher--ldaho Supreme Court/Court of Appeals 
*Electronic copy of transcript sent to: Diane Cano at dianec@bannockcounty.us 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MATHEW R. BENNETT AND ) 
BENJAMIN L. WALTON, ) Supreme Court No. 38138-2010 
) 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 
) 
vs. ) CLERK'S CERTIACATE 
) 
NANCY PATRICK, ) 
) 
Defendant-Respondent, ) 
_________ ) 
I, DALE HATCH, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock, do hereby certify that the 
above and foregoing record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound 
under my direction as, and is a true, full, and correct record of the pleadings and 
documents as are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho appellate 
Rules. 
I do further certify that all exhibits, offered or admitted in the above-
entitled cause, will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along 
with the court reporter's transcript and the clerk's record as required by Rule 31 
of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
544 
IN wrrNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal 
of said Court at Pocatello, Idaho, this __ day 
(Seal) 
545 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MATHEW R. BENNETT AND ) 
BENJAMIN L. WALTON, ) Supreme Court No. 38138-2010 
) 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 
) 
vs. ) CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
) 
NANCY PATRICK, ) 
) 
Defendant-Respondent, ) 
_________ ) 
I, DALE HATCH, the duly elected, qualified and acting Clerk of the District 
Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of 
Bannock, do hereby certify that the following are the original exhibits marked for 
identification and introduced in evidence at trial of the above and foregoing 
cause, to wit: 
1. Exhibit 41 Patient Detail Statement. 
2. Exhibit 65 Low Back Examination Form (four pages). 
3. Exhibit 120 Patient Summary by Dr. Henry West. 
4. Exhibit 145 IME Report on Benjamin Walton by David C. Simon, 
M.D. 
5. Exhibit 146 IME Report on Mat Bennetiby David C. Simon, MD. 
6. Exhibit 150 Mat Bennett Medical Bills Summary. 
546 
7. Exhibit 152 Benjamin Walton Medical Bills Summary. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY that the above exhibits are attached to, and made a 
part of, the original transcript on appeal in said cause. 
II\J WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal 
(Seal) 
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STATEMENT OF 'ACCOUNT FOR ~ 
RESPO N SI BL£ 
PARTY 
FINANCIAL CLASS 
@ 
BENNETT, MATHEW 
10010 BATISTE£ RD 
POCATELLO ID 
POLICY NO. 
83202 
/ ADMlTnNC 
DATE 
DISCHARGE 
OAT£ 
CYCLE STMT. TYPE 
1 F 98 
. IJATE .... 1 · D£.SCRIPTION ·· s~rct: coiif' ·· · 1 .. QUANTITY 
12/06/07 
12/06/07 
12/06/07 
* * * * 
THERAPEUTIC EXER 1,15 M 
INTERfERENT STIM 1,15 M 
HEAT PACK 1,15 MIN 
PHYSICAL THERAPY 
1603000 
1604002 
1604030 
1 
1 
1 
.. · ' .. 
PAGE : 1 
ANY PAYMENTS OR CHARGES NOT SHOWN HERE WILL APPEAR ON A LATER STATEMENT. 
THE INSURANCE COMPANY SHARE. IF SHOWN, IS AN ESTIMATE AND IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE. 
PLEASE INCLUDE PATIENT NUMBER ON ALL CORRESPONDENCE. 
OOC NO 6000001 (07101) C) llTHO PRINl ING 
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12/06/07 
12/06/07 
PREV. STMT. DATE 
48.00 
39.00 
29.00 
116 . 00 
1 16 . 00 
.. ,. - . 
~ 
~\ l'I •' I I r l "' 
~
• ,·' l . ' . 
. . 
• • ·"£, 
. ,·."~. ......,..,..,1._ . . 
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' • ._ . I r• • • ~· 00f ' • ,.:,.., J,-. ~ 1 • , 
. . 6St.::i.iEMOIU·Ai:'. .oRivE. 
l'OCATELi.o:·1bAHO 83201 
208-239·2IOO 
STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT FOR ~ 
RLSPONSIBLE BENNETT, MATHEW 
PARTY 10010 BAT1STEE 
POCATELLO 
· ···'· -
t i -:- .", ,J' - · -~ • 
:. ~ ~ - ' 
PATIENT'S NAME ( BENNE:TT, MATHEW 
RD 
ID 83202 
rtNI\NC IAL CLASS POUCV NO. CYCLE 
@ 1 
<'·,:: r . : · _. 
i 
ADMITTING 
DATE 
DISCHARGE 
DATE 
STMT. TYPt 
F 98 
..... .,. .. 
' ( 
' . · .. . _::. 
.. 
STATEMENT DATE 
1/08/08 
PATIENT NUMBER 
3906882 
12/06/07 
12/06/07 
PREV. STMT. DATE 
' 
., 
lJATE DESCRIPTION I SERVICE. CODE QUANTITY TOTAL CIIARGES 
0420 PHYS1CAL THERAPY 3 116 . 00 
T 0 T A L - ----- --- - 116 . 00 
i'"' . • . . ' ~ 
I I l \I' ~ 
... - . ..... w,-
ANY PAYMENTS OR CHARGES NOT SHOWN HERE WILL A?PEAR ON A LATER STATEMENT. 
THE JNSURANCE C01'vlPANY SHARE. Ir SHOWN, IS AN ESTIMATE AND !S SUBJECT TO CHANCE. 
PLEA SE INCUJDI:. PATIENT i\lUMBER ON ALL CORRESPONDENCE. 
OOC NO 8000 001 (01/07) <, LI HQ PRIN ING 
.· THE c..ST CLINIC 
CHlltONACTIC, ACU1'UNCTUJ1112 
NAiT\JJIIM. M..IDCHI: 
Johnson & Oita, Chtcl. 
419 West Whillmn Suect 
Poca!cllo, ID 83204 
May 27, 2008 
• 
WQI: 
EMAJI.! 
A TIN: Charles Johnlon 
RE: Malhcw Bennett• 
Dar Mr. Johnson, 
Plcac 6nd enclosed • 1ina1 billina for the above ctj>tioocd. He was released on .S-24-
2008. He no longer bas any complaints, ThCR iJ no pcmw,cnl partial impalnncnt. Be 
is l)'tnptollllllic and the pain is prc-t.ralllllllic status. 
Very tJUly yow-,, 
Oiplmnatc, American Boan! of Chiropn,ctic Oi1hopodisu 
Diplomatc, North American Academy of Impairment lwinc Physicians 
HOW/mb 
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HENRY G. WEST JR., DC, NMD, DABCO 
JASON D. WEST, DC, NM0, OM, FIAMA 
· GRANT D. 'F!NN, DC 
NAME: 
ADDRESS: 
DATE OF BIRTH: 
SOCIAL SECURITY: 
TELEPHONE: 
OCCUPATION: 
DATE OF INJURY: 
DATE OF EXAM: 
West Clinic, PA 
1188 Call Place 
Pocatello, Jdaho 83201 
Benjamin L. Walton 
I 771 South t 1d A venue 
Pocatello, ID 8320 l 
-
Home: (208) 478-9114 
Work: (208) 406-4074 
Cell: (208) 406-4074 
Owner 
10-18-2007 
11-21-2007 
Chiropractic 
Acupuncture 
Natural Medicine 
Phone: (208) 232-3216 
Fax: (208) 232-9412 
i nfo@thewestclini c. net 
www. thewestcl inic. net 
PURPOSE OF EXAM: Benjamin Walton is complaining of neck pain. He states that 
when he raises his left arm overhead the palm of his left hand feels warm. His fingertips 
tingle on the right hand. He is complaining of low back pain. He states these symptoms 
are a result of a motor vehicle accident. 
HISTORY: On October 18, 2007, he was driving east on Center Street through a 
construction zone when his vehicle was hit broadside on the passenger side. He was 
driving a Toyota truck and was wearing a seatbelt. The truck ramped up the back wheels 
came off the ground. He stated that within 30 minutes after the accident he had neck pain 
and felt nauseated. He had an emergency room visit at Portneuf Regional Medical 
Center. X-rays were taken and Motrin 800 milligrams were presc~bed. He was told that 
he had a cervical spine strain and a lumbar spine strain. He was given a neck brace to 
wear for a week, and he was told to take it easy and no lifting. He had two office visits 
with Richard Maynard, D.0. 
It has been a month since the accident and he says there are symptoms that are staying the 
same. 
EXAMINATION: Benjamin Walton is 6' in height and weighs 1.60 pounds. He is self 
employed as a drywaller, (Walton Drywall). 
Range of motion is measured with the JTech Dualar Inclinometry System with a 
computer interface. That report is attached separately. Motor strength tests against 
resistance are 5/5 bilaterally from CS to Tl. Deep tendon reflexes, the upper extremity, 
the biceps, triceps are +2 . Passive neck flexion elicits a positive Soto hall test to the right 
side of the neck at C3-C4 level. He is right handed and the grip test with the fayrnar 
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11-21-2007, Page 2 
Hand Dynameter on the second notch is 100 pounds. He could walk on tip toes and back 
of heels. There is no aberration to deep touch to the rolling pin wheel on the upper 
extremities. Manual cervical distraction gives a feeling of relief. The cervical · 
compression and Anvil percussion tests were negative. The foraminal compression test 
was positive on the right. The shoulder depressant test was positive. Bickele's test was 
positive on the right; it replicates the tingling sensation on the right upper extremity. 
Meyer's test is negative. Spurling's test is negative. Extension and rotation did not 
provoke Nystagmus or dizziness with the performance of the Bakody's sign with the 
right hand on his shoulder, aggravated the right shoulder pain. Adson's maneuver, 
Eden's test, and Wright's test were negative for a thoracic -outlet syndrome. 
Minor's sign is positive. Sitting root test is positive on the right. Forward bending of the 
fingertips are 10 inches from the floor, extension hurts, lateral bending to the right is 
within normal limits. Lateral bending to the left is within normal limits. Extension and 
rotation of the lumbar spine to the left evokes a pain on the right low back. He can do a 
full symmetrical squat. His straight leg raise is documented by the JTech report. There is 
weakness of the right great toe on extension and weakness of the right foot on eversion 
against resistance. The bilateral leg raise is positive. There is a decreased patellar on the 
right and left knee. Passive knee flexion is unremarkable. Internal and external rotation 
of the hips is within normal limits. The bowstring's sign is negative. The range of motion 
of the cervical spine is in impaired in all planes and the range of motion of the lumbar 
spine is impaired in all planes. 
X-RAY EXAMINATION: Five views of the cervical spine were taken on 11-21-2007. 
In weight bearing the right clavicle is 2.8 centimeters inferred to that on the left. There is 
a significant left inferiority of C7. The intercostal Clavicular joint is 6 millimeters 
inferred to that on the left. The neutral lateral view shows a fairly normal lordotic curve 
of the cervical spine. The intervertebral disc spaces have been maintained. Range of 
motion is measured from the tip of the odontoids to the center of the body of C6. From 
neutral to flexion is 25/45 degrees and from neutral extension 39/45 degrees. Overlay 
technique for the evaluation of segmental displacement is a study of radiography shows 
akinesis between the occiput and atlas. Inflexion and extension there is akinesis of C2 in 
cervical extension, akinesis in C3 in cervical flexion. Akinesis of C6 in cervical flexion. 
The open mouth odontoid view is essentially normal for alignment. The other odontoid 
spaces are equal. The spinous of C2 is in the midline. 
Three views of the Lumbosacral spine were taken. There is an AP view in weight 
bearing. It is essentially normal for alignment. The neutral lateral view shows 
Hyperlordosis. A gravitational line drop to the center of 13 strikes the posterior portion 
of the sacral base right at the intervertebral framen. Normally this strikes the anterior tip 
of the sacrum. The intervertebral disc space appeared to be adequately maintained. A 
recumbent surfalic tube view at 15 degrees shows the sacroiliac joints to be clearly 
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visualized and adequately maintained. The Coxofemoral joints are adequately 
maintained. 
DIAGNOSIS: 
1. Acute traumatic side lash cervical strain/sprain 
2. Brachial radiculopathy 
3. Multi-level Intersegmental disfunction characterized by: 
A. Akinesis of the occipital lantal junction in flexion and extension 
B. Ak.inesis of C2 in cervical extension 
C. Akinesis of C3 in cervical flexion 
D. Akinesis of C6 in cervical flexion 
E. Acute lumbar tarsal strain 
F. There is a loss of range of motion of the cervical spine in all planes 
G. There is a loss oflumbar range of motion in all planes of motion 
DISCUSSION: The nature of the patient's objective complaints is substantiated by 
clinical objective findings. The nature of the patient's subjective complaints are 
consistent with the nature of the reported injury of a side impact with injury in a torque 
plane, a lateral plane and a ramping injury. 
There is a strong clinical indication of a cervical disc syndrome. There is clinical 
correlation with symptoms of a lumbar disc protrusion all related to the injury. I am 
recommending a cervical MRl and a lumbar MRI for confirmation and correlation of the 
clini~j;#-~ 
Henry G. West, Jr., D.C. 
Diplomate, American Board of Chiropractic Orthopedists 
Diplomate, North American Academy of Impairment Rating Physicians 
HGW/mb 
Enclosures 
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Dewid C. Simon, M.D. • Board Certified 
2860 Challflillg Way, Suite 213 • Idaho Falls. lo 834114 • (208) 535-4420 
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Eleckfflr1G911phy 
lndepedenl Medial 
Ewkalia (IME( 
Examinee: 
Date of Birth: 
lllllliii.ton 
Date of Injury: 10/18/2007 
Date of Examination: 02/02/2010 
Examining Physician: David C. Simon, M.D. 
Chent: Brendan Taylor 
INT~Ol>UCTION 
This 31-year-old, right-handed. male was referred for an independent medical evaluation (1MB) 
by the above client The independc:nt mcdicaJ examination procca was explained to dz 
exeminee, and he Wlderstands that no patient/treating physician relaticmsl:rip was establubed. 
Mr. Walton was advised that the information provided would not be confidential and a report 
will be sent to the requesting client. 
Mr. Walton was cooperative. The history was obtained from ·the ~ee (Who WU a fair 
historian) and from the medical records that had been provided. The information he provided 
was consistent with the medical records provided. Accompanying Mr. Walton was his btother-
in-law. A questionnaire and pain inventories were comple!ed by the examinee. Mr. Walton 
reported no new difficulties occurring during the examination. 
HISTORY 
Preexisting Status 
He reports that he had a broken arm in 1991 and then an injury to his hand in 2004. He denies 
any prior back or neck problems or any prior motor vehicle accidents before 10/18/07. 
Injury 
He reports that he was involved in a tnotor vehicle ·accident on 10/ 18/07. He was a seatbelted 
driver in a Toyota truck that was hit by another vehicle on the pa&sen8er side. He states that 
this popped his truck up in the air. He st.ates that immediately following the injury he had 
nausea plus stiffness of his neck. He states that the police and a.mbula:J'Ide came to the scene but 
he drove himself to the emergency room in his truck. 
j ~"f:J/, 145 
..,...._,-----:-r--""'T"""'.-,,} 
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Clinical History 
He was evaluated in the Portneuf Emergency Room on 10118/01. It was hbted that he had been 
in a motor vehicle accident and initially afterwards he had belpedditect ttaffic without pain 
then in about 10-15 minutes he developed increasing stifm.ess of neck and low back. X-rays of 
the lumbar spine showed ''mild straightening which could be associated with muscular spasm." 
The x-rays of the cervical spine were also notable for straightening of cervical lordosis but 
were otherwise normal. He was diagnosed with a cervical spine sttain md lumbar spine strain. 
On 10/26/07, he was evaluated by Richard Maynard, ]).d. it ·was n~~:nrat ~ had been in a 
motor vehicle accident and initially he had had lieadachea attd tlngiing in his mnds but those 
were improved. He still had pain and stiffness in his low back but his neck was improving. He 
was started on Flexeril. 
He was re-evaluated on 11/9/07. He was still feeling sore and tight but not as bad. He was 
instructed to follow up in two weeks if not entirely better. 
On 11/21/07, he sought treatment from a chiroptactor, lienry Wost. liis chief cnmplaint was 
low back pain. He also was complaining of neck: pain! and some tinaling in his fingertips of his 
right hand.. The chiropractor's.diagnoses. were." ~--~Lside la$h,~ bt:achial· · . 
radiculoneuropathy and acute lumbar torsional strain." He also felt that the clinical 
examination ''indicates a cervical disc protrusion and a lumbar disc protrusion;•. He felt that an 
MRI was indicated for confirmation. 
An MRI of the cervical spine was one on 2/19/08. This showed a I1'rinotf)OSteriot broad based 
disc bulge at C4-5 and CS-6 but no disc protrusion. There was mild revetsa1 of the nonnal 
cervical lordosis. 
Mr. Walton underwent a few treatments with the chiropractor through sn/08. 
Current Status 
He reports continued pain in his back more. than his neck. He reports the pain is intermittent 
and minor but is made worse with lifting heavy things and made better with ibuprofen. On a 
scale from O (no pain) to 10 (excruciating pain), the examinee reports the pain how is a 2. 
During the past month the pain averaged 2, with a high of 4 and a low of 0. 
He reports that he has pain and stiffness first thing in the morning ahd he tries to stretch it out. 
He gets occasional headaches in both temple areas •bout 1-2 times per month. Occasionally, 
his right hand falls asleep. 
Occupational History 
He works for his own drywall business. 
Social ffistory 
The examinee lives in Pocatello with family. He describes his typical day as "drywall finisher, 
laborer". He smokes one pack of cigarettes per day. 
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Past Medical History 
Medical: 
Surgery: 
Medication: 
Allergies: 
He denies any other chronic medical problems. 
Negative 
Ibuprofen 1000 mg twice daily 
None known 
PHYSICAL EXAMlNATION 
General Observations 
The examinee is a muscular, healthy-appearing male, 
Behavioral Observations 
The examinee was pleasant, cooperative and attentive. Affect was rtonnal. During the visit, he 
appeared comfortable. There was no significant pain behavior. There were no significant non-
phy~iologic findings noted. 
I 
• ,•'., •·J -
Cardiovascular 
There is no edema in the upper extremities. Radial pulses are 2+ bilateritlly. Skin temperature 
is nonnal. 
Gait 
Normal and non-antalgic. No assistive device is used. 
Muscoloskeletal 
The shoulders are noticeably asymmetric with the left shoulder higher than the right. There is 
no scoliosis but it appears that the asymmetry is related to the right upper trapezius muscle 
being shorter than the left There is tenderness to palpation in the right upper ttapezius muscle 
and at one point I found a trigger points that referred symptoms to the. right upper extremity. 
There is no instability of the shoulder joint. Catpal compte$$i<m test is mildly positive on the 
right side. Phalen's test is mildly positive on the tight side, Straight leg raise is negative but he 
has poor flexibility. Patrick's test is mildly positive on the right side and he is poor and 
flexibility, right more than left. No joint instability is noted. 
Range of Motion 
Cervical spine range-of-motion is notable for pain with extension mote truui ftexion. With 
spine flexion, he did report some pain in his upper lumbar md lower thoracic spine. 
Skin 
No rashes, lesions, ulcers or abnormal pigmentation is present. 
3 
Neurological 
Coordination is normal. Deep tendon reflexes are 1 + in bilateral upper extremities and 2+ in 
bilateral lower extremities. Manual muscle testing was petfonned; no focai weakness was 
appreciated. Sensation is decreased to pinprick in the right median nerve distribution. Mental 
status is grossly intact. 
PAIN STATUS lNVENT01tmS 
Pain Drawing 
The examinee completed a pain drawing, using symbols to describe sensations. This drawing 
did not reveal findings suggestive of symptom magnification. 
Short Form McGill Pain Questionnaire 
The. McGill-P~in.Qµt;s~c,mnaire. sp~ifies _ 15 p9tc;ntial pain,de~pt9fs:. Th~ ex~ee rates the , . 
intensity of each descriptor on a scale of 0 to 3. The total of all descriptors was 24. The total of 
the 11 somatic descriptors was 18, averagirtg 1.6 and the total of the 4 affecti-v-e descriptors was 
6, averaging 1.5. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Diagnoses 
1. Motor vehicle accident on 10/18/07 (nearly 2 ½ years ago). jle has mild residual symptoms 
possibly due to myofascial pain and possibly due to facet pain. He does not appear to be 
exaggerating his symptoms. These problems ate likely related to the 10/18/07 motor 
vehicle accident. This assumes that he did not have any of these problems prior to the 
motor vehicle accident. I did not have any medical records from prior to the motor -v-ehicle 
accident to verify this. 
Mr. Walton would likely benefit from some physical therapy followed by a home exercise 
program. In my opinion, this would workbetter than chiropra~tic treatment. A 
prescription muscle relaxer may also be helpfill. Trigg.er point injections could be done if 
subsequent evaluations reveal ongoing trigger points. For facet pain, facet injections or 
medial branch blocks can sometimes be dooe, however his symptoms seem to be too mild 
and too intermittent to consider this invasive procedure. 
2. Probable carpal tunnel syndrome on the right side. this would not be related to the motor 
vehicle accident but would more likely be related to his work activities. 
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Causation 
Discussed above, based upon the available infotmation1 to a reasonable degree of medical 
probability, there is causal relationship between the examinee's cu.trent neck and back 
complaints and the subject motor vehicle accident However, if any pre-existing medical 
records are found which show that he did have pti>blems prior to the accident, the issue of 
causation will need to be reconsidered. 
The above analysis is based upon the available mfoimation at this time, including the history 
given by the examinee, the medical records and tests pmvided; the testilts _of paµi status . 
inventories, and the physical findings. It is assumed that the matmial _provided is correct. H 
more information becomes available at a later date, an additional ~ may he requested. 
Such information may or may not change the opinions rendered in. this evaluation. 
The examiner's opinions are based upon reasonable medical probability and ltt'e totally 
. independent of,the cli~t. -Medicine,.is. bQth)m.att and . .-ence;.8.llCl,aJW ~~­
may appear to be fit for work activity, there is no guarantee thaf.fhe t*'8Dll will not be re-
injured or suffer additional injury. Comments on ~·ofeate are professional 
opinions based upon the specifics of the case, and should not be gen~ DO'f necessarily be 
considered supportive or critical of, the involved providers or disciplines. Airy medical 
recommendations offered are provided as guidance, and not as medical orders. 
Thank you for asking me to see this examinee in consultation. If you have any further 
::~~~ease ::n.t hesitate to contact me. 
'v't. ~ 
David C. Simon, M.D. · 
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David C. Simon, M.D. • Board Certified 
2860 Charming Way, Suite 213 • Idaho Falls, ID 8.3404 • (208) 535-4420 
;pi,!al cord injl.r'/. 
Mu.1nlos.teltl!l 
spoos meckine. 
IE/A®ICS\ 
lndepudelll llledial 
Eual.wil IIMEI 
Examinee: Mat Bennett 
Date of Birth: 
Date of Injury: 10/18/2007 
Date of Examination: 02/02/20 l 0 
Examining Physician: David C. Simon, M.D. 
Client: Brendan Taylor 
INTRODUcttON 
.i 
This 28-year-old male was referred for an independent medical evaluation (IME) by the above 
client. The independent medical examination process was explained to the cxaminee, and he 
understands that no patient/treating physician relationship was established. Mr. Bennett was 
advised that the information provided would not be confidential and a report will be sent to the 
requesting client. 
Mr. Bennett was cooperative. The history was obtained from the exaininee (who was a fair 
historian) and from the medical records that had been provided. The information he provided 
was consistent with the medical records provided. Accompanying Mr. Bennett was his brother-
in-law. A questionnaire and pain inventories were completed by the examinee. Mr. Bennett 
reported no new difficulties occurring during the examination. 
mSTOR.Y 
Preexisting Status 
He reports that he had a prior car accident in 2005. However·; he denies any problems prior to 
the 2007 accident which were similar to what he had after it. I reviewed medical records dating 
back to 1997. On 1 /1197, it was noted that he had hypothyroidism. Jn l g9g, it was noted that 
he had anxiety and was on Adderal. None of the pre-existing records reveal any prior back 
problems. 
Injury 
He was involved in a motor vehicle accident on 10/18/07. He states that he was sitting in the 
passenger seat and another vehicle hit his vehicle on the passenger side slightly behind where 
he was sitting. He states that his head hit the window and he wss jostled around. Following 
the accident, he had pain and stiffness in his lower to r:niddle back. 
Clinical History 
On 10/18/07, he was evaluated at the PortneufEmergency Room.. He was complaining oflow 
back pain. At one point, he reported that his neck felt tight but following that he indicated that 
he had no neck pain. He was diagnosed with a lumbar back strain. 
On 10/30/07, he was evaluated by Evan Holmstead, M.D. It was noted that he had.just run out 
of his Vicodin that the E.R. had given him and the pain was bothersome. On examination, 
there was paraspinal muscle spasm. There were no radiating symptoms. He was prescribed 
Vicodin and Skelaxin. 
On 11/20/07, he returned to the emergency room complaining of right lower back pain. X-rays 
of the lumbar spine were normal. He was diagnosed with "Acute and chtoruc musculoskeletal 
low back pain with history of motor vehicle collision". He was referred to physical therapy. 
Physical therapy started on 11/26/07. He was complaining of right lumbar and gluteal pain. 
He went through five physical therapy treatments through 12/13/07 at which time it was noted 
that he had decreased symptoms and he was improving slowly. 
,He was re-evaluatedbyI)r. Holmsteaq·on 1 l/29/07 .. It was Q.O,ted-~the Wis-there for-baak · 
pain and he had injured it one week prior from just bending over. It was also noted that he had 
been doing cement work and had been unable to work for the last week. It was noted that if his 
low back pain continued, Dr. Holmstead would consider doing an MRI. 
On 4/16/08, he was evaluated by a chiropractor, Henry West. It was noted that he had been 
. The chiropractor's diagnosis was "Low back pain 
secondary to lumbar strain from a motor vehicle accident. 
On 5/24/08, the chiropractor wrote a note indicating that Mr. Bennett had no complaints and he 
felt good and he had "retained his pre-traumatic status." He was released from care. 
Current Status 
He reports occasional pain in his lower back that he describes as "increasingly better". He 
states that the pain will get worse after he does a lot of lifting and it is made better by stretching 
or Tylenol.. He occasionally gets pain into his right posterior thigh. On a scale from O (no 
pain) to 10 (excruciating pain), the examinee reports the pain now is a 0. During the past 
month the pain averaged 1, with a high of 3 and a low of 0. 
Occupational History 
At the time of the injury he had been doing drywall work. He states that he is not working 
now. 
Social History 
The examinee lives in Pocatello with his wife and 2 kids. He describes his typical day as 
"cleaning house, caring for kids." He smokes ½ pack of cigarettes per day. 
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Past Medical ffistory 
Medical: 
Surgery: 
Medication: 
Allergies: 
ADHD. 
Otherwise unremarkable. 
Ibuprofen or Tylenol 2-3 times per week 
None known 
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION 
General Observations 
The examinee is a mildly overweight but otherwise generally healthy-appearing male. 
Behavioral Observations 
The examinee was pleasant, cooperative and attentive. Affect was nontlal. During the visit, he 
appeared comfortable. There was no significant pain belu).viQr. There, were JlO. signiij.c;~t nQn:: 
physiologic findings noted. · 
Gait 
Nonnal and non-antalgic. No assistive device is used. 
Musculoskeletal 
No gross deformities are noted. The shoulders and pelvis are level; there is no scoliosis. There 
is no muscle atrophy or asymmetry noted. There is tenderness to palpation over the right 
sacroiliac area and possibly over the facet joints. There is no muscle spasm. Straight leg raise 
is negative. Patrick's test is positive on the right side. 
Range of Motion 
Lumbar spine range-of-motion is within normal li:mits; however, he reports pain with 
extension. 
Skin 
No rashes, lesions, ulcers or abnormal pigmentation is present. 
Neurological 
Coordination is normal. Deep tendon reflexes are 2+ in bilateral upper and lower extremities. 
Manual muscle testing was performed; no focal weakness was appreciated. Mental status is 
grossly intact. 
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PAIN STATUS INVENTORIES 
Pain Drawing 
The examinee completed a pain drawing, using symhols to describe sensatiorts. This drawing 
did not reveal findings suggestive of symptom magnification. 
Short Form McGill Pain Questionnaire 
The McGill Pain Questionnaire specifies 15 potential pain descriptors. the examinee rates the 
intensity of each descriptor on a scale of O to 3. the total of all descriptors was 1. The total of 
the 11 somatic descriptors was 1, averaging 0.1. The total of the 4 affective descriptors was 0. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Diagnoses 
1. Mild lumbar strain/sacroiliac sprain injury following a motor vehicle accident on 10/18/07. 
2. Work-related low back injury in November 2007. 
Discussion 
Mr. Bennett likely had a mild strain injury following the motor vehicle accident This may 
have predisposed him to the subsequent incident at work. However, x-rays were negative even 
after the second injury. His treating physician, Dr. Holmstead, did not £ind i1ny evidence of 
nerve impingement or radicular symptoms. By 5/24/08, his sytnpfufus were resolved and the 
chiropractor felt that he had retained his pre-traumatic status. The treatment that he had prior to 
5/24/08 was reasonable and necessary as related to the motor vehicle accident. 
Mr. Bennett reports occasional discomfort in his low back. It is possible that this is residual 
from the motor vehicle accident. However, occasional back discomfort is fairly common and 
he could have had a subsequent injury or it could be related to daily activities. Either way, 
occasional discomfort would not require any further medical care. 
Causation 
Based upon the available information, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, there was 
causal relationship between the examinee's initial low back complaints and the 10/18/07 motor 
vehicle accident. 
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Maximum Medical Improvement 
With regard to the 10/18/07 motor vehicle accident, the examinee has achieved maximum 
medical improvement. MMI is defined as the date after which further recovery a.nd restoration 
of function can no longer be anticipated, based upon a reasonable degree of medical 
probability. He likely reached MMI status by 5/24/08. 
Recommendations 
Diagnostic/Consultation 
With regard to the 10/18/07 motor vehicle accident,no further diagnostic testing or 
consultation is indicated. 
Therapeutic 
With regard to the I 0/18/07 motor vehicle accident, no further therapeutic intervention 
or consultation is indicated. 
The above analysis is based upon the available infonnation at this time, incl11ding the history 
given by the examinee, the medical records and tests provided, the results of pain status 
inventories, and the physical findings. It is assumed that the material provided is correct. If 
more information becomes available at a later date, an additional report may be requested. 
Such information may or may not change the opinions rendered in this evaluation. 
The examiner's opinions are based upon reasonable medical probability and are totally 
independent of the client. Medicine is both an art and a science, and although an individual 
may appear to be fit for work activity, there is no guarantee trust the person will not be re~ 
injured or suffer additional injury. Comments on appropriateness of care ate professional 
opinions based upon the specifics of the case, and should not be generalized, nor necessarily be 
considered supportive or critical of, the involved providers or disciplines. Any medical 
recommendations offered are provided as guidance, and not as medical orders. 
Thank you for asking me to see this examinee in consultation. If you have any further 
questions, please d ot hesitate to contact me. 
Sinlv 
D~Simon,M. 
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MATTHEW R. BENNETT 
MEDICAL BILLS SUMMARY 
MEDICAL BILLS 
Portneuf Medical Center 10/18/07 $291.00 
(Exhibit 11) 
Portneuf Medical Center 11/20/07 $631.84 
( Exhibit 27) 
Portneuf Medical Center Physical Therapy $316.00 
11/26/07 and 11/27/07 
(Exhibit 39) 
Portneuf Medical Center Physical Therapy $116.00 
12/06/07 
(Exhibit 41) I 
Mountain View Family Medicine (Dr. Evan Holmstead) $191.60 
10/30/07 and 11/29/07 
(Exhibit 55) 
West Chiropractic (Dr. Henry West) $310.00 
04/14/08 through 04/16/08 
(Exhibit 66) 
Shopko Pharmacy Prescriptions $81.27 
10/18/07 through 04/21/08 
(Exhibit 71) 
TOTAL MEDICAL BILLS THROUGH MAY 2008 $1,937.71 
West Chiropractic (Or. Henry West) $168.00 
02/05/10 through 02/08/10 -
(Exhibit 69) *Subsequent Treatment 
TOTAL MEDICAL BILLS THROUGH FEBRUARY 2010 $2,105.71 
EXIEIT } *tu.I (q"l./1" I ,so 
BENJAMIN L. WALTON 
MEDICAL BILLS SUMMARY 
MEDICAL BILLS 
Portneuf Medical Center 10/18/07 $917.00 
(Exhibit 90) 
Primary Care Specialists (Dr. Richard Maynard) $202.42 
10/26/07 and 11/09/07 
(Exhibit 104) 
West Chiropractic $703.00 
ll/21/07 through 05/07/08 
(Exhibits 123-124) 
Idaho Medicalj Imaging 02/19/08 (MRI) $1,170.50 
(Exhibit 133) 
-
Radiology Physicians of Idaho (MRI diagnostic) $38.00 
(Exhibit 91 ) 
TOTAL MEDICAL BILLS $3,030.92 
EXHIBJT 
I ~ "'/2./10 1 i;? 
,II 'ili'i 
II\J THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MATHEW R. BENNETT AND 
BENJAMIN L. WALTON, 
Plaintiffs - Appellants, 
vs. 
NANCY PATRICK, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Supreme Court No. 38138-2010 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Defendant - Respondent, ) 
_________ ) 
I, DALE HATCH, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock, do hereby certify that I 
have personally served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT and CLERK'S RECORD to each of the Attorneys of 
Record in this cause as follows: 
Charles Johnson 
JOHNSON OLSON CHARTERED 
Post Office Box 1725 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1725 
Brendon C. Taylor 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
Post Office Box 991 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal 
of said Court at Pocatello, Idaho, this __ day of · .. _ · . · 
(Seal) 
Deputy Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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